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Overview 
Almost 700,000 people are released from state prisons each year. Ex-prisoners face daunting obstacles 
to successful reentry into society, and rates of recidivism are high. Most experts believe that stable 
employment is critical to a successful transition, but ex-prisoners have great difficulty finding steady 
work.  
This report presents interim results from a rigorous evaluation of the New York City-based Center for 
Employment Opportunities (CEO), a highly regarded employment program for ex-prisoners. CEO 
participants are placed in paid transitional jobs shortly after enrollment; they are supervised by CEO 
staff and receive a range of supports. Once they show good performance in the transitional job, 
participants get help finding a permanent job and additional support after placement. 
CEO is one of four sites in the Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration and 
Evaluation Project, which is sponsored by the Administration for Children and Families and the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation in the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), with additional funding from the U.S. Department of Labor. The project is being 
conducted under contract to HHS by MDRC, a nonprofit research organization, along with the Urban 
Institute and other partners. 
The impacts of CEO’s program are being assessed using a rigorous research design. In 2004-2005, a 
total of 977 ex-prisoners who reported to CEO were assigned, at random, to a program group that was 
eligible for all of CEO’s services or to a control group that received basic job search assistance. So far, 
the two groups have been followed for two years after study entry.  
Key Findings 
• CEO’s program operated smoothly during the study period, and most program group 
members received the core services. More than 70 percent of the program group worked in a 
transitional job; the average length of that employment was about eight weeks.  
• CEO generated a large but short-lived increase in employment; the increase was driven by 
CEO’s transitional jobs. By the end of the first year of the study period, the program and control 
groups were equally likely to be employed, and their earnings were similar.  
• CEO reduced recidivism during both the first and the second year of the study period. The 
program group was significantly less likely than the control group to be convicted of a crime, to 
be admitted to prison for a new conviction, or to be incarcerated for any reason in prison or jail 
during the first two years of the study period. In Year 1, CEO reduced recidivism only for those 
who came to the program within three months after their release from prison; in Year 2, however, 
the program reduced recidivism both for recently released study participants and for those who 
were not recently released at study entry. 
The study will follow the two groups for a third year, but the results so far show that CEO’s program 
reduced recidivism, even after the employment gains faded. Decreases in recidivism have rarely been 
found in rigorous evaluations. Further research is needed to identify approaches that can produce more 
sustained increases in employment and earnings for ex-prisoners. 
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Executive Summary 
This report presents interim results from a rigorous evaluation of the Center for Em-
ployment Opportunities (CEO), one of the nation’s largest and most highly regarded employ-
ment programs for former prisoners. CEO is one of four sites in the Enhanced Services for the 
Hard-to-Employ Demonstration and Evaluation Project, which is testing innovative employ-
ment strategies for groups facing serious obstacles to steady work. The Hard-to-Employ project 
is sponsored by the Administration for Children and Families and the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with 
additional funding from the U.S. Department of Labor. It is being conducted under contract to 
HHS by MDRC, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization, along with the Urban Institute 
and other partners. 
The Policy Context: Prisoner Reentry and Transitional Work 
The number of people incarcerated in the United States has increased more than four-
fold since the 1970s. Today, more than 2 million people are incarcerated in federal and state 
prisons and local jails, and almost 700,000 people are released from state prisons each year. 
Corrections costs exceed $65 billion per year, with most of this total being borne by state and 
local governments. 
Ex-prisoners face daunting obstacles to successful reentry — for example, difficulties 
finding jobs, housing, and services for substance abuse or mental health problems — and rates 
of recidivism are very high. The most recent national statistics show that two-thirds of ex-
prisoners are rearrested and that half are reincarcerated within three years of release.  
Most experts believe that stable employment is critical to a successful transition into the 
community, but ex-prisoners tend to have characteristics that make them hard to employ — for 
example, low levels of education and little previous work experience. Moreover, there is strong 
evidence that incarceration further hinders their employability. Ex-prisoners are legally barred 
from working in certain occupations, and many employers are reluctant to hire people with 
criminal records.  
Very little is known about effective employment strategies for ex-prisoners, but many 
people see transitional jobs as a promising model. Transitional job programs rapidly place 
participants into temporary, paid jobs, usually in nonprofit or government agencies; provide 
various kinds of support; and then help participants find permanent jobs. When targeted to ex-
prisoners, transitional jobs give participants a source of legitimate income during the critical 
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period after release from prison, and they also provide staff with an opportunity to identify and 
address workplace problems before participants move to the regular labor market. 
The Center for Employment Opportunities 
The Center for Employment Opportunities was created by the Vera Institute of Justice 
in the 1970s to provide immediate, paid work to individuals returning to New York City after 
being released from prison. CEO became an independent nonprofit organization in 1996 and 
currently serves about 2,000 parolees each year.  
Paid, temporary employment still forms the core of CEO’s model. Individuals who are 
referred to CEO by their parole officer are placed in paid jobs immediately after completing a 
four-day preemployment class that teaches job readiness skills. Participants work in crews, 
performing maintenance and repair work for city and state agencies at several dozen sites 
around New York City. They report to CEO work site supervisors.  
Participants generally work four days a week and are paid the minimum wage ($7.25 
per hour in New York State as of July 24, 2009, but it ranged from $5.15 to $6.00 per hour 
during the study period); they receive paychecks each afternoon, at their work sites. The fifth 
day of each week is spent in CEO’s office in lower Manhattan, where participants meet with 
CEO staff and take part in supplementary activities, such as an extensive fatherhood program 
that helps them resolve child support issues and improve their family relationships. 
Participants are continuously evaluated by their work site supervisors, and both supervi-
sors and office-based job coaches (employment-focused case managers) seek to identify and 
address workplace problems. Once participants have demonstrated good performance on the 
job, they are deemed “job ready” and begin working with a job developer to find permanent 
employment. CEO continues to provide support for up to one year after placement. 
The CEO Evaluation 
The impacts of CEO’s program are being assessed using random assignment, which is 
generally considered the most reliable research design for evaluations of this type. Between 
January 2004 and October 2005, a total of 977 ex-prisoners who were referred to CEO by their 
parole officer, who reported to the program, and who met the study’s eligibility criteria were 
randomly assigned to one of two groups:1
                                                 
1The MDRC team worked with CEO and the New York State Division of Parole to design a random as-
signment process that ensured that the study did not decrease the number of people who received transitional 
 
(continued) 
ES-3 
• Program group (total = 568). Individuals who were randomly assigned to 
this group were eligible for all of CEO’s program services, including the 
four-day preemployment class, placement in a transitional job, job coaching, 
additional services (such as the fatherhood program), job development ser-
vices, and postplacement services. 
• Control group (total = 409). Individuals who were randomly assigned to 
this group started with a condensed version of the preemployment class that 
lasted one and a half days and then were given access to a resource room that 
includes computers (with job search software), phones, voice mail, a printer, 
a fax machine, and other job search tools. When clients came into the re-
source room, a staff person was available to assist them with many aspects of 
job search. 
The research team is tracking both groups for three years using administrative records 
and a survey of participants. Any significant differences between the groups that emerge over 
time are described as “impacts,” or “effects,” of CEO because, owing to the random assignment 
design, one can be confident that the groups were comparable when they entered the study. 
Three points about the design are critical. First, in designing the study, the MDRC team, 
CEO, and the funders decided to offer basic job search assistance to the control group, rather 
than denying them CEO services altogether. This decision was made in part for ethical reasons 
but also because the study sought to isolate and test the impacts of the core elements of CEO’s 
model — transitional jobs with job coaching and assistance from CEO job developers — rather 
than assessing whether CEO was more effective than other programs with similar services that 
control group members might find if they were sent away. Nevertheless, as discussed further 
below, control group (and program group) members were free to seek out other services in the 
community, and many did so. 
Second, the individuals who were targeted for the study — parolees who were referred 
to CEO by their parole officer — represent a subset of the parolees that CEO serves. For 
example, everyone who graduates from New York State’s Shock Incarceration (boot camp) 
program and returns to New York City is required to participate in CEO’s program. For 
contractual reasons, boot camp graduates and participants in some other special programs were 
not included in the study. CEO provides very similar services to all these groups of parolees. 
                                                 
job slots and that ensured that CEO had enough participants to fill its contractual obligations to the sponsors of 
transitional job work sites. Random assignment was conducted only during weeks when the number of new 
enrollees exceeded the number of available slots at transitional job work sites. 
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Third, during the study period, CEO engaged in a large-scale program review and busi-
ness planning process sponsored by a private foundation. This process resulted in several 
program enhancements, particularly in the assistance provided to participants after they had 
been placed in jobs. Because these changes were phased in during the study period, they did not 
affect many of the study participants. Thus, the results might be different if the study were 
conducted today and all participants received the enhanced services. 
Characteristics of the Study Participants 
The vast majority of sample members are male, and almost all are black or Hispanic. 
Fifty-seven percent were over 30 years old when they entered the study. About half of the study 
sample had at least one child under age 18, although only 16 percent lived with any of their 
children. Just over half the sample had a high school diploma or a General Educational Devel-
opment (GED) certificate, and most had at least some employment history. More than 80 
percent reported that they had worked, and about 61 percent reported that they had worked for a 
single employer for six consecutive months. 
Study participants had been arrested an average of eight times and had been convicted 
an average of seven times. More than half had been convicted of a violent offense, and nearly 
three-quarters of the sample had prior drug offense convictions. On average, sample members 
had spent five years in state prison over their lifetime. 
Interestingly, only 41 percent of the study sample came to CEO within three months af-
ter release from prison. This is not typical of the full CEO population, about three-fourths of 
whom come to the program either immediately on release or shortly thereafter. For example, 
those excluded from the study — boot camp graduates and participants in some other special 
programs — always come to CEO just after release. Those in the study sample came to CEO 
after referral by a parole officer who is not involved with special programs. These officers base 
their referral decisions on many factors. For instance, some parole officers may have referred 
parolees to CEO after they had worked for a time and then lost a job.  
Program Implementation and Service Receipt 
The study assessed CEO’s implementation using site visits to the program and its work 
sites, interviews with staff and participants, and data from CEO’s management information 
system. 
• CEO’s program operated smoothly during the study period, and most 
program group members received the core services. 
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CEO is a well-managed program that largely operates as designed. Program tracking 
and payroll data show that almost 80 percent of the program group completed the initial four-
day preemployment class and that more than 70 percent worked in a transitional job. The 
average length of transitional employment was about eight weeks. The large majority of 
program group members who worked in a transitional job also met with CEO job coaches and 
job developers. About 40 percent of those who worked in a transitional job (30 percent of the 
full program group) were placed into permanent jobs, according to CEO’s records.  
• The program group was more likely than the control group to receive 
several kinds of employment services, but many control group members 
got help at CEO or elsewhere; some control group members worked in 
transitional jobs at other organizations.  
As noted earlier, two critical elements of the CEO model were generally available to the 
program group but not to the control group: (1) transitional jobs and associated job coaching 
and (2) assistance from CEO job developers. However, control group members could receive 
other kinds of employment help from CEO. Moreover, it was expected that sample members 
from both groups might seek out assistance from other organizations in the community. Thus, 
one would not necessarily expect to see large differences between groups in the receipt of 
certain kinds of employment services. 
The client survey, which was administered to 531 sample members an average of 20 
months after study entry, included many questions about the services that sample members 
received through CEO or other organizations. Not surprisingly, the program group was substan-
tially more likely to receive some kinds of employment help, such as referrals to specific job 
openings — the kind of help provided by CEO job developers (32 percent of the program group 
and 19 percent of the control group reported receiving such a referral). In other areas, however, 
such as receiving advice about job interviews or help with résumés, the differences between 
groups were much smaller because many control group members received these services from 
CEO or another organization. Although very few control group members worked in a transi-
tional job at CEO, some worked in similar jobs at other organizations. It is difficult to determine 
precisely how many control group members worked in such jobs, however, because survey 
responses on this topic do not appear to be accurate. 
Impacts on Employment and Earnings 
CEO’s impacts on employment and earnings were assessed using data from the New 
York State Department of Labor and the National Directory of New Hires — both of which 
track quarterly earnings in jobs covered by unemployment insurance (UI) — as well as data 
from the client survey.  
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• CEO generated a large but short-lived increase in UI-covered employ-
ment; the increase was driven by access to CEO transitional jobs.  
Figure ES.1 shows the percentage of program and control group members who worked 
in UI-covered jobs in each quarter during the two-year follow-up period. (CEO’s transitional 
jobs are covered by unemployment insurance and thus are counted as employment.) During the 
first quarter after study entry, the difference between groups was very large: 66 percent of the 
program group worked, compared with 26 percent of the control group. By the fourth quarter, 
however, after most program group members had left the CEO transitional jobs, the difference 
between groups was no longer statistically significant. There were few statistically significant 
differences in earnings, or in job characteristics as measured by the client survey.  
Impacts on Recidivism 
CEO’s impacts on recidivism were measured using data from the New York State Divi-
sion of Criminal Justice Services and the New York City Department of Correction. These data 
show all arrests and convictions in New York State plus admissions to both New York State 
prisons and New York City jails.  
• CEO reduced recidivism during both the first and the second year of the 
study period; different measures of recidivism were affected in each 
year.  
As shown in Table ES.1, over the full two-year follow-up period, the program group 
was significantly less likely than the control group to be convicted of a crime, to be admitted to 
state prison for a new crime conviction, and to be incarcerated for any reason in prison or jail. 
These findings are noteworthy, as impacts on recidivism have rarely been found in rigorous 
evaluations of programs for ex-prisoners. 
Although CEO’s employment impacts faded in Year 1, there were reductions in reci-
divism in both Year 1 and Year 2. The pattern of results is complex, however, and different 
measures of recidivism were affected in each year. For example, there was a reduction in arrests 
in Year 2 but not in Year 1, and there was a reduction in felony convictions in Year 1 but not in 
Year 2. (These results are not shown in the table.)  
• CEO reduced recidivism both for sample members who enrolled in the 
study shortly after leaving prison and for those who were not recently 
released at study entry. 
An earlier report from this study shows that, in Year 1 of the study period, CEO pro-
duced large decreases in key recidivism measures for individuals who entered the study within 
three months after release from prison but that it had no impacts on recidivism for those who  
 The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Figure ES.1
Quarterly Impacts on Employment
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SOURCES: MDRC calculations from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) database and 
unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New York State.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between 
research groups for the corresponding variable.
The sample size is 973. Four sample members are missing Social Security numbers and therefore could not 
be matched to UI data.
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The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table ES.1
 Two-Year Impacts on Recidivism
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Arresteda (%) 37.7 41.8 -4.1 0.192
Convicted of a crimeb (%) 30.5 38.3 -7.7 ** 0.011
Convicted of a felony 6.6 7.7 -1.1 0.536
Convicted of a misdemeanor 22.8 29.4 -6.6 ** 0.019
Convicted of a violent crimec (%) 4.4 5.8 -1.5 0.309
Incarceratedd (%) 49.5 55.4 -5.9 * 0.064
Prison 25.3 27.7 -2.4 0.399
Jail 49.1 53.5 -4.4 0.168
Incarcerated for a new crime (%) 13.9 16.9 -2.9 0.212
Prison 4.2 6.8 -2.6 * 0.077
Jail 10.1 10.8 -0.7 0.718
Incarcerated for a technical parole violation (%) 31.8 28.9 2.9 0.340
Prison 17.4 15.5 1.9 0.428
Jail 29.1 25.6 3.5 0.234
Total days incarcerated 100 107 -7 0.500
Prison 46 54 -8 0.244
Jail 54 53 1 0.828
Arrested, convicted, or incarcerated (%) 55.7 62.5 -6.8 ** 0.032
Status in the last quarter of Year 2e (%)
Incarcerated and employed 3.5 1.9 1.6 0.135
Incarcerated and not employed 21.4 25.0 -3.7 0.177
Not incarcerated and employed 29.3 26.9 2.4 0.404
Not incarcerated and not employed 45.9 46.3 -0.4 0.911
Sample size (total = 977) 568 409
(continued)
                
        
                 
 
                    
               
   
                      
         
                 
         
                
             
 
                   
               
     
                  
        
                  
              
        
             
              
             
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice 
Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of Correction (DOC).
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entered the study further from the point of release.1
Program Costs 
 As shown in Table ES.2, this pattern was 
much less clear in Year 2. For example, among those who entered the study more than three 
months after release, CEO reduced felony convictions and incarceration for new crimes in Year 
2. At the same time, decreases in recidivism were not as consistent in Year 2 for the recently 
released sample members; for example, although there was a statistically significant decrease in 
violent crime convictions, there was a significant increase in felony convictions.  
Using fiscal and program tracking data from CEO and survey data on service receipt, 
the study estimated the net cost per program group member — that is, the cost of CEO services 
over and above the cost of services received by the control group.  
• The cost of all employment and training services was $3,200 more per 
program group member than the cost of services for the average control 
group member. 
The gross cost of the CEO program was estimated to be about $4,263 per program 
group member, which includes nearly $1,000 in direct payments to participants. More than half  
                                                 
1Dan Bloom, Cindy Redcross, Janine Zweig, and Gilda Azurdia, “Transitional Jobs for Ex-Prisoners: Ear-
ly Impacts from a Random Assignment Evaluation of the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) 
Prisoner Reentry Program” (New York: MDRC, 2007). 
SOURCE:  MDRC calculations using data from the New York State (NYS) Division of Criminal Justice 
Services (DCJS) and New York City Department of Correction (DOC).
NOTES:  Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level 
indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups 
for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is only counted as a single event.  If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, 
only the most serious charge is recorded in the analysis.
bA total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random 
assignment. Total includes convictions for "other" reasons, felony and misdemeanor crimes.
cViolent crimes as based on conviction charges defined by Langan, Patrick A., and David J. Levin. 2002. 
Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994. Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report NCJ 193427. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. See appendix B.1 for charges defined 
as violent
dIncludes all reasons for incarceration such as sentences for new crimes, technical violations of parolem 
detainee (jail) and other reasons. Therefore incarcerations for new crimes and parole violations do not sum to 
N TES: Results in this table are wei hted by week of rand m assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level dicates the probability that on  would incorrectly conclude that a differenc  exists between 
re earch groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date i counted only  a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same dat , 
only th  most serious charge is recorded in the analysis.
bThe total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random 
assignment. These convictions ar  counted in the a alysis as occurring after andom assignment.The total 
includes convictions for "other" reasons, felonies, and misdemeanor crimes.
cViolent crimes are based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners 
Released in 1994, Special Report NCJ 193427 (Washington, DC: U.S. Departme t of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002). See Appen ix C for charges defined as violent.
dIncludes all easons for incarceration, such as sentences for new crim s, technical violations of parole, 
detainee (jail), and other re sons. Therefore, incarcerations for new cri es and arole violations do not sum to 
the percentage incarcerated. See Appendix Table C.1 for more details about reasons for incarceration.
e arc ration statu based on Quarter 8 after random assignment. Incarceration includes both prison and 
jail.
 Less Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Value H-Starsa
Arrestedb (%)
 Year 1 20.8 24.2 -3.4 0.429 24.0 22.1 1.9 0.612
Year 2 25.8 33.7 -7.8 0.109 20.0 24.5 -4.5 0.222
Convicted of a felony (%)
Year 1 1.4 4.8 -3.4 * 0.051 1.3 2.3 -1.1 0.366
 Year 2 11.3 4.2 7.1 ** 0.020 1.6 4.5 -2.9 ** 0.048 ***
Convicted of a misdemeanor (%)
Year 1 9.5 11.9 -2.4 0.461 14.2 12.5 1.7 0.578
Year 2 13.2 25.5 -12.3 *** 0.003 16.3 19.9 -3.7 0.280
Convicted of a violent crimec (%)
Year 1 2.5 1.3 1.2 0.432 1.6 1.5 0.1 0.937
Year 2 1.7 7.0 -5.3 ** 0.015 3.0 2.9 0.1 0.951 **
Admitted to state prison (%)
Year 1 9.4 19.5 -10.1 *** 0.005 12.8 11.6 1.3 0.658 **
Year 2 21.1 19.0 2.2 0.616 15.8 16.4 -0.6 0.846
Incarcerated in prison for a new crime (%)
Year 1 0.5 4.9 -4.4 *** 0.005 1.1 2.1 -1.0 0.365 *
Year 2 6.6 3.2 3.4 0.164 1.4 4.2 -2.8 * 0.051 **
Incarcerated in prison for a technical parole violation (%)
Year 1 7.2 12.1 -4.9 0.119 9.1 8.6 0.5 0.840
Year 2 12.7 11.3 1.5 0.681 11.7 7.8 3.9 0.124
(continued)
More Than 3 Months
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table ES.2
Impacts on Selected Measures of Recidivism in Year 1 and Year 2, 
Center for Employment Opportunities
Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
by Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
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Less Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Value H-Starsd
Total days incarcerated in prison
Year 1 10 20 -10 ** 0.036 14 9 4 0.184 **
Year 2 41 56 -15 0.132 33 31 2 0.793
Sample size (total = 929)d 225 160 311 233
Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
More Than 3 Months
Table ES.2 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of 
Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts between 
the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
are interpreted.
bEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, only the most serious charge is recorded in the 
analysis.
cViolent crimes are based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, Special Report NCJ 193427 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002). See Appendix C for charges defined as violent.
dA total of 48 sample members are missing the last prison release date and are therefore missing from all outcomes in this table.
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of this total stemmed from costs associated with the transitional jobs and wages paid to partici-
pants. When the total cost of all services received by the control group — both in and out of 
CEO — is subtracted from the total cost of all services received by the program group, the net 
cost is $3,195 per person. Although the study does not include a formal benefit-cost analysis, 
CEO is already producing offsetting budgetary savings by reducing recidivism. For example, 
CEO reduced the number of days in prison, and given the high expenditures by government 
agencies on incarceration, any reduction in prison days could translate into substantial cost 
savings. 
Conclusions and Implications 
Although the prisoner reentry issue has attracted considerable attention in recent years, 
there is very little evidence about which programmatic strategies are effective in reducing 
recidivism and promoting successful transitions from prison to the community. CEO is one of 
the only major programs for ex-prisoners that has been subject to a rigorous evaluation using a 
random assignment design, so this evaluation is providing much-needed evidence to inform the 
field.  
So far, the results are mixed. On the one hand, CEO reduced several key measures of 
recidivism. This is a noteworthy result, since few programs have been found in rigorous studies 
to decrease recidivism. On the other hand, while CEO’s transitional jobs generated a very large 
increase in formal employment in the early months of the study period — suggesting that 
subsidized jobs may be necessary to substantially increase employment for ex-prisoners — 
there is no evidence that the program increased employment or earnings in the long term. 
Interestingly, the recidivism impacts continued even after the employment impacts faded.  
The study will continue to track employment and recidivism outcomes for another year, 
but some preliminary conclusions are possible at this point. First, the results suggest that while 
there is a link between employment and recidivism, this connection is not straightforward. In 
Year 1, CEO increased employment for both recently released and not recently released sample 
members, but it reduced recidivism only for those who were recently released. In Year 2, CEO 
generated reductions in recidivism for both groups, even though the employment impacts had 
long since faded. Future analyses will seek to understand more about how CEO produced 
impacts on recidivism — for example, by investigating the links among outcomes, individual 
characteristics, and CEO participation patterns for program group members.  
Second, while the results suggest that subsidized jobs may be needed to substantially 
boost employment for ex-prisoners, they also suggest that short-term transitional jobs do not 
necessarily lead to long-term increases in unsubsidized employment. It is notable that less than 
half of the program group members who worked in a CEO transitional job were placed in 
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permanent employment. Given the sharp drop in the program group’s employment rate over 
time, it may be worth considering models that offer subsidized jobs over a longer period, use 
earnings supplements to encourage sustained employment in low-paying unsubsidized jobs, 
provide training to try to raise ex-prisoners’ skill levels so that they can qualify for high-paying 
jobs, or take other approaches.  
1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This report presents interim results from a rigorous evaluation of the New York City-
based Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO), one the nation’s largest and most highly 
regarded employment programs for former prisoners. CEO is one of four sites in the Enhanced 
Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration and Evaluation Project, which is testing 
innovative employment strategies for groups facing serious obstacles to steady work. The Hard-
to-Employ project is sponsored by the Administration for Children and Families and the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation in the U.S. Department and Health and Human 
Services (HHS), with additional funding from the U.S. Department of Labor. It is being 
conducted under contract to HHS by MDRC, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization, 
along with the Urban Institute and other partners. 
Prisoner Reentry and Transitional Work 
The number of people incarcerated in the United States has increased more than four-
fold since the 1970s.1 Today, more than 2 million people are incarcerated in federal and state 
prisons and local jails, and almost 700,000 people are released from state prisons each year. 
Corrections costs exceed $65 billion per year, with most of this total being borne by state and 
local governments.2
Ex-prisoners face daunting obstacles to successful reentry — for example, difficulties 
finding jobs, housing, and services for substance abuse or mental health problems. Moreover, 
they are concentrated in a relatively small number of urban neighborhoods that also experience 
high rates of poverty and other social problems. Not surprisingly, rates of recidivism are very 
high. The most recent national statistics show that two-thirds of ex-prisoners are rearrested and 
that half are reincarcerated within three years of release.
 
3
                                                 
1On a per capita basis, the number of people in prison in the United States remained roughly constant — 
about 110 per 100,000 residents — from the 1920s to the 1970s. By 2004, there were 484 prisoners per 
100,000 residents (Raphael and Stoll, 2007).  
 The rate of recidivism is slightly lower 
in New York State but is still of great concern. Of the nearly 25,000 people released from New 
York State prisons in 2004, about 40 percent returned to prison within three years — 11 percent 
2Bureau of Justice Statistics (2007). 
3Langan and Levin (2002).  
2 
for a new crime and 29 percent for a “rule violation,” such as a failure to comply with parole 
conditions.4
Most experts believe that stable employment is critical to a successful transition into the 
community, but ex-prisoners tend to have characteristics that make them hard to employ — for 
example, low levels of education and little previous work experience. Moreover, there is strong 
evidence that incarceration further hinders their employability. Ex-prisoners are legally barred 
from working in certain occupations, and many employers are quite reluctant to hire people 
with criminal records.
  
5 At the end of 2007, only 12 percent of New York State parolees who 
were available for work were employed full time and earning more than the minimum wage; 49 
percent were not employed at all.6
Very little is known about effective employment strategies for ex-prisoners, but many 
people see transitional jobs as a promising model.
  
7 This is the latest in a long line of subsidized 
employment models that have been targeted to hard-to-employ individuals. Transitional job 
programs rapidly place participants into temporary, paid jobs, usually in nonprofit or govern-
ment agencies; provide various kinds of support (for example, workshops or referrals for social 
services); and then help participants find permanent jobs. When targeted to ex-prisoners, 
transitional jobs give participants a source of legitimate income during the critical period after 
release from prison, and they also provide staff with an opportunity to identify and address 
workplace problems before participants move to the regular labor market.8
The Center for Employment Opportunities 
 
The Center for Employment Opportunities was developed by the Vera Institute of Jus-
tice in the 1970s to provide immediate, paid work to individuals returning to New York City 
after being released from prison. CEO became an independent nonprofit organization in 1996 
and currently serves about 2,000 parolees each year.  
Paid, temporary employment still forms the core of CEO’s model. Individuals who are 
referred to CEO by their parole officer are placed in paid jobs immediately after completing a 
                                                 
4New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (2008). The three-year recidivism rates are similar 
for those released in 1997, 2000, and 2004. However, the percentage who returned to prison for a new crime 
fell over time, while the percentage who returned for a parole violation increased. 
5Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2003); Pager (2003).  
6New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (2008). These figures are not directly comparable 
to the outcome data for study participants presented later in this report.  
7For a review of research on employment-focused programs for ex-prisoners, see Bloom (2006). 
8For more information on the transitional job model, see the National Transitional Jobs Network Web site: 
www.transitionaljobs.net. 
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four-day preemployment class. Participants work in crews, performing maintenance and repair 
work for city and state agencies at several dozen sites around New York City. They report to 
CEO work site supervisors.  
Participants generally work four days a week and are paid the minimum wage ($7.15 
per hour in New York State as of July 24, 2009, but it ranged from $5.15 to $6.00 per hour 
during the study period); they receive paychecks each afternoon, at their work sites. The fifth 
day each week is spent in CEO’s office in lower Manhattan, where participants meet with staff 
and take part in supplementary activities, such as a fatherhood program. 
Participants are continuously evaluated by their work site supervisors. Both supervisors 
and office-based job coaches (employment-focused case managers) seek to identify and address 
workplace problems. Once participants have demonstrated good performance on the job, they 
are deemed “job ready” and begin working with a job developer to find permanent employment. 
CEO continues to provide support after placement, though, as discussed further in the next 
section, the nature and intensity of those postemployment services changed during the period of 
the study. 
The CEO model is designed on the assumption that helping ex-prisoners find jobs — 
particularly during the period immediately after release — will ultimately lead to lower recidiv-
ism. In the short term, the program raises employment directly through the transitional jobs. 
Over the long term, the transitional job experience is designed to help participants develop 
“world of work” or “soft” skills, such as punctuality and the ability to work in a team — and to 
build a track record of successful performance on the job — that will help them get and keep 
permanent employment. Although CEO offers some supplementary services, such as the 
fatherhood program, it maintains a sharp focus on employment. Job coaches typically refer 
participants to other organizations for help with housing, substance abuse, or other issues. 
The CEO Evaluation 
The impacts of CEO’s program are being assessed using a random assignment research 
design. Between January 2004 and October 2005, a total of 977 ex-prisoners who were referred 
to CEO by their parole officer, who reported to the program, and who met the study’s eligibility 
criteria,9 were randomly assigned to one of two groups:10
                                                 
9For both ethical and methodological reasons, individuals who had worked in a CEO transitional job in the 
past year (“recycles”) were excluded from the study and were assigned to the regular CEO program. Also, only 
individuals who signed an Informed Consent form were included in the study sample. 
 
10The MDRC team worked with CEO and the New York State Division of Parole to design a random as-
signment process that ensured that the study did not decrease the number of people who received transitional 
(continued) 
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• Program group (total = 568). Individuals who were randomly assigned to 
this group were eligible for all of CEO’s program services, including the 
four-day preemployment class, placement in a transitional job, job coaching, 
additional services (such as the fatherhood program), job development ser-
vices, and postplacement services. 
• Control group (total = 409). Individuals who were randomly assigned to 
this group started with a revised version of the preemployment class that 
lasted one and a half days rather than four days and then were given access to 
a resource room that includes computers (with job search software), phones, 
voice mail, a printer, a fax machine, and other job search tools, including 
publications. When clients came into the resource room, a staff person was 
available, if needed, to assist them with many aspects of job search, including 
use of the equipment, help developing a résumé, and assistance with setting 
up a voice mail account so that potential employers could leave messages for 
the participants.11
The research team is tracking both groups for three years using a number of data 
sources (described below). Any significant differences between the groups that emerge over 
time are described as “impacts,” or “effects,” of CEO because, owing to the random assignment 
design, one can be confident that the groups were comparable when they entered the study.
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Three points about the design are critical. First, in designing the study, MDRC, CEO, 
and the funders decided to offer basic job search assistance to the control group, rather than 
denying them CEO services altogether. This decision was made in part for ethical reasons but 
also because the study sought to isolate and test the impacts of the core elements of CEO’s 
model — transitional jobs with job coaching and assistance from CEO job developers — rather 
than assessing whether CEO was more effective than other programs with similar services that 
 
                                                 
job slots and that ensured that CEO had enough participants to fill its contractual obligations to the sponsors of 
transitional job work sites. Random assignment was conducted only during weeks when the number of new 
enrollees exceeded the number of available slots at transitional job work sites. 
11If control group members worked diligently in the resource room for three months but were unable to 
find employment on their own, they were offered CEO’s job development services (but not a transitional job), 
but this happened very rarely. Of course, control group members could — and did — seek assistance from 
other employment programs in the community. (See Chapter 3.)  
12Since the proportion of people randomly assigned to the program group varied from week to week, 
weights were used so that the impact results were not dominated by a disproportionate assignment to one group 
or the other in any given week. In particular, program group members received a smaller weight in the impact 
calculation if they entered the study in a week when a higher proportion of individuals were assigned to the 
program group, and vice versa. The same was true for control group members. In addition, following standard 
practice in studies such as this, the estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling 
for the characteristics of sample members before random assignment. 
5 
control group members might find if they were simply sent away. Nevertheless, as discussed 
further below, sample members were free to seek other services in the community, and many 
did so. In interpreting the study results, it is critical to understand the level and type of services 
that the control group received. 
Second, it is important to note that the individuals who were targeted for the study — 
parolees who were referred to CEO by their parole officer — represent a subset of the parolees 
that CEO serves. For example, everyone who graduates from New York State’s Shock Incarce-
ration (boot camp) program and returns to New York City is required to participate in CEO’s 
program. Because all boot camp graduates are mandated to participate in CEO, it was not 
possible to include them in a random assignment evaluation. Similarly, for contractual reasons, 
participants in some other smaller, special programs were also excluded. CEO provides very 
similar services to all these groups of parolees. 
Third, during the study period, CEO engaged in a large-scale program review and busi-
ness planning process sponsored by a private foundation. As discussed further in Chapter 2, this 
process resulted in several program enhancements, particularly in the program’s job placement 
services and assistance for participants after they had been placed in jobs. The plan was official-
ly implemented in July 2005 –– just a few months before random assignment ended –– though 
some of its components began earlier. Because these program enhancements were phased in 
during the study period, they affected only a subset of the study participants. If the new services 
resulted in better outcomes, then the results of the study might have been different if it had been 
conducted later.  
Data Sources Used in This Analysis 
The analysis in this report uses data from a wide variety of sources: 
• Baseline data. Participants completed a short baseline information sheet 
when they entered the study. Some additional baseline data were also ob-
tained from CEO’s management information system. 
• State criminal justice data. These data were provided by the New York 
State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), which compiles data 
from many city and state agencies. The data provide information on a range 
of outcomes –– including arrests and convictions in New York State and in-
6 
carceration in state prison –– for each member of the study sample, both be-
fore and after study entry.13
• Local criminal justice data. These data, provided by the New York City 
Department of Correction, show admissions and releases from New York 
City jails.  
 
• Child support data. The New York State Office of Temporary and Disabili-
ty Assistance, which administers the state’s child support enforcement pro-
gram, provided data on formal child support orders and payments.  
• Employment data. Data from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) 
and the New York State Department of Labor show employment in jobs 
covered by unemployment insurance (UI), including CEO transitional jobs. 
These data cover the period from three years prior to study entry to two years 
after study entry for all sample members.14
• Program data. These data, from CEO’s management information and pay-
roll systems, provide information on each individual’s participation in the 
CEO components for which the person was eligible, including transitional 
jobs and appointments with job coach and job developer. 
 
• Survey data. A survey was administered to 531 members of the program 
and control groups, approximately 16 to 23 months after people entered the 
study. The survey asked questions about service receipt, employment, hous-
                                                 
13DCJS provided MDRC with three SPSS (“Statistical Package for the Social Sciences”) portable files 
matched to a sample request file using New York State Identification (NYSID) Numbers: an arrest, a parole, 
and a corrections file. Each file includes information about unsealed events only. The arrest file includes data 
from the DCJS rap sheet system, including arrests, convictions, and sentencing. The corrections file contains 
information furnished to DCJS from the New York State Department of Corrections, including state prison 
admissions and releases (with a small number of records on jail stays). The parole file contains information 
furnished to DCJS from the New York State Division of Parole, including parole term start and end dates, 
abscond dates, and parole revocation information. The arrest and corrections files contain data reported to 
DCJS from January 1970 to present, and the parole file contains data reported to DCJS from January 1960 to 
present. In addition, DCJS provided a separate file containing data on sealed events; that file was provided in a 
form that did not allow individuals to be identified. DCJS takes no responsibility for the methods of statistical 
analysis or for the conclusions derived from the analysis.  
14The analysis uses data from both the NDNH and the New York State Department of Labor. The De-
partment of Labor provided individual-level data on employment for all sample members from 2001 through 
2007. It did not, however, provide individual-level data on quarterly earnings. The NDNH includes individual-
level data on both employment and earnings but covers only the period from Quarter 4, 2004, through Quarter 
3, 2007. 
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ing, drug treatment, family relationships, and other issues. The response rate 
for the survey was about 68 percent.15
• Field research data. Members of the research team visited CEO and its 
work sites on several occasions between 2004 and 2006, conducting struc-
tured interviews with staff and observing program activities. In addition, in-
depth interviews were conducted with 19 members of the program group. 
 
At this point, data from all the administrative records are available for at least two years 
after study entry for all sample members. The study will eventually follow sample members for 
three years. 
Characteristics of the Study Participants 
Table 1.1 presents the baseline characteristics of the program group, the control group, 
and both groups combined (the full sample). As expected in a random assignment design, there 
are very few significant differences in background characteristics between the two research 
groups. In addition, the characteristics of the CEO study sample are similar to the national 
population of individuals released from state prison to parole, and similar to the parole popula-
tion in New York City.16
The vast majority of sample members are male (93 percent).
 
17
Before random assignment, 16 percent of the sample were married, and 9 percent were 
living with their spouse. Another 21 percent were unmarried but living with a partner. About 
half of the study sample (48 percent) had at least one child under age 18, although only 16 
percent lived with any of their children. Only 19 percent reported having a formal child support 
order in place. 
 Almost all are black or 
Hispanic. (Nationally, about one-third of those released to parole are white; in New York City, 
fewer than 10 percent of parolees are white.) On study entry, 57 percent of the sample members 
were over 30 years old, and the average age was 34. (Nationally, the average age of prisoners 
being released in recent years is 34; about two-thirds of New York City parolees are over age 
30.) 
                                                 
15The survey targeted 777 of the 977 sample members. See Appendix A for further information. 
16National data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2002); state data from the New York State Division of 
Parole (2008). 
17There is a small but statistically significant difference between the two groups in the percentage of sam-
ple members who are male. The impact calculations presented in Chapters 4 through 6 are adjusted to account 
for this difference. Also, all results were examined for males separately, and the results are very similar to those 
presented. 
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The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table 1.1
Selected Characteristics of Sample Members 
at the Time of Random Assignment, by Research Group
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Full
Characteristic Group  Group  Sample
Age (%)
18 to 24 years 19.0 20.3 19.6
25 to 30 years 23.8 23.7 23.8
31 to 40 years 31.4 30.3 30.9
41 years or older 25.7 25.7 25.7
Average age (years) 33.7 33.7 33.7
U.S. citizen (%) 74.6 73.6 74.2
Race/ethnicity (%)
White, non-Hispanic 1.4 2.2 1.8
Black, non-Hispanic 64.3 64.5 64.4
Hispanic 31.2 29.8 30.6
Other 3.0 3.4 3.2
Male (%) 91.4 95.3 93.0  **
Has any children under age 18 (%) 48.1 47.9 48.0
Lives with any children under age 18 (%) 16.3 15.2 15.8
Ordered to provide child support
to a child under age 18 (%) 18.9 19.9 19.3
Education (%) .
High school diploma 9.5 11.4 10.3
General Educational Development (GED) certificate 42.6 43.9 43.1
Beyond high school 4.8 3.5 4.3
None of the above 43.1 41.2 42.3
Housing status (%)
Rents or owns home             16.6 19.9 18.0
Lives with friends or relatives 59.1 55.1 57.4
Lives in transitional housing 12.4 11.2 11.9
Lives in emergency housing or is homeless             3.7 5.4 4.4
Other 8.1 8.4 8.3
Marital status (%)
Married, living with spouse 8.1 9.3 8.6
Married, living away from spouse 7.4 7.7 7.5
Unmarried, living with partner 21.8 20.1 21.1
Single 62.6 63.0 62.8
(continued)
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The process of obtaining affordable housing on release from prison is complicated be-
cause most returning prisoners do not have income from employment and are not eligible for 
many other forms of public assistance. In addition, current federally subsidized housing pro-
grams give public housing authorities the power to deny housing or to terminate the leases of 
individuals with a history of drug use or criminal behavior. Thus, many sample members were 
living with friends or relatives (57 percent) or in some type of transitional housing (12 percent); 
4 percent reported living in emergency housing or were homeless. 
Just over half the sample had a high school diploma or a General Educational Devel-
opment (GED) certificate at baseline, and a very small proportion (4 percent) had a postsecon-
dary degree. Most had at least some employment history. More than 80 percent reported that 
they had worked, and about 61 percent reported that they had worked for a single employer for 
six consecutive months. 
Table 1.1 (continued)
Program Control Full
Characteristic Group  Group  Sample
Ever employed (%) 81.1 81.2 81.2
Employed 6 consecutive months 
for one employer (%) 59.9 62.7 61.1
UI-covered employment in the quarter prior
to random assignmenta (%) 14.9 11.7 13.6
UI-covered employment in the year prior 
to random assignmenta (%) 24.1 24.0 24.0
Sample size 568 409 977
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the Baseline Information Form and unemployment 
insurance (UI) wage records from New York State.
NOTES: Data in this table are unweighted, but the results for the statistical significance test are 
weighted by week of random assignment.
In order to assess differences in characteristics across research groups, chi-square tests were used 
for categorical variables, and t-tests were used for continuous variables. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level 
indicates the probability that one would be making an error in concluding that there is a difference 
between research groups for the variable in question.
aThis measure was created using data from unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from 
New York State.
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In the year before study entry, 24 percent of the sample were employed in a UI-covered 
job. This means that at least some study participants did not come to CEO immediately after 
release from prison –– an issue that is discussed further below. 
Table 1.2 shows the criminal histories of study participants for both the program and the 
control group before random assignment and including the offense for which they were recently 
released from prison.18
Before random assignment, study participants had been arrested an average of eight 
times –– similar to the 1994 national release cohort
 Again, there are few differences between the groups. As expected, all 
the study participants have a history of arrest, conviction, and incarceration. The average 
lifetime total time spent in state prison for study participants is about 60 months, or five years. 
19
Table 1.2 also shows the time between the last prison release and the date of random as-
signment. These data confirm that only 41 percent of the study sample came to CEO within 
three months after release. This is not typical of the full CEO population, about three-fourths of 
whom come to the program either immediately on release or shortly thereafter. 
 –– with about five felony arrests and three 
misdemeanor arrests. Before random assignment, study participants had been convicted an 
average of seven times, with about three of those being felony convictions. Nearly 70 percent of 
the sample members had prior arrests for violent offenses, and 51 percent were convicted of 
violent offenses. Nearly three-quarters of the sample had prior drug offense convictions. 
As noted above, boot camp graduates and participants in some other special programs 
were excluded from the study for contractual reasons. Individuals in these special programs 
almost always come to CEO just after release. Those in the study sample came to CEO after 
referral by a parole officer who is not involved with special programs. These parole officers 
base their referral decisions on a wide variety of concerns and circumstances. For example, 
some parole officers may have referred parolees to CEO after they had worked for a time and 
then lost a job. Because the CEO model was designed to serve ex-prisoners just after release, 
and because most of CEO’s broader population fits this profile, the results presented in this 
report are examined separately for people who came to CEO soon after release and for those 
who came later. 
                                                 
18These data include incarceration in state prison but not local jails. 
19Langan and Levin (2002). 
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Program Control
Characteristic Group  Group Full Sample
Arrest history
Any prior arrests (%) 100 100 100
Average number of arrestsa 7.4 7.7 7.5
Number of prior felony arrests 4.5 4.6 4.5
Number of prior misdemeanor arrests 2.8 3.1 2.9
Ever arrested for a violent crimeb (%) 67.5 67.5 67.5
Number of prior arrests for a violent crime 1.4 1.4 1.4
Conviction history
Any prior convictionc (%) 100 100 100
Average number of prior convictionsd 6.6 6.9 6.7
Number of prior felony convictions 2.7 2.5 2.6 ***
Number of prior misdemeanor convictions 3.6 4.1 3.8
Convicted of a violent crime (%) 51.7 50.9 51.4
Convicted of a drug-related crime (%) 73.1 73.9 73.4
State prison history
Lifetime number of months in state prisone 60.6 59.1 60.0
Months between latest state prison release
and random assignmentf (%)
1-3 months 41.4 39.4 40.6
4-6 months 14.7 13.5 14.2
7-9 months 10.8 11.7 11.2
More than 9 months 33.0 35.4 34.0
Parole
Months remaining on parole 34.2 32.9 33.6 **
Sample size 561 409 970
(continued)
Center for Employment Opportunities
Criminal History at the Time of Random Assignment, 
Table 1.2
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
by Research Group
               
            
                  
                  
        
           
          
               
             
                    
           
12 
Roadmap of the Report 
The remainder of the report is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 describes the implementation of CEO’s program during the study period and 
presents data on what proportion of the program group received the core program components. 
Chapter 3 describes the differences in service receipt between the two research groups, 
including both services provided by CEO and those provided by other organizations; the 
analysis uses data from the client survey. 
Chapters 4 through 6 discuss the CEO program’s impacts. Chapter 4 describes the im-
pacts on employment; Chapter 5 presents impacts on recidivism; and Chapter 6 discusses 
impacts on a variety of other outcomes.  
Chapter 7 discusses the net costs of the CEO program. 
Table 1.2 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 
(DCJS).
NOTES: T-tests were used to assess differences in characteristics across research groups. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would be making an error in concluding that there is a 
difference between research groups for the variable in question.
Due to missing data, seven sample members are missing prior criminal histories.
Sample sizes vary from 924 to 970 due to missing data.
Prior criminal history includes the arrest, conviction, and incarceration related to the offense for which 
one was on parole for at the time of random assignment (the current offense).
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same 
date, only the most serious charge is recorded in the analysis. 
bThe violent crime indicator is defined by Penal Law 70.02 and also includes underlying offenses.
cThis outcome excludes convictions where a final disposition was not found.  
dEach conviction date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple convictions on the same 
date, only the most serious charge is recorded in the analysis. 
e"Lifetime" includes historical data as early as 1970. 
fA total of 48 sample members are missing the latest prison release date and are excluded from this
measure.
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Chapter 2  
The Implementation of the CEO Program 
The New York City-based Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) is one the 
largest and most highly regarded employment programs for former prisoners who are returning 
to the community. To understand the impact that CEO has on participants’ outcomes, this 
chapter examines the program’s context and operational strategies. Data from site visits to CEO 
and its work sites and data from its management system are used to describe program activities 
and their implementation. First the chapter discusses CEO’s institutional structure and staffing 
strategy, program flow, and program activities, highlighting differences in the services offered 
to this study’s two research groups. Then data describe the extent to which participants in the 
program group and those in the control group actually received those services. 
The purpose of the CEO program model is to provide individuals who have recently 
been released from incarceration opportunities for immediate work and pay, necessary work 
experience for more permanent employment, and a chance to build work-related soft skills. It 
uses a day-labor model whereby clients are paid daily for their work. The work itself is not 
intended to train employees with new hard skills for particular types of jobs but, instead, 
provides participants the chance to build a recent and relevant work history and practice work 
behavior to take to permanent positions. 
During the study enrollment period of January 2004 through October 2005, CEO was 
also participating in a major program analysis and business plan to improve its efficiency and 
processes. Thus, the program’s service package was enhanced and refined over the course of the 
study enrollment period. Most of the changes did not affect what happened at the work sites but, 
rather, the services that clients were offered to support their work in transitional jobs, to help 
them find permanent jobs, and to promote retention in permanent jobs once they were placed in 
them. Changes made during the study period are described below, along with the timing of 
when they were implemented. Regardless of the timing of the enhancements, however, the core 
of CEO’s services — transitional job work crews, job coaching, and job development — 
remained in place during the entire study period.  
CEO’s Institutional Structure and Staffing 
CEO provides services to former prisoners living all over New York City through a 
program office located in lower Manhattan. The organization has two operational focuses: (1) 
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implementing the transitional work component of the CEO model1
Several types of staff focus on the other CEO service offerings. Recruitment and intake 
staff recruit participants through local parole offices and register them at CEO intake sessions 
every Friday morning. Job coaches primarily serve as individual case managers, supporting 
participants while in transitional jobs and after they are placed in permanent jobs. Job coaches 
also share the responsibility of teaching the preemployment job readiness classes — called “life 
skills” classes — that are required before participants begin work in transitional jobs. Job 
developers focus on moving participants into permanent employment by working with both 
outside employers and participants. Other staff implement specialized programs, such as the 
Responsible Fatherhood Program focused on child support services (described below). Partway 
through the study enrollment period (in the first quarter of 2005), CEO added another type of 
staff — retention workers — who took over some responsibilities of job coaches; these staff 
focus on supporting participants after they have been placed in permanent employment.  
 and (2) supporting individu-
als in transitional jobs and helping them find permanent positions. Staff focusing on transitional 
jobs include those involved in identifying and developing work sites, assigning participants to 
work crews, supervising participants while employed at work sites, and paying participants 
daily for the work they do. Work site supervisors, who oversee participants in transitional jobs, 
represent the largest category of staff within the CEO structure and are in the only staff category 
at CEO that is unionized. 
CEO Program Flow  
Typically, all CEO clients follow a single program path starting at intake sessions and 
leading to transitional employment and other services. However, during the course of study 
enrollment, participants were randomly assigned during intake sessions either to the program 
group — representing CEO’s usual service offerings — or to the control group. Intake sessions 
occurred every Friday during the study period. Participants came to the program with a referral 
from a parole officer, although the parolees in this study were not mandated through parole 
orders to participate in the CEO program. (They were, however, expected to seek, obtain, and 
maintain employment.)2
                                                 
1During the study enrollment period, the transitional job portion of the program was called the “Neighbor-
hood Work Project.”  
 In most cases, CEO staff knew in advance who was expected each 
Friday, but random assignment occurred only among those who actually came to the program 
that day. 
2Some criminal justice populations that CEO serves are mandated to participate in the program (for exam-
ple, the New York State Shock Incarceration, or “boot camp,” participants). Presumably, mandated populations 
may more fully participate in programs, given the ability of criminal justice personnel to hold people accounta-
ble for their participation by levying sanctions against them if they do not. 
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Once participants were signed in, CEO staff accessed an MDRC database specifically 
designed to conduct random assignment for this study. Staff noted the number of transitional 
job slots that needed to be filled in order for CEO to fully staff its work sites. If at least five 
more people came to the Friday session than the number of available slots, random assignment 
was conducted, and the “excess” participants were assigned to the control group. 
Once participants were randomly assigned, the control group was escorted to a different 
floor of the building, and the program group remained in the original intake area. Both the 
program and the control group immediately started the first day of the preemployment life skills 
classes specifically tailored for them. On occasion, CEO staff encountered parolees who were 
resistant to being placed in the control group because they had come to the program expecting a 
job. Because of CEO’s longstanding presence in the community as a group that gives ex-
prisoners jobs right away, some parolees arrived assuming that they would be placed into a 
transitional job. When this did not happen, some clients were disappointed and, occasionally, 
irritated or angry. Staff found these incidents to be challenging and were placed in the position 
of explaining the random assignment process multiple times. In some cases, they needed to 
speak with a client about his or her attitude because of concerns that it might affect other clients’ 
attitudes toward the control group services. Although these incidents occurred throughout the 
study’s enrollment period, fewer than five participants asked to be removed from the study as a 
result of being placed in the control group.3
Program group members were offered the full array of CEO services. In addition to 
starting the life skills class on the first day, the program group members were given CEO intake 
assessments. These one-on-one sessions conducted by job coaches recorded information about 
participants’ demographic characteristics, criminal history, current housing status, education 
and employment histories, marital status, parental status, and more. The preemployment life 
skills class was a four-day class, which 79 percent of the program group completed. Participants 
were placed in transitional job work sites on the fifth day. Once in transitional jobs, participants 
worked four days a week and were in the CEO program office during the fifth day. During the 
office day, participants met with job coaches and job developers and took part in specialized 
programming, such as the Responsible Fatherhood Program. Participants also had access to a 
resource room. Once a participant was considered job ready, he or she began working with a job 
developer to find a permanent job. After the participant was placed into a permanent position, 
CEO followed the person for six months to one year, and the participant was eligible for the 
Rapids Rewards incentive program (described below).  
  
                                                 
3CEO staff had experience dealing with situations in which the number of available work slots was not 
large enough to accommodate everyone seeking services. In the past, however, there had been no random 
assignment, and staff had the option of telling some applicants to come back at a later date.  
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The control group received a limited service package. This group also participated in a 
preemployment life skills class, but, unlike the program group’s class, the class for the control 
group lasted for only one and a half days. It covered topics related to securing identification 
documents needed for employment, job search strategies, and interview concepts, such as 
addressing how to answer questions related to criminal history. About 37 percent of control 
group members completed the class.4
Activities for the Program Group  
 After completing the class, participants were given access 
to a resource room, in which they could use equipment for job searching activities, such as 
computers, fax machines, and phones with voice mail accounts. Control group participants had 
access to the room at different times during the day than program group members. During the 
first initial months of the study, the control group was assigned a staff person who provided 
supports similar to case management. Later, the resource room was staffed by a “librarian” who 
was available to answer questions about available equipment and computers. Very few control 
group members visited the resource room more than two or three times. If members of the 
control group completed the life skills class and consistently attended the resource room for 
three months but were unable to find a job, they were then offered job development services. 
This happened for only seven control group members. 
The sections below more fully describe CEO program components and describe 
changes that occurred during the study period as a result of CEO’s implementing its new 
business plan. The services described are those that were offered to the program group, though 
not everyone followed through and used this help and support. 
The Preemployment Life Skills Class  
As noted above, typical participation in CEO begins with the preemployment life skills 
class. The purpose of the class is to brief participants on the transitional job program, to intro-
duce them to the process of building soft skills that takes place during the transitional job 
experience, and to begin preparing them for job searches and employment after the transitional 
job. Job coaches rotate the responsibility of teaching the four-day class, beginning Friday 
mornings (directly after random assignment during the study enrollment period). 
The class covers several important issues –– particularly, what to expect from the CEO 
program and services. It addresses the program’s rules and regulations, the nature of the work 
done at work sites, how to behave at the work sites, and what types of behaviors (such as 
                                                 
4Some clients were disappointed about not getting a transitional job and about being placed in the control 
group. It is not clear whether this disappointment affected the dropout rate from the life skills class. 
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unexcused absences) could lead to suspensions and discharges from the program. Clients sign 
forms agreeing to abide by CEO program rules. Class instructors also introduce CEO’s Compa-
ny Principles –– or the “CEO CPs,” an abbreviation that is formed by the first letters of the five 
workplace behaviors described in the company philosophy: Cooperation with supervisors, 
Effort at work, On time, Cooperation with co-workers, and Personal presentation. The CEO 
CPs provide the framework by which staff teach participants soft skills related to employment. 
The framework is introduced during class and built upon while at transitional job work sites. 
Participants are expected to demonstrate the skills on the job, and the hope is that the skills will 
be translated into permanent positions, making clients more employable and helping them retain 
their new jobs. 
The life skills class also addresses other issues related to employment. For instance, 
former prisoners often do not have the proper identification needed to secure employment, such 
as Social Security cards. If clients do not have such identification, CEO staff help them obtain 
it. It is a critical first step in the employment readiness process, and CEO tries to ensure that this 
issue does not remain a barrier to work. Additionally, participants spend some time in class 
learning job searching skills and how best to deal with employers’ questions about criminal 
history on job applications and during interviews. Finally, instructors attempt to motivate clients 
to strive for success both in transitional jobs and in their pursuits for permanent lawful employ-
ment.  
Once the class is complete, participants are assigned a job coach. Clients begin formally 
meeting with job coaches at this point in the programming. No particular system was used to 
make such assignments for most of the study enrollment period; however, a system change 
occurred midway through 2005 whereby participants were assigned in clusters to pairs of job 
coaches and job developers. The idea was that by pairing job coach and job developer casel-
oads, the staff would work in closer collaboration to move clients through transitional work and 
into permanent employment. It is not clear whether this change was implemented fully; if it 
was, however, then this new staffing approach affected approximately one-third of study 
participants. 
CEO’s Transitional Jobs with Job Coaching  
Participants begin their transitional jobs after they finish the life skills class. They are 
assigned to daily work crews, each having a CEO supervisor. Along with daily work, the CEO 
program provides job coaching to participants to help build soft skills that facilitate long-term 
employability. The program does this in two ways: through hands-on job coaching provided on-
site by work site supervisors and through support and guidance provided by office-based job 
coaches. Participants formally meet with their job coach once a week on the day that they are in 
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the CEO offices, although they may be in contact with a job coach in other ways during the 
workweek.  
Working in Transitional Jobs  
CEO staff identify and develop appropriate work sites for their clients. Then the transi-
tional job work sites, which are both city and state agencies, contract with the New York State 
Division of Parole as part of an Internal Service Fund. CEO acts as an agent of Parole to meet 
the contractual requirements that CEO developed with the site. On a typical day, more than 200 
CEO participants work at 30 or more work sites across New York City, conducting mostly 
maintenance, repair, and janitorial work; 9 work sites were observed for this study, to under-
stand how the work activity at the transitional jobs was conducted.5
Participants contact CEO daily in the afternoon to find out where they will be working 
the next day — a process called “plugging in.” Because CEO emphasizes that the jobs are 
transitional in nature; staff do not attempt to match participants with work in their field of 
interest but, instead, are focused on fulfilling the contractual obligations to work site clients in 
terms of crew sizes needed at each site. Participants may be at the same site for some time or 
may switch work sites frequently, depending on the needs of each site. At the start of each shift, 
supervisors check in with CEO’s central office if too few or too many workers show up at 
particular work sites, and people are shifted as necessary to deploy the appropriate number of 
workers at each site.  
 Table 2.1 includes exam-
ples of the work site locations, the number of participants assigned to each site, and the type of 
work being conducted at the site. 
Some sites require one crew while others require more than one. In general, the work is 
steady and repetitive in nature. Examples of tasks include sweeping, mopping, dusting, cleaning 
bathrooms, breaking down boxes for recycling, and groundskeeping. The researchers found that 
participants spent the majority of their time at most sites engaged in work activity and complet-
ing tasks. Only in two of the nine studied work sites did participants have low levels of work 
engagement during the observation period. 
Interaction between program participants and CEO supervisors varied across the nine 
sites. In five sites, participants had intermittent interaction with supervisors for task assignment, 
quality control checks, and administrative tasks. In three sites, participants had consistent and 
significant positive interaction with supervisors providing instruction and structure to the work 
crew activities in addition to quality control checks and administrative tasks. In only one site  
                                                 
5Based on field research that was conducted for the Hard-to-Employ project by Demetra Nightingale of 
the Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies and John Trutko of Capital Research Corporation. 
 # # 
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Number General Nature
 Location in Work Crewa of Work Main Activities
Brooklyn Criminal Court 8 Custodial/janitorial Participants clean courthouse building floors, 
steps, bathrooms, and courtrooms
Brooklyn Criminal Court 8 Custodial/janitorial Participants sweep courtyard, clean bathrooms, 
and dust offices
City Administration Building 7 Custodial/janitorial Participants mop/wash floors, clean and sanitize 
bathrooms, remove trash, and break down boxes
City of New York Office Building 6 Custodial/janitorial Participants clean floors, hallways, and 
bathrooms and remove trash
City of New York Office Building 8 Custodial/janitorial Participants mop, vacuum, and clean building floors;
sanitize bathrooms; and take out trash 
City of New York Office Building 8 Custodial/janitorial Participants mop and sweep hallways
Criminal Courts Building 12 Custodial/janitorial Participants sweep, wash, and buff floors
and take out trash
Criminal Courts Building 2 Custodial/janitorial Participants sweep, mop, and wax floors
and break down boxes
Bronx Community College 13 Custodial/janitorial Participants pick up litter, rake leaves, shovel snow, and
(City University of New York) generally keep grounds around community college clean
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table 2.1
Examples of CEO Work Sites
Center for Employment Opportunities
SOURCE: These data come from an observational substudy across the sites in the Hard-to-Employ project that was conducted by Demetra 
Nightingale of the Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies and John Trutko of Capital Research Corporation.
NOTE: aNumber of individuals who were observed at the work site for this study.  
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was there considerable negative interaction between the supervisor and participants about 
behavioral issues, such as the use of cell phones on-site.  
Usually, CEO participants do not interact with the general public or the personnel in the 
buildings where they work. In some sites, the work is completed after business hours. In other 
sites, however, where jobs are completed during business hours, CEO participants sometimes 
have such interaction throughout the day. Also, in some sites, participants interact with other 
custodial staff who are not affiliated with CEO. Anticipating such occasions, on-site behavior is 
discussed during the preemployment life skills class.  
Two other activities occur every day at work sites. First, participants are paid each af-
ternoon for their work that day. CEO provides daily pay as part of a day-labor model of transi-
tional work. Daily pay is a way to help those who were incarcerated immediately start working 
toward self-sufficiency, by having cash in hand. It is a way to ease the day-to-day life of people 
in this situation so that they do not need to wait several weeks for a paycheck after they start 
working, and this offsets the appeal of getting “quick money” through illegal activities. 
Second, CEO work site supervisors play a role in identifying problems on work sites 
and intervening around these issues. They also identify individuals who may require discipli-
nary action. They complete work site evaluations every day for each participant. As noted 
earlier, CEO does not emphasize teaching particular work skills at sites; rather, the focus is on 
learning and practicing the soft skills of the CEO CPs. Thus, participants are rated daily on each 
aspect of this philosophy: 
1. Cooperation with supervisors (such as having a positive relationship, being 
respectful, responding to instruction, being able to teach others)  
2. Effort at work (such as being productive, responsible, and satisfied with the 
results of one’s efforts, and also having initiative at work)  
3. On time (such as being ready to work at start time and after breaks and work-
ing until dismissal time, giving advance notice of the need to take time off, 
and avoiding absences) 
4. Cooperation with co-workers (such as not having conflicts with others, being 
able to work in a team, practicing positive workplace behaviors, and being a 
role model)  
5. Personal presentation (such as being respectful in speech, being clean, and 
having high energy) 
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Participants’ work site evaluations are communicated to their job coaches so that the 
coaches can address with them any issues that occur at work sites and can provide guidance and 
support in how best to improve their performance. During the first portion of the study enroll-
ment period, work site supervisors filled out evaluations on forms that were left in the office at a 
particular location. It was expected that job coaches would then search through the pile of forms 
to find their participants’ evaluations in order to review behavior and progress at work sites. 
This process proved to be cumbersome and time-consuming for job coaches, and so the infor-
mation was not being used to its fullest potential. 
In response, CEO implemented the “Passport to Success” in May 2005.6
Participants work in transitional jobs until they find permanent employment, either with 
or without assistance from CEO, or until they are discharged from the program. Inappropriate 
work behavior at a site might lead to discharge, as it might on any job. In addition, unexcused 
absences from work sites can lead to disciplinary action and suspensions from the transitional 
work. Participants can be reinstated to transitional jobs, but they will eventually be dismissed if 
they continue to miss work. It is CEO’s policy to notify parole officers when participants are 
discharged from the program.  
 This new 
evaluation system requires participants to carry their Passport booklet daily (the booklet is kept 
in a plastic pocket that hangs from a necklace). On days that participants do transitional work, 
the work site supervisors complete evaluations directly in the Passport booklets. On days that 
participants are in the CEO office, the job coaches review the completed booklets with partici-
pants during their weekly meetings to address any issues or concerns, and they give participants 
positive feedback about their performance, as appropriate. It appears that this system puts the 
work site supervisors’ evaluation information to good use. According to staff respondents 
during site visits, the Passport system is a straightforward way to keep track of clients’ progress 
at work sites. 
Providing Support Through Office-Based Job Coaching 
Job coaches implement the case management component of the CEO program. They 
provide one-on-one guidance and support to help clients succeed both while in the program and 
while transitioning into permanent employment. CEO employs about 10 job coaches on staff 
who each work with about 80 to 100 cases at a time, with 30 to 50 of those cases being actively 
engaged in transitional jobs. 
                                                 
6This change affected approximately one-third of the study participants who were enrolled between May 
and October 2005 as well as any others who were enrolled earlier but were still in programming when the 
initiative began. 
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Job coaches meet with participants at least once a week, usually in the CEO office. Dur-
ing these one-on-one meetings, job coaches review individual participants’ job performance 
using the Passport to Success booklet as a guide, and they address any barriers to work that 
require additional support and referrals to other programs and services.7
Job coaches sometimes visit work sites to meet with participants. Although such visits 
were always an element of the program, partway through the study enrollment period, job 
coaches were encouraged to visit work sites more often and were required to conduct at least 
some such visits each week. Typically, work site visits are conducted to observe a new partici-
pant or to observe a participant who is encountering problems on-site. The extent to which job 
coaches actually went to work sites during the study period is unclear.  
 Job coaches also work 
with participants to develop a résumé, to build skills in how to search for jobs, and to prepare 
for job interviews (such as how to answer potential employers’ questions related to criminal 
history — the so called “conviction question”). Participants are also encouraged to raise their 
own issues and concerns during these meetings so that staff can help them address problems on 
the work site or in their personal lives.  
Job coaches determine when participants are considered “job ready” and are able to ac-
tively move toward placement in permanent positions. Coaches typically begin reviewing cases 
for job readiness after two weeks in a transitional job, and the goal is to move people into 
permanent employment as soon as possible. Staff use a standard form that they complete to 
decide whether a participant is ready to move on. Job readiness is based primarily on work site 
performance; however, participants who have a significant employment history may be consi-
dered job ready right away. At the other end of the spectrum, staff reported that some partici-
pants become “comfortable” in their transitional job and have to be urged to work harder to find 
a permanent position. CEO creates an environment where clients feel valued and feel safe when 
it comes to dealing with their conviction history. Some individuals may be reluctant to leave 
employment that is accepting and to move on to unknown and unfamiliar situations.  
Finding Permanent Positions  
CEO employs job developers to work with both CEO participants and outside employ-
ers to move people from transitional jobs into permanent jobs. About 10 to 14 job developers 
work with about 40 participants each. The cases do not transition from job coaches to job 
developers; instead, participants work with both types of staff simultaneously. Although job 
                                                 
7CEO does not have a formal process for referring clients to other types of services that they might need. 
Most referrals are to housing programs on an as-needed basis, if that issue arises. The New York State Division 
of Parole is responsible for referring parolees to services that are related to special conditions for release, such 
as substance abuse treatment or anger management. 
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coaches and job developers do not necessarily collaborate on addressing the needs of individual 
participants, they do work together for individual clients as needed –– for example, preparing a 
client when a job opportunity arises. The job developer might identify the job and help arrange 
the interview, and the job coach might do mock interviews with the client in preparation for this 
specific interview. 
After participants have worked in transitional jobs for two weeks, job developers gener-
ally meet with them one-on-one. At the first meeting, the job developer completes an assess-
ment in order to learn about the participant’s interests, job skills, and work history. If the 
participant has been deemed job ready by the job coach, then the participant and job developer 
begins to have weekly meetings. If the participant is not yet job ready, the weekly meetings wait 
until that occurs.  
Although job developers work with participants directly, the bulk of their time is spent 
developing employer accounts and identifying job opportunities for participants. Job developers 
identify accounts through many means, but they rely heavily on “cold-calling” employers; that 
is, they contact businesses that might have positions appropriate for CEO participants and “sell” 
the idea of hiring them. As selling points to potential employers, job developers use the tax 
credits associated with hiring former prisoners along with bonding insurance, which protects 
employers from any risk involved with such hiring. Under the federal bonding program, CEO 
pays for up to $10,000 of bonding insurance for the first six months, which covers any financial 
losses related to employee dishonesty that might occur as a result of the hire. Staff report that 
small employers are sometimes interested in the tax credits and bonding but that larger employ-
ers are not as responsive to these inducements.8
Once the job developers identify employer accounts and job openings, they try to match 
them to appropriate clients in their caseloads. If they cannot find a match from their own 
caseload, they go to other developers’ caseloads to identify someone. The job developers 
schedule interviews for those clients who seem appropriate for the position. When possible, 
they send more than one person to the employer to interview, to be sure to meet that employer’s 
needs by offering options. Job developers prepare clients for interviews by helping them 
anticipate the questions that will be asked, by developing responses, and by explaining how 
clients should behave during the interview. Afterward, job developers contact the employer to 
ask how the interviews went and whether the employer is planning to hire a CEO participant; if 
not, they may offer to send other clients to interview. Job developers work hard to meet em-
 Each job developer is responsible for specific 
employer accounts, but all the developers consistently need to add new employers to their set of 
accounts. Some employers come back to CEO to fill positions again and again, but others do 
not. 
                                                 
8The majority of employers in this study did not opt for CEO to pay for bonding insurance. 
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ployers’ needs, with the hope that employers who have vacant positions will come back to CEO 
over time. 
Each job developer is required to meet a job placement quota each month; the number 
to be met depends on seniority in the position. There are three levels of job developers. During 
the study period, first-level job developers were required to make five job placements each 
month; second-level developers were expected to make seven placements per month; and third-
level job developers had to make eight placements each month. If job developers meet their 
quotas for six consecutive months, they are eligible for pay raises and promotions. They also are 
eligible for financial bonuses if they exceed their monthly placement quotas. 
Box 2.1 gives a sense of the challenges faced by CEO staff by presenting examples of 
how six sample members in the study moved through transitional jobs to permanent positions. 
Services After Job Placement  
CEO attempts to track whether clients stay employed in the jobs that they are placed in. 
For most of the study enrollment period, job coaches were responsible for connecting with 
clients to confirm their employment. Job coaches asked clients to come to the office with their 
paycheck stubs so that CEO could track employment. Job coaches were paid a bonus for 
collecting clients’ pay confirmation. In early 2005, a new unit of retention workers was added to 
take over this function from job coaches.  
In August 2004, CEO also started an incentive program –– called “Rapid Rewards –– 
for clients to confirm their continued employment.9
                                                 
9Although 56 percent of the sample were enrolled in the study after this change occurred, it affected only 
the 22 percent of participants who were enrolled between August 2004 and October 2005 and who were placed 
in permanent positions. 
 CEO created this program as a way to keep 
better track of employment retention, in order to meet contractual benchmarks for various 
funding streams (though it is possible that the rewards also encourage clients to remain em-
ployed). Through Rapid Rewards, both clients who are placed in positions by CEO and those 
who find jobs on their own are eligible for noncash incentives. To sign up for the program, a 
participant has to keep a job for 30 days, have a paycheck stub, and work at least 20 hours per 
week. Then, at different milestones, people receive rewards — such as gift certificates to 
various stores and paid Metrocards (for mass transit) — for continuing employment and 
bringing their paycheck stub to the CEO office. Rewards are given every 30 days through one 
year, at which point clients can receive an additional $250 gift certificate. 
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Box 2.1 
Case Examples: Center for Employment Opportunities 
Client 1 
Client 1 received support from CEO to find a permanent job. This client completed the life 
skills class and was sent to a transitional job, where he worked and had good attendance. 
He reportedly was doing well on-site and had no problems. The client met weekly with 
both his job coach and his job developer, and he also met with a social worker from the 
Responsible Fatherhood Program. The job developer had the client in mind for a particular 
position when they first started working together: a bike-riding delivery position. Once the 
position became available, the job coach worked with the client to tailor his résumé to the 
position. The job coach also prepared the client for the interview and conducted a mock 
interview with him. The job developer went to the interview with the client. The client was 
offered the job and was placed within six weeks of finishing the life skills class. Unfortu-
nately, the position lasted only until the client’s bike was stolen. The client then chose not 
to return to CEO for further help finding another job, although that option was offered to 
him. 
Client 2 
Client 2 had a slower start than Client 1, but he was still placed in a permanent position by 
CEO. This client started the life skills class but did not complete it the first time he took it. 
The next week, he started the life skills class again and attended every day. Once he was in 
the transitional job, his attendance was consistent, and he even worked double shifts when 
needed. 
The job developer who placed the client met him about six weeks into his time 
with CEO and sent him on an interview the day they met. This client was originally on a 
different job developer’s caseload, but he was transferred to a second job developer 
because his work history and personality matched the openings that that job developer had 
in his employer accounts. The client was hired by a marketing research firm. At the time 
of the site visit, the client had worked in the position for 20 days. 
Client 3 
Client 3 also moved to a second job developer –– in this case, because that job developer 
needed a client who had a driver’s license in order to fill an available position. The em-
ployer was interested in the tax credit for hiring former prisoners, and the job developer 
completed the paperwork for the employer to claim this credit.  
Before the interview, the job developer talked with the client about how to dress 
for it, because she knew from experience that this company did not like to hire people who 
dressed too formally or who were unwilling to get dirty, which the job required. The client 
was hired and was making $8.00 per hour but was fired two months later for refusing to do 
certain types of work. He returned to CEO for further assistance, but CEO declined to 
provide it because the client was fired from the position it had placed him in. The job 
developer was glad that she had placed people in this company before, because she be-
lieves that if this were the first time working with the company, she would have lost the 
employer account. 
(continued) 
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In addition, twice a year — in April and November — CEO holds retention events. 
These are times when the staff come together with former clients to celebrate employment. 
Clients can get rewards and certificates for maintaining their jobs.10
Finally, if former clients find themselves losing permanent positions that they were 
placed in or if other issues affecting employment occur, such as relapsing in substance abuse, 
CEO will offer them services once more under the following conditions. If a parole officer 
refers a former client back to CEO, that person may return to the program for assistance as long 
as he was not terminated from the permanent position for theft or violence. If the period of 
absence from the program is shorter than six months, then the person simply resumes full 
  
                                                 
10At the time of the study, CEO job coaches did not continue to work with clients after they were placed in 
permanent placements. Notably, after the study enrollment period was completed, CEO staff continued to alter 
and refine their approaches to retention services.  
Box 2.1 (continued) 
Client 4 
Client 4 was doing well in the CEO transitional job and was considered to be job ready. A 
job developer met with her and sent her to an interview. She did not get that job, and the 
job developer planned to continue working with her. However, the client began to miss 
days of work on the transitional job, and then she started to miss even her meetings with 
staff. Staff later learned that this client had relapsed into drug abuse. 
Client 5 
Client 5 was considered an ideal CEO client whose case went smoothly throughout the 
process of working in a transitional job and meeting with job coaches and job developers. 
At the time of the site visit, the client worked in a permanent job and had stayed in contact 
with CEO to earn retention bonuses for keeping this position. 
Client 6 
At the time of the site visit, Client 6 had been successfully working in a CEO transitional 
job for three months and had a work history as a dishwasher, laborer, demolition worker, 
and machine glass-cutter. The job developer had sent him on three interviews for perma-
nent positions, but he had not yet been hired. The job developer believed that the client 
had not been hired because he was an older man; the job developer reported that when it 
came to hiring laborer positions, employers tend to want younger men. The job developer 
planned to continue to work with this client to find a permanent placement. He was com-
fortable sending this client to several employers for interviews because the client was 
eager to work. 
SOURCE: Case reviews conducted during an in-person site visit in June 2005. 
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services: a transitional job, job coaching, and job development. If a former client is no longer on 
parole but still would like CEO’s help, that person can receive job development and postplace-
ment services.  
The Responsible Fatherhood Program  
The final major service that CEO provides is its Responsible Fatherhood Program, 
which attempts to help clients better manage their parenting responsibilities and their child 
support orders. The program is described to clients during the life skills class, and participation 
in it is voluntary. 
The Responsible Fatherhood Program offers assistance managing child support orders. 
This is seen as supporting CEO’s employment mission, because clients who have large support 
orders may have little incentive to work in the formal labor market, since their employer will be 
required to withhold support payments from their paycheck. The first step is for CEO to receive 
a report of a client’s account history so that it is aware of any outstanding orders. CEO staff 
assist clients in understanding their support orders, help prepare them for dealing with the Child 
Support Enforcement agency, and brief them on what to expect during court hearings related to 
orders. CEO focuses on current payments but not on arrears, which may be very large. (In many 
cases, noncustodial parents accrue arrears while they are incarcerated.) Clients may owe some 
or all arrears to the state, in which case, they are still obligated to pay. If the arrears are due the 
mother of the child and not the state, CEO helps fathers fill out the related paperwork.  
CEO staff have an ongoing relationship with one customer service outreach person at 
the Child Support Enforcement agency. Staff accompany clients to meet with this staff person 
about modifying clients’ child support orders, and because the CEO staff have this existing 
relationship, clients do not have to wait to be seen. CEO staff help provide information to 
customer service about the type of work that the clients are participating in. Typically, support 
orders are modified to $25 per month, and these funds are collected through wage withholding. 
The order changes are temporary, however, and clients need to go back to court to have them 
readjusted based on earnings in about a three-month period. 
CEO also offers a parenting class to those in the Responsible Fatherhood Program. The 
class includes six sessions over the course of six weeks. Clients attend the class during their day 
in the office, when they meet with other CEO staff, such as job coaches and job developers. 
Participation in CEO Program Activities 
Although CEO staff intend for participants to receive all the services outlined above, 
not everyone remains in programs to accept all the help offered. To understand program impacts 
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on participants’ outcomes, it is important to know how much of the CEO service package 
participants received.11,12
As shown in Table 2.2, almost 80 percent of the program group completed the four-day 
preemployment life skills class.
 
13
Although 28 percent of the sample did not participate in a CEO job, they were still fol-
lowed throughout the study. They were not asked why they did not work a CEO job, but these 
clients likely left the program before completing the life skills class, for any number of reasons. 
They may have left for lack of interest, to take another job, or because of personal issues. 
 As expected, almost everyone who completed the class — 
about 72 percent of the total program group — worked at least one day in a work crew in the 
transitional job program. The bottom panel of the table shows that, of the participants who 
worked in a CEO transitional job work crew, 29 percent worked 1 to 4 weeks; 40 percent 
worked 5 to 12 weeks; and 24 percent worked 13 weeks or more. The average length of time in 
a work crew was 8 weeks. 
Among the total program group (top panel), 60 percent met with a job coach at least 
once, and 22 percent met with a job coach more than four times (not shown in table). However, 
one would not expect those who never worked in a transitional job to meet with a job coach. In 
fact, whether or not clients worked a transitional job and how long they worked that job mat-
tered for receiving other services. For example, as shown in Table 2.3, among those who 
worked a transitional job for 13 weeks or more, 94 percent met with a job coach at least once, 
and 72 percent met with a job coach more than four times. Contact with job developers follows 
the same pattern. For the total program group (Table 2.2), 57 percent met with a job developer 
at least once, and about 12 percent met with a job developer more than four times (not shown in 
table). As expected, however, more of the group received job developer services the longer they 
worked in transitional jobs. Among those who worked a transitional job for 13 weeks or more 
(Table 2.3), 99 percent met with a job developer at least once, and 71 percent met with a job 
developer more than four times.  
Only a portion of those in the program group found permanent positions. Independent 
of the number of times that participants met with job developers, 30 percent of the program 
group were placed in permanent jobs or found permanent jobs through their own efforts (Table 
2.2). However, when one considers the amount of time that participants worked in a transitional  
                                                 
11Participants in both the program and the control group reported also receiving services from organiza-
tions other than CEO. The details of this participation are documented in Chapter 3. 
12The data presented in this section come from CEO’s management information and payroll systems. Be-
cause of variations in data entry by staff, these data may not fully capture all CEO contacts with participants. 
13Thus, 21 percent of participants did not participate in CEO services because they did not complete the 
life skills class. No data are available to indicate how much of the class they received.  
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The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table 2.2
Program Group’s Participation in CEO Activities
Center for Employment Opportunities
Outcome Contol group
Completed life skills/preemployment class (%) 78.9
Worked in CEO transitional job (%) 71.7
Weeks worked in CEO transitional joba  (%)
Never worked in CEO transitional job 28.4
Less than 1 week  5.5
1-4 weeks         20.8
5-12 weeks        28.5
13-24 weeks       14.1
More than 24 weeks 2.8
Days between random assignment date and start of CEO transitional job (%)
Never worked in CEO transitional job 28.4
0-7 days 48.4
8-14 days 14.8
More than 14 days 8.5
Met with a job coach (%) 59.5
Met with a job developer (%) 57.4
Placed in an unsubsidized jobb (%) 30.2
Among those who worked in a CEO transitional job (total = 407)
Weeks worked in CEO transtitional joba (%)
Less than 1 week  7.6
1-4 weeks         29.0
5-12 weeks        39.8
13-24 weeks       19.7
More than 24 weeks 3.9
Average weeks worked in CEO transitional job 8.3
Number of meetings with job coach (%)
None 18.4
1-2 31.0
3-4 20.1
More than 4 30.5
Number of meetings with job developer (%)
None 21.4
1-2 34.6
3-4 15.5
More than 4 28.5
(continued)
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job, the placement rates increase. For example, 56 percent of those who worked in a transitional 
job for 13 weeks or more found permanent positions (Table 2.3). Of all those placed in perma-
nent positions since the Rapid Rewards program began in August 2004, 52 percent received at 
least one retention bonus. (See Box 2.2 for more information about program participation.)  
Conclusion  
To understand the impact of a program on participants’ lives, one must understand the 
services that people were offered and those that they actually received. The types of help and 
support received and how participants experience programs are valuable contextual backdrops 
for evaluation findings. Following are some important themes to reflect on when considering 
these impact findings:  
• The CEO model includes preemployment job readiness activities, transitional 
work, placement services into permanent positions, and postplacement reten-
tion support and incentives. 
Outcome Percentage
Placed in an unsubsidized job (%) 40.8
Self-placement 7.9
Direct placement 34.4
Participated in fatherhood activity (among fathers) (%) 39.2
Sample size 568
Table 2.2 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and 
Learning (NIGEL) database. 
NOTES: This table reflects program participation and CEO employment between January 2004 
and October 2006. There were nine control group members (2.2 percent) who worked in CEO 
during the follow-up period. CEO outcomes for these control group members are not shown in 
the table.
aIt is important to note that weeks worked may not be consecutive but includes a total of weeks 
worked after an individual's random assignment date. This variable is created by taking total days 
worked in CEO and dividing by 4 because participants work four days per week in CEO and 
attend job coaching or other CEO services on the fifth day.
bThis includes unsubsidized employment placements by CEO staff and self-placement 
employment that CEO was made aware of or that the client reported to CEO. 
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At least At least 5 weeks 13 weeks
Outcome (%) 1 day 2 weeks or more or more
Met with a job coach 
At least once 81.6 88.3 91.5 94.4
More than four times 30.5 35.5 51.3 71.9
Met with a job developer
At least once 78.6 87.1 94.9 98.9
More than four times 28.5 34.0 47.0 70.8
Placed in or found permanent jobsb 40.8 45.0 49.1 56.2
Sample size (total = 407)
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table 2.3
Program Group’s Participation in CEO Services, by Length of Time
Center for Employment Opportunities
 Working a CEO Transitional Job
Among Those Who Worked a CEO Transitional Joba
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and 
Learning (NIGEL) database. 
NOTES: This table reflects program participation and CEO employment between January 2004 and 
October 2006. The sample in this table includes program group clients randomly assigned between 
January 2004 and October 2005. There were nine control group members (2.2 percent) who worked 
in CEO during the follow-up period. CEO outcomes for these control group members are not shown 
in the table.
aIt is important to note that weeks worked may not be consecutive but includes a total of weeks 
worked after an individual's random assignment date. This variable is created by taking total days 
worked in CEO and dividing by 4 because participants work four days per week in CEO and attend 
job coaching or other CEO services on the fifth day.
bThis includes unsubsidized employment placements by CEO staff and self-placement employment 
that CEO was made aware of or that the client reported to CEO. 
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Box 2.2 
Index of Program Participation 
Although the information in this chapter sheds light on program participation rates, it is 
still not clear just how much of the program people received. Thus, an index of program 
participation (including time worked in a transitional job, number of meetings with job 
coaches, and number of meetings with job developers) was created to examine the propor-
tions of the program group that received small, medium, or high amounts of CEO services. 
About 27 percent of the program group never worked in a transitional job and also never 
had any meetings with job coaches or job developers. These people remained in the study 
and were tracked over time, although they never completed the first step of CEO’s servic-
es –– the life skills class –– or they completed the class but never returned to CEO for the 
transitional job.  
However, among those who got any transitional job or job coaching or job development 
services, 37 percent received a low amount of services; 34 percent received a medium 
amount of services; and 29 percent received a high amount of services. Notably, this index 
is meant only to shed light on how much service was provided to clients. Higher service 
receipt does not necessarily mean greater program success. Some clients who had low 
service receipt may be in this category because they did not require many services. They 
may have moved quickly to a permanent position due to their job readiness or arising 
opportunities.  
• Low service receipt is defined in two ways: (1) anyone who worked in a tran-
sitional job for four weeks or less and received up to two appointments with 
job coaches or job developers or (2) anyone who worked in a transitional job 
for less than one week but who somehow received three or more meetings with 
job coaches or job developers. 
• Medium service receipt is defined in two ways: (1) anyone who worked a 
transitional job for five to twelve weeks and received up to four appointments 
with job coaches or job developers or (2) anyone who worked in a transitional 
job for one to four weeks and also received three or more meetings with job 
coaches or job developers. 
• High service receipt is defined in two ways: (1) anyone who worked in a tran-
sitional job for thirteen or more weeks or (2) anyone who worked in a transi-
tional job for five to twelve weeks and received four or more meetings with job 
coaches or job developers. 
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• CEO clients have many opportunities to receive services and assistance 
through direct contact with staff, including work site supervisors, job coach-
es, job developers, and staff from the Responsible Fatherhood Program (for 
those enrolled in it). 
• CEO provides two ways for clients to build soft skills — hands-on expe-
rience in a transitional job and office-based job coaching. 
• The CEO model requires efficient and capable staff to support over 30 work 
sites and to pay clients on a daily basis. 
• CEO emphasizes the transitional nature of the work and tries to move clients 
to permanent positions as soon as they are able.  
• During the study enrollment period, CEO made several service enhance-
ments (for example, the Passport to Success evaluation system, Rapid Re-
wards, and the addition of retention workers); however, the core of the pro-
gram’s services — transitional job work crews, job coaching, and job 
development — remained the same during that time. The implemented en-
hancements did not affect the full program group. 
Finally, Box 2.3 concludes this chapter by sharing the thoughts of 19 members of the 
program group who gave information in ethnographic interviews about their perceptions of 
CEO services and their feelings about participation in the program. 
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Box 2.3 
Findings from Ethnographic Interviews 
With a few exceptions, participants were positive about their experiences in the CEO 
program. A number of participants expressed the sentiment that, in a time of need, “they 
help you out.” They reported that, by and large, supervisors were fair and did not harass 
them. A few negative incidents and personality clashes were noted; however, those who 
had such experiences usually were able to transfer to another site. Participants who were 
interviewed reported that their relations with other CEO participants were fine. Most of 
them seemed to see themselves as able to get along with others well. Although no partici-
pants reported significant problems with other participants, no one reported befriending 
other participants either.  
Participants discussed a number of aspects of the program that they felt were helpful. First 
was the work itself, which met a number of important and immediate needs. The job gave 
them somewhere to go, filled their days, and offered a regular routine that kept them off 
the streets and away from former undesirable behavior or habits. This was an important 
aspect of the program for some participants. Establishing a regular routine was an impor-
tant step in their pursuit of regular legal employment. Additionally, for most participants, 
the work that they were asked to do (maintenance) was familiar and not difficult. No one 
spoke of feeling overworked in the program.  
Another benefit of going to work was, of course, the pay. All the participants found the 
money useful to cover basic expenses, like transportation, meals, some utilities, items for 
their children, and cigarettes. The money was not enough to make substantial contributions 
to housing expenses. In addition to the pay, a few participants mentioned appreciating the 
incentives that went with program participation. 
Participants were most grateful for the help that CEO staff gave in having to answer the 
most difficult question regarding convictions or felonies. “They just helped me with the 
answer, you know, if an employer asks you a question like “Have you been convicted of a 
crime?” That was a very difficult question for me to answer.” Participants were relieved 
by the groundwork that CEO staff did in arranging interviews with employers, who were 
aware of the felony status of their applicants. “And the only good thing that I was looking 
forward to them sending me to these jobs was that the employers already knew . . . they 
basically knew your background.”   
Among the participants interviewed, only about one-quarter were currently employed. 
Most of those got their current jobs through CEO contacts. Of the others, some were still 
with CEO; others had been discharged from the program for various reasons; and others 
had simply left to job-search on their own. Some in the unplaced category reported never 
being sent out on any interviews by CEO, while others had been sent on interviews and 
even began work with some employers in positions that did not work out. A few were very 
positive about CEO (those who had been placed into jobs) and reported maintaining 
contact with the program (for example, by giving speeches at events and sharing employ-
ment opportunities at their work site). 
(continued) 
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Box 2.3 (continued) 
I talk positive about CEO because they helped me. I honestly feel like they 
did care and they did help, so it was, like, I can’t even talk bad about them, 
because they did get me employment, and they did help me out while I was 
looking for employment. They put a little money in my pocket and kept me 
out of trouble, I had a little cigarette money.  
Some participants were unsure about approaching the program for assistance after having 
left, but a few who were unsuccessful in finding employment noted that they are consider-
ing returning to the program for work. One participant expressed the intention of returning 
to CEO for employment as a site supervisor. 
SOURCE: Ethnographic study of 19 program group members by Alissa Gardenhire Crooks. 
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Chapter 3 
Impacts of CEO on Participation and Service Receipt 
Chapter 2 describes the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) program for for-
mer prisoners who are returning to the community and provides information on the level of their 
participation in CEO activities, using data from the program’s tracking and payroll systems. 
This chapter uses data from the client survey to present information on the receipt of such 
services as job search assistance, education or training, and parenting classes –– whether sample 
members received these services from CEO or from another organization. It focuses primarily 
on differences in the services received by survey respondents in the study’s two research 
groups. The client survey achieved a 70 percent response rate for the program group and a 66 
percent response rate for the control group. Most individuals were surveyed 16 to 23 months 
after being randomly assigned to the two groups; random assignment occurred between January 
2004 and October 2005.1
The findings in this chapter help to inform the analysis of CEO’s effects on employ-
ment and recidivism, which are presented in Chapters 4 and 5. As discussed in Chapter 2, both 
research groups received certain preemployment services from CEO. Thus, it is expected that a 
relatively similar proportion of program and control group members would receive employment 
services. However, the main treatment difference between the two groups was the receipt of 
transitional jobs by program group members. Thus, the program group’s receipt of transitional 
jobs is expected to greatly exceed the control group’s. 
 
Although the survey collected information on the types of activities that individuals par-
ticipated in and the types of services and supports that they received, the survey does not 
address whether program or control group respondents received higher-quality services. Also, 
the survey did not collect information on the intensity of the services that sample members 
received. 
Box 3.1 explains how to interpret the impact tables presented in the remainder of the 
report. 
                                                 
1The survey interview dates ranged from 15 to 28 months after random assignment. Note that, according 
to administrative data, the CEO survey respondents experienced stronger employment and recidivism effects 
than the rest of the research sample. Thus, the survey might show bigger impacts on outcomes linked to 
recidivism than might exist for the full sample. Refer to Appendix A for additional information regarding the 
client survey. 
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Box 3.1 
How to Read the Estimated Impact Tables in This Report 
Most tables in this report use a similar format, illustrated below. Several participation outcomes are 
shown for the program group and the control group. For example, the table shows that about 68 (67.9) 
percent of the program group and about 64 (64.3) percent of the control group ever participated in any 
employment or education-related activity. 
The “Difference” column in the table shows the differences between the two research groups’ participa-
tion rates — that is, the CEO program’s estimated impact on participation. For example, the estimated 
impact on participating in job search activities can be calculated by subtracting 58.9 percent from 60.6 
percent, yielding a 1.6 percentage point difference.  
Differences marked with asterisks are “statistically significant,” meaning that it is quite unlikely that the 
differences arose by chance. The number of asterisks indicates whether the estimated impact is statisti-
cally significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, or 1 percent level (the lower the level, the less likely that 
the impact is due to chance). For example, as shown in the last row of data, the program group model 
had a statistically significant impact of 9.9 percentage points at the 5 percent level on participating in 
individual job searches. (One asterisk corresponds to the 10 percent level; two asterisks, the 5 percent 
level; and three asterisks, the 1 percent level.) The p-value shows the exact levels of significance.  
Impact estimates are regression-adjusted using background characteristics of the sample, including 
gender, age, race/ethnicity, prior employment, prior recidivism, length of time between release from 
prison and random assignment, and other relevant characteristics. In addition, the impact estimates are 
weighted by the week of random assignment to reflect the representation of each research group in the 
research sample. 
See Appendix F for additional information about the impact tables. 
Impacts on Participation in Employment and Education Activities 
 
Outcome 
 Program 
Group 
 Control 
Group 
Difference 
(Impact)   P-Value 
        
Participated in any job search, education,       
 or training activity (%)  67.9 64.3 3.6  0.400 
        
Participated in a job search activity (%) 60.6 58.9 1.6  0.709 
 Group job search/readiness 50.7 51.8 -1.2  0.798 
 Individual job search  31.2 21.3 9.9 ** 0.012 
        
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215       
       
SOURCE: MDRC calculations based on responses to the client survey. 
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Impacts on Participation in Employment and Educational 
Activities  
Table 3.1 shows the impacts of CEO on participation in employment and education ac-
tivities. As noted in Chapter 2, both the program and the control group members were offered 
preemployment services, but only the program group members were placed in transitional jobs. 
According to the survey data, program group members were twice as likely to participate in a 
transitional job: 32 percent of the program group and 16 percent of the control group reported 
doing so. Although the difference of 16 percentage points is large and statistically significant, 
participation was definitely underreported because CEO’s payroll data show that 72 percent of 
the program group received a transitional job paycheck from CEO. (See Chapter 2.) The survey 
was administered over a year after random assignment, and if sample members had a transition-
al job early in that period, or if they worked the transitional job for only a short period, they 
might not have remembered the job when asked.2 It is impossible, however, to know how much 
each research group underreported transitional job participation, since both groups may have 
worked in such jobs for organizations other than CEO.3
As expected, the two groups were equally likely to report participating in job search ac-
tivities. The services that CEO provided to the control group were much more limited than 
those provided to the program group, but, as noted above, the survey did not measure the 
intensity or quality of such services. Program group members were more likely than control 
group members to report participating in individual job search (that is, a job search supervised 
by an agency staff person). The results also show that about one-quarter of each research group 
reported participating in education or training –– mostly in General Educational Development 
(GED) classes or vocational training. 
 
Table 3.2 shows the percentage of each respondent group that received various types of 
employment-related assistance. The bottom rows of the table show that a large proportion of 
both research groups reported receiving at least one employment service since random assign-
ment: 83 percent of the program group and 79 percent of the control group. The results also 
show that control group members were more likely to receive help from organizations other  
                                                 
2Transitional job participation was measured in two ways. First, among survey respondents who were ever 
employed since random assignment, the survey asked whether or not they were employed in a transitional or a 
subsidized job for which they got a paycheck from an employment program –– for example, CEO, Wildcat, 
and the Doe Fund –– rather than from their company or employer. Second, respondents were asked whether or 
not they were ever employed in a day-labor job.  
3One limitation of collecting data through surveys is that individuals may misremember or misreport some 
of the outcomes. In this case, however, there is no indication that the underestimates are more severe for one 
group than the other. Additional analysis, which compared outside data sources with the survey responses, 
found similar underreporting for both research groups. (See Appendix B.)  
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea
Worked in a transitional jobb (%) 32.3 16.2 16.1 *** 0.000
Participated in any job search, education, 
or training activity (%) 67.9 64.3 3.6 0.400
Participated in a job search activity (%) 60.6 58.9 1.6 0.709
Group job search/readiness 50.7 51.8 -1.2 0.798
Individual job search 31.2 21.3 9.9 ** 0.012
Participated in an education/training activity (%) 26.5 29.1 -2.6 0.515
Adult basic education/GED/ESL classes 10.4 10.2 0.1 0.962
College courses 4.4 4.7 -0.3 0.883
Vocational training 10.6 10.6 -0.1 0.977
Other 13.4 13.9 -0.5 0.867
Average number of weeks participating in:
Job search activities 3.3 2.7 0.6 0.236
Education/training activities 1.2 1.1 0.1 0.785
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Center for Employment Opportunities
Impacts on Participation in Employment and Education Activities
Table 3.1
SOURCE: MDRC calculations based on responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between 
research groups for the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the standard 
errors for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000 (presented in the order in which they appear on the table): 3.8.
bThis measure includes respondents who said “yes” to having worked in a transitional or subsidized job where 
they got a paycheck from an employment program (such as CEO, Wildcat, or the Doe fund) or having worked in 
a day labor job.
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Table 3.2
Impacts on Receipt of Employment Services
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea
Received referral to specific job opening 32.3 18.8 13.5 *** 0.001
At CEO 27.9 9.6 18.3 *** 0.000
At another organization 5.6 11.6 -6.0 ** 0.014
Received advice about job interviews 64.6 56.3 8.4 * 0.054
At CEO 55.0 39.0 16.0 *** 0.000
At another organization 14.2 25.2 -10.9 *** 0.002
Received advice about discussing criminal history with 
potential employers 69.1 60.7 8.4 ** 0.044
At CEO 58.7 44.9 13.8 *** 0.002
At another organization 12.9 21.6 -8.7 *** 0.009
Received advice about how to behave on a job 66.4 55.9 10.6 ** 0.013
At CEO 57.3 42.7 14.6 *** 0.001
At another organization 10.4 20.2 -9.8 *** 0.002
Received names of people to contact about jobs 29.7 22.6 7.1 * 0.076
At CEO 27.8 15.3 12.5 *** 0.001
At another organization 5.9 10.9 -5.1 ** 0.038
Received help putting a résumé together 57.7 60.0 -2.3 0.611
At CEO 52.5 43.7 8.9 ** 0.049
At another organization 11.7 26.3 -14.6 *** 0.000
Received advice about filling out job applications 58.5 53.8 4.7 0.285
At CEO 49.7 41.4 8.3 * 0.060
At another organization 9.8 18.6 -8.8 *** 0.004
Received any of the above advice/assistance 82.5 78.9 3.6 0.295
At CEO 74.0 62.8 11.2 *** 0.005
At another organization 27.0 38.5 -11.5 *** 0.006
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
SOURCE: MDRC calculations based on responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between 
research groups for the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the 
standard errors for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000 (presented in the order in which they appear on the table): 
3.4, 4.3, and 3.4.
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than CEO — almost 39 percent of the control group received help from another organization, 
compared with only 27 percent of the program group.  
Program group members were more likely to report receiving help in most of the spe-
cific areas. Notably, they were much more likely than control group members to receive a 
referral to a specific job opening: 32 percent of program group members received job referrals, 
compared with only 19 percent of control group members. The difference of 13.5 percentage 
points is statistically significant. This result is not surprising, since control group members 
generally could not receive help from CEO job developers and only 12 percent received such 
assistance from another organization. As expected, the research groups were equally likely to 
report receiving assistance in putting together a résumé and getting advice about filling out job 
applications; many control group members reported receiving such assistance from CEO.  
Impacts on Support and Guidance 
In addition to providing employment services and transitional jobs to program group 
members, CEO staff members provided an array of support and guidance to address issues that 
could prevent clients from successfully reentering the community and the workforce. To 
estimate the effects of staff interactions with participants, the survey asked participants ques-
tions about the support and guidance that they received from CEO and from other organizations. 
Table 3.3 shows that program group respondents were more likely than control group respon-
dents to report that they could turn to a program staff person for advice and support with 
personal or family issues: 41 percent of the program group, compared with 31 percent of the 
control group. The difference is statistically significant. There is also a statistically significant 
difference between the research groups in an individual’s likelihood of viewing a staff member 
as a mentor or guide. Note that about 15 percent of control group members reported receiving 
any of these types of support and guidance from CEO staff. In fact, control group members 
were more likely to report viewing a CEO staff member as a mentor or guide than staff from 
other organizations. 
Impacts on Receipt of Child Support and Parenting Services 
Table 3.4 shows that survey respondents in the program group were more likely than 
those in the control group to participate in child support and parenting activities. Almost 19 
percent of program group members reported receiving help with child support issues and  
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Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group Impact P-Valuea
Can turn to someone on staff for advice and support
with personal or family issues 40.5 30.8 9.7 ** 0.024
At CEO 30.3 14.6 15.6 *** 0.000
At another organization 17.0 22.4 -5.4 0.119
Views someone on staff as a mentor or guide 28.4 21.4 7.0 * 0.073
At CEO 22.6 12.3 10.3 *** 0.003
At another organization 3.7 3.4 0.3 0.835
Has someone on staff who goes out of the way 
to help when needed 38.5 34.0 4.5 0.287
At CEO 30.7 18.5 12.2 *** 0.002
At another organization 11.9 21.3 -9.4 *** 0.003
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
Center for Employment Opportunities
Impacts on Support and Guidance
 Table 3.3
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
SOURCE: MDRC calculations based on responses from the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference in the 
corresponding variables exists between research groups.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the 
standard errors for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000 (presented in the order in which they appear on the 
table): 3.8.
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Table 3.4
Impacts on Participation in Parenting Activities
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea
Received help with child support issues 18.4 6.0 12.4 *** 0.000
At CEO 15.6 3.9 11.7 *** 0.000
At another organization 2.1 1.4 0.7 0.554
Participated in parenting program 16.9 6.6 10.4 *** 0.000
At CEO 13.6 3.0 10.6 *** 0.000
At another organization 2.8 3.2 -0.4 0.811
Participated in fathers' discussion groupb 17.9 7.2 10.7 *** 0.000
At CEO 15.4 3.8 11.6 *** 0.000
At another organization 3.3 3.2 0.2 0.928
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
SOURCE: MDRC calculations based on responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between 
research groups for the corresponding variable.
The sample in this table includes all respondents, including those who are not parents.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the 
standard errors for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000 (presented in the order in which they appear on the 
table): 2.9, 2.7, 3.0, 2.7, 3.0, and 2.7.
bFemale respondents are excluded from this measure (total = 37).
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participated in parenting classes, compared with about 6 percent of the control group.4
Conclusion 
 These 
results are not surprising, given that CEO participants could spend one day a week participating 
in voluntary activities, which included an extensive fatherhood program that assisted partici-
pants with child support issues and parenting classes.  
The survey results show that the program group was significantly more likely than the 
control group to report participating in transitional jobs. As discussed above, since the survey 
likely underestimated participation in these jobs, it is impossible to estimate CEO’s effect on 
transitional job participation. As expected, program and control group respondents reported 
being just as likely to participate in employment activities and to receive employment assis-
tance, such as help preparing a résumé and filling out a job application. However, the program 
and control groups received different types of services. For instance, program group members 
were more likely to receive referrals to specific job openings, advice on how to behave on a job, 
help with child support issues, and support addressing personal issues. Finally, the survey 
results show that the program group members were more likely than control group members to 
report viewing someone on the CEO staff as a mentor or guide.  
                                                 
4These percentages refer to the entire program and control groups, even though about half the people in 
each group were not parents. 
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Chapter 4 
Impacts of CEO on Employment and Earnings 
Many former prisoners have low levels of education and little work experience, along 
with other characteristics that make it difficult for them to find employment. The added burden 
of a criminal record can make finding employment even more challenging. The New York 
City-based Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) seeks to place program participants in 
immediate, wage-paying transitional jobs that provide legitimate income during the uncertain 
period after release from prison. The transitional jobs help participants obtain experience while 
allowing staff to identify and address workplace problems through observation, job coaching, 
and other supportive services. Ultimately, the program seeks to increase clients’ placement in 
unsubsidized employment and improve their job retention.  
This chapter presents the CEO program’s two-year impacts on employment and earn-
ings, using unemployment insurance (UI) data from New York State and the National Directory 
of New Hires (NDNH) and payroll data from CEO. Using these data, it is possible to accurately 
estimate the proportion of this study’s sample members who were employed in a UI-covered 
job for at least one day in each quarter in the two years following random assignment.1 CEO’s 
transitional jobs are included in UI wage records. UI-covered earnings data from the National 
Directory of New Hires are available only for the second year of follow-up.2 The chapter also 
presents data on employment and job characteristics as captured by the client survey (discussed 
in Appendix A).3
Impacts for the Full Sample 
 
• CEO substantially increased employment early in the follow-up period, 
but the impact faded over time. 
Table 4.1 presents CEO’s impacts on UI-covered employment and earnings. Results are 
shown separately, by year, for CEO transitional jobs, unsubsidized employment, and total UI- 
                                                 
1Random assignment occurred between January 2004 and October 2005. 
2Due to data archiving, NDNH earnings data are not available for the first three quarters following random 
assignment. Therefore, this report presents annual average earnings impacts only for Year 2.  
3Some transitional employment programs report to the UI system, and some do not; therefore, there is no 
way of knowing whether any of the non-CEO jobs in the UI records are transitional jobs. In this report, non-
CEO employment found in the UI data is considered unsubsidized employment. 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea
Employment (%)
CEO transitional employment
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) 69.5 2.7 66.8 *** 0.000
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 6.3 1.4 4.9 *** 0.000
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 69.8 3.8 66.0 *** 0.000
Unsubsidized employmentb
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) 45.9 48.6 -2.7 0.388
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 48.7 49.3 -0.7 0.833
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 59.6 62.8 -3.2 0.307
Total UI-covered employment
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) 81.5 57.5 23.9 *** 0.000
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 51.4 50.0 1.4 0.664
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 85.2 69.3 16.0 *** 0.000
Earnings ($)
CEO transitional job earningsc
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) 887 31 856 *** 0.000
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 61 9 52 *** 0.009
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8)d 947 40 907 NA
Unsubsidized earningse
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) --- --- --- ---
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 5,106 4,661 445 0.531
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) --- --- --- ---
Total UI-covered earningse
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) --- --- --- ---
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 5,167 4,670 497 0.484
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) --- --- --- ---
Sample size (total = 973)f 564 409
(continued)
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Table 4.1
 Impacts on Employment and Earnings
Center for Employment Opportunities
               
  
                 
            
          
               
                 
             
 
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) 
database and unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New York State and payroll 
data from CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and Learning (NIGEL) 
database. 
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covered employment (which includes CEO transitional jobs and unsubsidized jobs).4
                                                 
4NDNH employment data are available for only a partial sample in Quarters 1 to 3. New York State em-
ployment data are available for the full follow-up period but do not provide information to allow a distinction 
between CEO transitional jobs and unsubsidized employment. Additional state aggregate data for the full 
sample allowed a comparison of NDNH data for the partial sample in Quarters 1 to 3 and the full sample in 
those quarters. This comparison showed that the partial sample from NDNH represents findings for the full 
sample. NDNH data are, therefore, used in this chapter’s analysis. Appendix Table B.1 compares NDNH 
partial sample results and New York State aggregate results for the full sample. 
 CEO’s 
ultimate goal was to increase employment in unsubsidized jobs. Therefore, it is helpful to 
examine employment results separately in order to account for the program’s effects on unsub-
sidized jobs separate from CEO transitional jobs. The upper half of the table shows employment 
in CEO’s transitional jobs, unsubsidized employment, and total UI-covered employment. The 
first four rows show, as expected, that most program group members (70 percent) and only a 
Table 4.1 (continued)
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for 
pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 
percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude 
that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. 
Following are the standard errors for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000 (presented in the order 
in which they appear on the table): Employment: 2.3604, 1.3036, 2.4045, 2.8239, and 2.6085.
Earnings: 52.487.
bUnsubsidized employment is estimated from NDNH data, which are incomplete for 
Quarters 1 to 3. A comparison of aggregate estimates provided for the full sample from the 
NYS Department of Labor indicates that the results from NDNH are representative of the full 
sample. 
cCEO earnings in Year 1 are based on payroll data from CEO's NIGEL.
dThis difference is not tested for statistical significance because the UI data are estimated 
from different sources in Year 1 and Year 2 and the years could not be combined on an 
individual level to provide a total.
eEarnings data are incomplete in Year 1 and therefore cannot be estimated accurately in 
Year 1 or in the total for both years.
fFour sample members are missing Social Security numbers and therefore could not be 
matched to UI data.
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few control group members (3 percent) worked in a CEO transitional job in Year 1.5
The next four rows of the table show impacts on unsubsidized employment. In both 
years, less than half of both research groups worked in an unsubsidized job. In Year 1, there was 
no statistically significant difference in working in an unsubsidized job.
 Few 
sample members worked in a CEO transitional job in Year 2.  
6
The final rows of the top panel of the table show that, overall, 85 percent of the program 
group worked in a UI-covered job for at least one day, compared with 69 percent of the control 
group, for a 16.0 percentage point increase over the two years.  
 In Year 2, there was no 
statistically significant impact on unsubsidized employment or total UI-covered employment.  
• Employment increases were driven by access to CEO’s transitional jobs. 
Without the CEO transitional jobs, rates of UI-covered employment 
were low throughout the follow-up period. 
When comparing the results in the upper panel of Table 4.1, it becomes evident that 
CEO’s large increases in employment were driven by participation in the program’s transitional 
jobs. As the table shows, there was no statistically significant impact on unsubsidized employ-
ment during the follow-up period.7
The bottom panel of Table 4.1 presents CEO’s impacts on earnings in each type of em-
ployment. Due to data limitations, earnings are not available for Year 1.
  
8
Figure 4.1 presents quarterly employment rates over the follow-up period. The figure 
shows UI-covered employment patterns for both research groups and examines how the 
 Earnings data are 
available for Year 2, and they show that CEO did not significantly increase earnings.  
                                                 
5The results presented in Table 4.1 are from UI records and, therefore, do not exactly match the results 
from the program’s management information system data, presented in Chapter 2, which show that about 72 
percent of the program group worked in a transitional job in Year 1 (Table 2.2).  
6Analysis presented below shows that there was a statistically significant reduction in unsubsidized em-
ployment in Quarter 1 of the follow-up period.  
7It is important to note that adding CEO transitional employment to unsubsidized employment in a par-
ticular year does not produce the total UI-covered employment for that year. This is because total UI-covered 
employment is defined as working in either a transitional job or an unsubsidized job and because many sample 
members worked in both types of jobs in any given period. 
8Given the large increase in average employment in Year 1, it might seem likely that there would be a 
corresponding increase in earnings. However, some of CEO’s early increases in transitional employment were 
offset by a reduction in unsubsidized employment (Appendix Table B.2). In addition, CEO’s jobs were part 
time and paid only minimum wage, whereas employment obtained by members of the control group may have 
consisted of higher wages and/or more hours. Taken together, these circumstances make it difficult to predict 
whether CEO increased earnings in Year 1. 
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Figure 4.1
Quarterly Impacts on Employment
Center for Employment Opportunities
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SOURCES: MDRC calculations from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) database and 
unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New York State.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists 
between research groups for the corresponding variable.
The sample size is 973. Four sample members are missing Social Security numbers and therefore could 
not be matched to UI data.
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patterns changed over time. Differences that are statistically significant are indicated by stars 
next to the quarter number at the bottom of the graph.  
As discussed above, CEO produced large impacts on UI-covered employment early in 
the follow-up period. The figure shows that 66 percent of the program group worked for at least 
one day in Quarter 1, compared with only 26 percent of the control group –– for an impact of 40 
percentage points. (Appendix Table B.2 shows the quarterly employment numbers that were 
used to produce Figure 4.1.) Results for the control group provide evidence of what the em-
ployment patterns would be without CEO’s transitional jobs and related services. The figure 
shows that, in the absence of CEO, rates of employment in UI-covered jobs were low. Less than 
one-third of the control group worked in each quarter, and this proportion did not increase 
substantially over time. For the program group, employment peaked in Quarter 1 and declined 
until Quarter 4, after which it remained stable and similar to the control group’s employment 
rate. This pattern shows that the diminishing impacts are a result of a decline in employment for 
the program group and are not a result of the control group’s “catching up” to the program 
group over time, as is common in evaluations of employment programs serving low-income 
populations.  
Impacts on Job Characteristics  
Table 4.2 presents CEO’s impacts on employment and on the characteristics of the cur-
rent or most recent job, as reported in the client survey, which was administered 16 to 23 
months after random assignment in most cases. The table shows that roughly equal numbers (45 
percent) of program and control group respondents reported that they were working at the time 
of the interview. This is broadly consistent with the results from UI wage data in Figure 4.1, 
which shows no impact on employment in Year 2.9
Surprisingly, Table 4.2 also shows that the control group was as likely as the program 
group to report being employed at any time since random assignment. As discussed above, 
Table 4.1 shows that CEO increased UI-covered employment by 16 percentage points during 
the same time period. Two factors may account for the difference in results between the two 
data sources. First, the control group may have been more likely to work in jobs not covered by  
 
                                                 
9Further analysis was conducted that lined up reported employment at the time of the survey with em-
ployment from the UI data in the same quarter for each respondent. This analysis revealed that, most of the 
time, the two data sources agreed. Roughly 20 percent of both research groups reported employment in the 
survey that did not show up in UI data. Appendix Table B.3 presents an analysis comparing UI and survey 
reports of employment in the quarter of the client interview. Some respondents were interviewed while they 
were incarcerated. The table shows that a significant proportion of the discrepancy in employment between the 
survey and the administrative records data is explained by employment in prison or jail, which is not recorded 
in UI data sources.  
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Table 4.2 
Impacts on Employment and Job Characteristics
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea
Employment (%)
Ever worked for pay since random assignment 83.4 86.2 -2.8 0.378
Ever worked in temporary, odd job, or day labor since 
random assignmentb 37.1 35.2 1.9 0.661
Temporary or odd job 8.5 16.2 -7.7 *** 0.008
Day labor through a program 20.6 7.1 13.5 *** 0.000
Day labor not through a program 13.4 17.8 -4.4 0.174
Currently working for pay 44.6 45.2 -0.6 0.896
In prison 6.2 8.3 -2.1 0.359
In the community 38.4 36.8 1.6 0.715
Characteristics of current/most recent job
Current or most recent job is day labor, temporary, or odd job (%) 14.4 10.8 3.6 0.227
Hours per week (%)
Fewer than 30 14.2 14.0 0.2 0.955
30-34 7.4 5.4 2.0 0.364
35-44 44.9 49.3 -4.4 0.328
45 or more 16.7 17.0 -0.3 0.943
Average hours per week 31.1 33.3 -2.2 0.160
Hours per week vary (%)
A lot or a fair amount 22.7 28.5 -5.8 0.139
A little or hardly at all 59.9 56.3 3.6 0.423
Usual work schedule (%)
Regular daytime shift 53.4 61.6 -8.2 * 0.063
Regular evening shift 12.2 7.1 5.1 * 0.064
Regular night shift 4.9 5.7 -0.8 0.684
Other 11.8 10.6 1.3 0.651
Usual schedule includes weekend work (%) 39.8 41.6 -1.8 0.684
Hourly wage (%)
Less than $6.00 10.3 11.0 -0.7 0.793
$6.00-$7.99 25.3 25.1 0.2 0.960
$8.00-$9.99 20.0 18.0 2.0 0.594
$10.00-$11.99 12.3 14.8 -2.5 0.421
$12.00 or more 14.8 16.2 -1.4 0.673
Average hourly wage, among those employed ($) c 9.55 9.41
(continued)
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unemployment insurance. This is important because jobs not covered by the UI system may be 
more informal and of lower quality than jobs that are covered. Second, Chapter 3 shows that 
many survey respondents in the program group did not remember working in a CEO transition-
al job. Indeed, further analysis (not shown) found that almost all the program group members 
who reported on the survey that they had not worked since random assignment received at least 
one transitional job paycheck from CEO. This analysis suggests that had program group 
respondents accurately recalled their employment in CEO’s transitional jobs, the “ever em-
ployed” impact estimated from the survey would have closely mirrored the results from admin-
istrative records. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is not possible to determine how many control 
group members accessed transitional jobs through organizations other than CEO. 
The second panel of Table 4.2 presents CEO’s impacts on the types of jobs obtained by 
participants since random assignment. These measures show that about a third of both research 
groups worked in day-labor, temporary, or odd jobs since random assignment. For the program 
group, a large proportion of these jobs were day labor through CEO. These results also show 
that the control group was more likely to report working in jobs described as temporary or odd 
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Employer-provided benefits (%)
Sick days with full pay 16.3 14.1 2.2 0.500
Paid vacation 21.6 15.2 6.4 * 0.067
Paid holidays other than Christmas and New Year 20.0 19.7 0.3 0.937
Retirement plan 9.2 9.3 0.0 0.991
Dental benefits 20.3 21.5 -1.2 0.738
Health benefits 8.9 11.7 -2.8 0.300
Received a promotion at this job (%) 11.8 7.1 4.7 * 0.085
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
Table 4.2 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations based on responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance 
level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research 
groups for the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the standard 
errors for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000 (presented in the order in which they appear on the table): 3.18.
bSubcategories are not mutually exclusive and may not sum to the total.
cThis measure is calculated among those who worked since random assignment and is therefore considered 
nonexperimental and is not tested for statistical significance.
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jobs, indicating that CEO reduced employment in temporary or odd jobs by 7.7 percentage 
points. This finding suggests that some of CEO’s impact on employment may have been a 
result of moving people from an informal job to a UI-covered job.  
The remainder of Table 4.2 shows that there were no significant differences between 
the research groups in the characteristics of their current or most recent job at the time of the 
survey interview. Most reported working full time –– just over 31 hours per week for both 
research groups. About one-fourth reported that their hours varied quite a bit. Most respondents 
reported fairly low hourly wages. Fewer than one in five reported earning $12.00 or more per 
hour, with about a third earning less than $8.00 per hour. Among those who had worked since 
random assignment, the average hourly wage was $9.55 for program group members and $9.41 
for their control group counterparts. A small proportion reported receiving any type of employ-
er-provided benefits, such as paid days off or health insurance. Notably, program group mem-
bers were more likely than their control group counterparts to report having paid vacation and 
having received a promotion at their current or most recent job (12 percent and 7 percent, 
respectively). Among those who worked, the average length of time at the most recent job was 
about eight months for both research groups (not shown). 
Employment Impacts for Subgroups 
Subgroups Defined by Time Since Release from Prison 
Research on reentry issues stresses the importance of support immediately on release 
from prison. The first days and weeks after release are the most uncertain and are thought to be 
the crucial point for intervention. CEO’s program was designed to assist people coming directly 
out of prison. As discussed in Chapter 1, however, a large proportion of the study sample 
members had been out of prison for a long time before coming to CEO. On average, sample 
members had been out of prison for a year before enrolling in the study; 41 percent of program 
group members and 39 percent of control group members were released from prison within 
three months before random assignment (Table 1.2). Results were examined separately for the 
375 sample members who came to CEO within three months after release from state prison.10
                                                 
10Some sample members were released from New York City jails during the three months prior to report-
ing to CEO. These sample members are not included in the “recently released” subgroup.  
 A 
large majority of CEO’s overall client population comes to the program either immediately on 
release or shortly thereafter (for example, Shock Incarceration, or “boot camp,” graduates). 
More broadly, the “recently released” group better fits the usual definition of a “reentry” 
population, and the results for that group can test the widely held assumption that reentry 
programs are more effective if they begin working with ex-prisoners immediately after release. 
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One-year findings from this evaluation showed that CEO’s impacts on employment for the 
recently released subgroup were similar to impacts for the group that reported to CEO further 
from release, though they were somewhat larger and declined more slowly.11
• Employment impacts for the recently released subgroup are similar to 
results for the full sample.  
 
Table 4.3 presents CEO’s impacts on employment for subgroups defined by length of 
time between prison release and random assignment. As was shown for the full sample, impacts 
on UI-covered employment were very large for both subgroups in Year 1 and diminished by 
Year 2. The table shows that CEO increased employment over the two-year follow-up period by 
22.7 percentage points for the recently released subgroup and by 14.3 percentage points for 
those who reported to CEO further from release. As was shown in the one-year report, the 
impacts on employment were larger for the recently released group in Year 1, but overall effects 
for the two-year follow-up are not statistically different for the subgroups. (The rightmost 
column of Table 4.3 shows H-stars to indicate whether the impacts for the two subgroups are 
statistically different from each other.)12
Other Subgroups 
 Appendix Tables E.1 and E.2 present detailed quarterly 
employment and earnings impacts for the subgroups, by length of time between prison release 
and random assignment.  
The research team examined results for other subgroups based on literature suggesting 
that CEO may have affected certain subgroups differently. For example, prior research has 
shown that employment programs can be more successful for older men and women coming 
out of prison.13
                                                 
11Bloom, Redcross, Zweig, and Azurdia (2007). Recidivism impacts in Year 1 were much larger for the 
recently released subgroup. 
 Results were also examined for those who had a high school diploma or a 
General Educational Development (GED) certificate at baseline and for those who did not, 
using the hypothesis that the program may have better results for a more disadvantaged sub-
group that is less likely to find employment without assistance. Results for these other sub-
groups are generally similar to results for the full sample. Findings for other subgroups are 
presented in Appendix E. 
12When comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to 
assess whether the difference in impacts between the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in 
much the same way as the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests is interpreted.  
13Uggen (2000). 
 # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
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Less Than 3 Months More Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea H-Starsb
CEO transitional employment
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) 73.3 -0.6 74.0 *** 0.000 67.9 3.5 64.4 *** 0.000 *
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 2.9 0.2 2.6 * 0.062 8.4 2.2 6.2 *** 0.003
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 73.3 -0.6 74.0 *** 0.000 68.1 5.4 62.7 *** 0.000 **
Total UI-covered employment
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) 86.6 54.0 32.7 *** 0.000 79.8 58.2 21.6 *** 0.000 *
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 53.2 48.0 5.2 0.325 49.5 50.7 -1.2 0.774
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 89.4 66.7 22.7 *** 0.000 83.8 69.4 14.3 *** 0.000
Earnings in Year 2 ($) 6,322 5,703 620 0.593 4,800 3,729 1,071 0.249
Sample size (total = 925)c 220 155 313 237
Table 4.3
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
Center for Employment Opportunities
Impacts on Employment, by Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) database and unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from 
New York State and payroll data from CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and Learning (NIGEL) database. 
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that 
one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the standard errors for all impacts with a p-value 
of 0.000 (presented in the order in which they appear on the table and beginning with the "Less Than 3 Months" subgroup): 3.7945, 3.7945, 4.5319,  
4.1909, 3.1721, 3.282, 3.8253, and 3.5286.
bWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts 
between the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) tests are interpreted. 
cA total of 48 sample members are missing the latest prison release date prior to random assignment and are therefore missing from estimates in this 
table. In addition, four sample members are missing Social Security numbers and therefore could not be matched to UI data. 
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The Role of CEO’s Transitional Jobs 
The results presented above show that CEO’s transitional jobs contributed a great deal 
to the program’s impacts on UI-covered employment. However, the increase in employment in 
transitional jobs did not lead to higher employment in unsubsidized jobs. Survey data suggest 
that the quality of jobs obtained by both the program group members and the control group 
members was similar. 
Figure 4.2 examines CEO’s quarterly impacts on UI-covered employment over the fol-
low-up period, excluding CEO’s transitional jobs. The figure shows that, in the absence of 
CEO’s jobs, employment rates for the program group are similar, on average, to the control 
group’s rates. In the early quarters, however, CEO led to reductions in unsubsidized employ-
ment. In Quarter 1, 19 percent of program group members worked in an unsubsidized job, 
compared with 28 percent of control group members. The difference of minus 9 percentage 
points is statistically significant. (Appendix Table B.2 shows the numbers used to generate this 
figure.) The reduction quickly faded after the first quarter, however. This result is not unex-
pected and suggests that a small number of participants would have been able to obtain em-
ployment quickly early on, without CEO, and ended up substituting CEO’s transitional em-
ployment for these other jobs.14
To shed light on how the CEO transitional job experience may have influenced unsub-
sidized employment after participants left the program, Box 4.1 presents a diagram of the 
employment patterns for a typical sample of 100 program group members and examines the 
available data more closely. Data from CEO’s management information system are used to 
identify the point at which participants left the program, and then this information is matched to 
UI data from NDNH.
  
15
                                                 
14Data limitations in both the survey and the UI records prevent the researchers from knowing exactly how 
many control group members accessed transitional jobs through organizations other than CEO. It is also 
possible that some control group participants enrolled in transitional employment at another agency. These 
transitional jobs may also be in the UI data, but it is not possible to identify whether UI-covered employment is 
transitional using the available data.  
 This analysis uses administrative records on UI-covered jobs to estimate 
employment. As discussed above, some participants worked in jobs that are not covered by 
unemployment insurance.  
15Note that, in this analysis, CEO’s transitional jobs are identified using administrative data, which, there-
fore, may not exactly match the data in CEO’s management information system, presented in Chapter 2. 
 59 
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Figure 4.2
Quarterly Impacts on Employment Without CEO Transitional Jobs
Center for Employment Opportunities
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SOURCE: MDRC calculations from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) database and 
unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New York State.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between 
research groups for the corresponding variable.
The sample size is 973. Four sample members are missing Social Security numbers and therefore could not 
be matched to UI data.
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Box 4.1 
Employment Patterns for a Typical Sample of  
100 Program Group Members 
70
Worked a CEO transitional job
36
Transitioned to 
unsubsidized 
employment*
12
Worked in all 
remaining 
quarters
6
Lost job but 
working at end 
of follow-up
18
Not working at 
end of follow-up
10
Worked 
unsubsidized job 
in a later quarter
24
Never worked 
again after CEO
16 
Worked 
unsubsidized job 
during follow-up
14 
Never worked 
80
Completed four-day life skills class
100
Randomly assigned
The diagram above shows the UI-covered employment outcomes for a typical sample of 100 
program group participants. As the figure shows, many participants did not participate in all 
aspects of the program and, therefore, did not get CEO’s full intended treatment. The diagram 
shows that 20 participants dropped out before completing the initial four-day life skills class 
and that an additional 10 participants completed the class but did not work in a CEO transi-
tional job. Ultimately, 36 worked in a transitional job and were placed in unsubsidized em-
ployment.* For those who did graduate from the program, only a small proportion (12) were 
able to remain steadily employed after leaving CEO. Although some participants who lost jobs 
after they left the program were able to regain employment by the end of the follow-up period, 
many experienced long spells of unemployment between jobs. 
SOURCES: MDRC calculations based on unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New 
York State provided by the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) database and CEO’s Net-
work for Information Gathering Evaluation and Learning (NIGEL) database.  
NOTES: The numbers in this diagram are an approximation and may not exactly match similar 
outcomes presented in other sections of this report due to differences in data sources and rounding. 
*The analysis assumes that a person “transitioned” to regular employment if he worked in an 
unsubsidized job in the same quarter as the CEO transitional job or in the quarter immediately 
following. This assumption may overestimate the number of people who transitioned. For example, 
it is possible that a person could have worked for one day in a CEO transitional job, then left the 
program, and then not worked in an unsubsidized job for another three months. Notably, however, 
the proportion that was assumed to transition in this analysis –– 36 percent –– closely matches data 
in CEO’s management information system, which shows that 30 percent of the program group were 
placed in an unsubsidized job. 
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Conclusion 
The findings above show that, in the absence of CEO, employment levels for these re-
turning prisoners were very low throughout the two-year follow-up period. Few were able to 
find and keep steady jobs in the absence of intervention and provision of a transitional job. 
CEO employed people who otherwise would not have worked in a UI-covered job — 
as shown by the 16 percentage point increase in the proportion who worked at all during the 
follow-up. Although CEO increased UI-covered employment early in the follow-up as a result 
of the transitional jobs, this increase was short-lived and did not lead to an increase in unsubsi-
dized employment through two years after program entry. About one-third of those who started 
the program eventually graduated and were placed in an unsubsidized job; however, among 
those, few were able to remain employed steadily after leaving CEO.  
Informal and odd jobs were a source of employment for about a fourth of the sample. 
Some of CEO’s impact on employment was the apparent result of moving people from informal 
jobs to UI-covered employment, in the form of a CEO-provided transitional job.  
Taken together, the employment results suggest that transitional jobs are an effective 
strategy to increase employment among former prisoners but that additional supports or 
supplements may be needed to help them gain and retain regular employment and increase 
earnings. Evidence from the evaluation suggests that short-term subsidized employment does 
not necessarily lead to increases in unsubsidized employment. As the program group moved out 
of CEO’s transitional jobs, the employment rate declined. Earnings supplements in combination 
with additional skills training may be needed to sustain unsubsidized employment for this 
population.  
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Chapter 5 
Impacts of CEO on Recidivism 
It is widely believed that interventions designed to increase employment for former 
prisoners may also lead to reduced recidivism. Legitimate employment could reduce the 
incentive to commit crimes, and it may also connect former prisoners to more positive social 
networks and daily routines, helping to ease the transition into the community after leaving 
prison.1
Table 4.1 in Chapter 4 shows that CEO led to substantial increases in employment early 
in this study’s follow-up period and that these increases were primarily the result of CEO’s 
transitional jobs. For the program group, employment peaked in Quarter 1 after random as-
signment, and it declined until Quarter 4, after which it remained stable and similar to the 
control group’s employment rate.
 The premise of the program at the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) in 
New York City is that the provision of transitional jobs and other employment services will lead 
to higher levels of employment and, ultimately, reductions in recidivism.  
2
This chapter presents CEO’s impacts on key measures of recidivism. Administrative 
data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) are used to meas-
ure arrests, convictions, prison incarceration, and parole outcomes. Administrative data from the 
New York City Department of Correction are used to measure jail incarceration. Appendix C 
describes how key recidivism measures are defined in this analysis.  
 The program did not increase employment or earnings in the 
second year of follow-up.  
Impacts for the Full Sample 
• For the full sample, CEO led to reductions in convictions and incarcera-
tion in prison over the first two years of the follow-up period.  
Table 5.1 presents CEO’s impacts on measures of recidivism for the two-year follow-
up period. The data provide a complete picture of convictions and incarceration in both New  
                                                 
1Bloom (2006). 
2Random assignment occurred between January 2004 and October 2005. 
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The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table 5.1
 Two-Year Impacts on Recidivism
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Arresteda (%) 37.7 41.8 -4.1 0.192
Convicted of a crimeb (%) 30.5 38.3 -7.7 ** 0.011
Convicted of a felony 6.6 7.7 -1.1 0.536
Convicted of a misdemeanor 22.8 29.4 -6.6 ** 0.019
Convicted of a violent crimec (%) 4.4 5.8 -1.5 0.309
Incarceratedd (%) 49.5 55.4 -5.9 * 0.064
Prison 25.3 27.7 -2.4 0.399
Jail 49.1 53.5 -4.4 0.168
Incarcerated for a new crime (%) 13.9 16.9 -2.9 0.212
Prison 4.2 6.8 -2.6 * 0.077
Jail 10.1 10.8 -0.7 0.718
Incarcerated for a technical parole violation (%) 31.8 28.9 2.9 0.340
Prison 17.4 15.5 1.9 0.428
Jail 29.1 25.6 3.5 0.234
Total days incarcerated 100 107 -7 0.500
Prison 46 54 -8 0.244
Jail 54 53 1 0.828
Arrested, convicted, or incarcerated (%) 55.7 62.5 -6.8 ** 0.032
Status in the last quarter of Year 2e (%)
Incarcerated and employed 3.5 1.9 1.6 0.135
Incarcerated and not employed 21.4 25.0 -3.7 0.177
Not incarcerated and employed 29.3 26.9 2.4 0.404
Not incarcerated and not employed 45.9 46.3 -0.4 0.911
Sample size (total = 977) 568 409
(continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice 
Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of Correction (DOC).
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York State prisons and New York City jails. Arrests include only unsealed arrests. Impacts on 
all arrests, including unsealed and sealed events, are shown in Appendix Table C.1.3
The first row in Table 5.1 shows that there is no significant difference between the pro-
gram and control groups in the percentage arrested within two years of release from prison. 
About two-fifths of both groups were arrested within two years. The program group was 
significantly less likely to be convicted of a crime (31 percent, compared with 38 percent). The 
reduction in convictions was driven primarily by CEO’s impact on misdemeanor-level charges 
(minus 6.6 percentage points). CEO reduced the proportion incarcerated in either prison or jail 
by 5.9 percentage points. The program also generated reductions in incarceration in state prison 
due to a sentence for a new crime (minus 2.6 percentage points).
  
4
 
 It is interesting to note that 
incarceration resulting from a new sentence was lower than the proportion convicted of a new 
crime; 38 percent of the control group were convicted of a crime, but only 17 percent were 
admitted to prison or jail because of a new sentence. This could be related to the fact that the 
majority of convictions were for misdemeanor-level crimes that may not carry additional prison 
or jail time. It is also possible that some of these misdemeanor convictions were classified as  
                                                 
3Data containing sealed arrests were provided to MDRC in a form that did not permit the identification of 
any individual sample member. The researchers could not tell exactly which members of the sample had a sealed 
event; it was possible to tell only that an individual was a program group or control group member.  
4Between 4 percent and 6 percent were incarcerated for other or “unknown” reasons (Appendix Table C.1). 
Table 5.1 (continued)
SOURCE:  MDRC calculations using data from the New York State (NYS) Division of Criminal Justice 
Services (DCJS) and New York City Department of Correction (DOC).
NOTES:  Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level 
indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups 
for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is only counted as a single event.  If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, 
only the most serious charge is recorded in the analysis.
bA total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random 
assignment. Total includes convictions for "other" reasons, felony and misdemeanor crimes.
cViolent crimes as based on conviction charges defined by Langan, Patrick A., and David J. Levin. 2002. 
Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994. Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report NCJ 193427. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. See appendix B.1 for charges defined 
as violent
dIncludes all reasons for incarceration such as sentences for new crimes, technical violations of parolem 
detainee (jail) and other reasons. Therefore incarcerations for new crimes and parole violations do not sum to 
precent incarcerated  See appendix table C 2 for more details about reasons for incarceration
             
N TES: Results in this table are wei hted by week of rand m assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level dicates the probability that on  would incorrectly conclude that a differenc  exists between 
re earch groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date i counted only  a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same dat , 
only th  most serious charge is recorded in the analysis.
bThe total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random 
assignment. These convictions ar  counted in the a alysis as occurring after andom assignment. The total 
includes convictions for "other" reasons, felonies, and misdemeanor crimes.
cViolent crimes are based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin (2002). See Appendix C for 
charges defined s violent.
dIncludes all r asons for incarceration, such as sente ces for new crimes, technical violations of parole, 
d tainee (jail), and other r asons. Therefore, inc rcerations for new rimes and par le violations do not sum to 
the percentage incarcerat d. See Appendix Table C.1 for more details about re sons for incarceration.
eIncarceration status based on Quarter 8 after random assignment. Incarceration includes both prison and 
jail.
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technical parole violations as the reason for admission.5 A small proportion of convictions were 
for felony-level charges, predominantly stemming from drug- or property-related crimes. Box 
5.1 presents detailed data about the reasons for conviction for both research groups. As shown 
in Box 5.1 and Table 5.1, very few convictions were for violent crimes.6
Row 6 of Table 5.1 shows that 55 percent of the control group were reincarcerated in 
jail or prison in the two-year follow-up period, compared with 50 percent of the program group. 
This reduction of 5.9 percentage points in incarceration is statistically significant. Incarceration 
includes admissions to prison or jail for new sentences (crimes), technical parole violations, 
detainees (jail only), and other or unknown reasons (prison only).
 In this analysis, violent 
crime consists mainly of misdemeanor-level assault charges. 
7
Near the bottom of Table 5.1, a summary measure that combines arrests, convictions, 
and incarceration shows that CEO reduced recidivism by 6.8 percentage points. More than half 
of the program group and nearly two-thirds of the control group experienced some form of 
recidivism in the two years following random assignment.
 The table shows that more 
than one-fourth of both research groups were reincarcerated for a parole violation; about half 
were returned to prison for these violations.  
8
                                                 
5In some cases, there is a lag in time between sentencing and admission to prison; therefore, for a small num-
ber of convictions, the admission to prison may not have occurred during the two-year follow-up period.  
  
6The classification of charges is based on definitions from Langan and Levin (2002).  
7Appendix Table C.1 presents a detailed breakdown of reasons for incarceration in both prison and jail. 
8Note that the levels of the summary recidivism measure are higher than the proportion of the sample who 
were arrested. This measure accounts for all incarcerations, convictions, and unsealed arrests. Incarceration data 
(continued) 
 
Box 5.1 
Reasons for Convictions 
 Program Control Difference     
Reason (%) Group Group (Impact)   P-Value 
      
Violent crime 4.4 5.8 -1.5  0.309 
Drug crime 15.6 19.9 -4.3 * 0.079 
Property crime 14.9 18.3 -3.4  0.159 
Public order crime 3.4 2.9 0.5  0.674 
Other 0.6 0.5 0.1  0.871 
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Although recidivism rates seem high, the research sample’s rate is actually lower than 
the state average for prisoners returning to New York State.9 About 33 percent of people 
released from prison in New York State in 2004 and 2005 returned to prison within two years,10 
compared with only about 28 percent of the study’s control group. Returns to prison for parole 
violations were much lower than the state average.11
The bottom panel of Table 5.1 provides information about the sample members’ em-
ployment and incarceration status in the last quarter of follow-up.
 Roughly 60 percent of the research sample 
had already been out of prison for more than three months when they entered the study; on 
average, the research sample had been out of prison for a year before entering the study. Thus, it 
is also useful to compare the two-year recidivism rates from the study with the three-year rates 
for returning prisoners in New York State. The research sample has even lower recidivism rates: 
40 percent of state releases returned to prison within three years, compared with 28 percent of 
the study’s control group. The fact that recidivism rates for the research sample are lower than 
the state average suggests that this group may have been relatively more motivated than the 
average ex-prisoner. Indeed, the fact that individuals in the study reported to CEO for employ-
ment assistance may also indicate a higher level of motivation among this group. 
12
Impacts on additional measures of recidivism for the two research groups are presented 
in Appendix Table C.1.  
 By the end of Year 2, both 
research groups show similar combined outcomes. Over 45 percent were neither working nor 
employed in a UI-covered job during the last quarter of follow-up. Chapter 6 presents impacts 
on outcomes as reported by the client survey. The survey findings may provide insights into the 
ways that individuals were supporting themselves and into their housing and family circum-
stances. 
• CEO reduced recidivism in each of the first two years of the study pe-
riod.  
                                                 
include all admissions to and releases from prison and jail, regardless of arrest and conviction status, whereas 
many arrests are “sealed” if they do not end in conviction. In addition, some returns to jail or prison as a result of a 
parole violation would not show up as an “arrest” on the administrative data because parole officers sometimes 
transport a parolee directly to jail. 
9See the 2007 Crimestat report (New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, 2008).  
10New York State recidivism rates are based on prison releases in 2004 and 2005. For the vast majority of 
study participants, the calendar period for prison release ranged from 2003 to 2005. 
11Some of this difference may be a result of categorization of other or unknown admission reasons. DCJS 
does not show how these admissions are categorized in the 2007 Crimestat report. For the study, these admissions 
are categorized separately from parole violations and new crimes, and they account for about 5 percent of prison 
incarcerations. 
12This measure is based on an individual’s status in Quarter 8 and can be measured only quarterly because 
that is when UI employment data are reported.  
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Table 5.2 presents CEO’s impacts on several key measures of recidivism separately for 
Year 1 and Year 2. This table focuses only on measures presented in the first-year report and 
shows impacts on arrests, convictions, and incarceration in prison.13
The table shows that the program’s positive impacts on recidivism can be found in both 
years, though the exact outcomes that were affected in each year differ. Notably, CEO’s impacts 
on arrests and convictions were larger in the second year of follow-up. The first rows of Table 
5.2 show that CEO had no impact on arrests in Year 1 but that the program reduced arrests by 
nearly 5 percentage points in Year 2. The next rows show that CEO reduced felony convictions 
in Year 1 but that the program’s impact on convictions was driven by a 7.1 percentage point 
reduction in misdemeanors in Year 2. Reductions on prison incarceration for a new crime were 
found in Year 1 but not in Year 2. Impacts on additional measures of recidivism, by year, are 
presented in Appendix Tables C.2 and C.3. 
 This analysis is a useful 
follow-up to the earlier findings and can aid in understanding how CEO’s recidivism impacts 
played out over time. This analysis may also help to shed light on whether CEO’s impacts on 
employment –– which were concentrated in the first year –– match its impacts on recidivism.  
These findings show that CEO reduced recidivism in both years of follow-up and that, 
for some outcomes, the impacts were larger in Year 2. The relationship between recidivism and 
employment, however, is not straightforward. As reported in Chapter 4 (Table 4.1), the impacts 
on employment were largest earlier in the follow-up, and there were no impacts on employment 
in the second year. The findings also raise questions about the pathway through which CEO 
reduced recidivism. As an employment program, CEO was designed to reduce recidivism 
indirectly through employment. Because CEO had no impact on employment in Year 2, 
however, these findings raise questions about how CEO reduced recidivism during that time. 
Impacts on Recidivism for Subgroups  
Future analyses will seek to understand more about the ways in which CEO produced impacts 
on recidivism by investigating the links among outcomes, individual characteristics, and CEO 
participation patterns for program group members.  
Subgroups Defined by Time Since Release from Prison 
The first days and weeks out of prison are thought to be a crucial point for program in-
tervention, and programs that intervene early may be more successful. Indeed, the one-year 
results published from this evaluation show that CEO’s positive impacts on recidivism in Year  
                                                 
13The earlier report (Bloom, Redcross, Zweig, and Azurdia, 2007) does not include measures on incarcera-
tion in jail as these data were not available at the time. 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Arresteda (%)
 Year 1 21.7 22.9 -1.3 0.638
Year 2 22.8 27.5 -4.6 * 0.098
Convicted of a felony (%)
Year 1 1.4 3.1 -1.7 * 0.071
 Year 2 5.2 4.5 0.7 0.630
Convicted of a misdemeanor (%)
Year 1 11.8 12.1 -0.3 0.897
Year 2 14.5 21.5 -7.1 *** 0.004
Convicted of a violent crime (%)
Year 1 1.9 1.4 0.5 0.542
Year 2 2.5 4.5 -1.9 0.106
Admitted to state prisonb (%)
Year 1 11.0 14.0 -3.0 0.166
Year 2 16.7 17.5 -0.8 0.733
Incarcerated in prison for a new crime (%)
Year 1 0.8 3.0 -2.2 ** 0.012
Year 2 3.4 3.8 -0.4 0.742
Incarcerated in prison for a technical parole violation (%)
Year 1 8.0 9.5 -1.5 0.412
Year 2 11.2 9.5 1.7 0.395
Total days incarcerated in prison
Year 1 12 13 -1 0.583
Year 2 34 40 -7 0.228
Sample size (total = 977) 568 409
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table 5.2
Impacts on Selected Measures of Recidivism in Year 1 and Year 2
Center for Employment Opportunities
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 
(DCJS).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between 
research groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, 
only the most serious charge is recorded in the analysis.
bIncludes all reasons for incarceration, such as sentences for new crimes, technical violations of parole, 
detainee (jail), and other reasons. Therefore, incarcerations for new crimes and parole violations do not sum to 
the percentage incarcerated. See Appendix Table C.1 for more details about reasons for incarceration.
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1 are concentrated in the subgroup that had been released recently from prison (41 percent of 
the program group and 39 percent of the control group reported to CEO within three months of 
release).14
Table 5.3 presents CEO’s impacts on recidivism for subgroups defined by time since 
release from prison for the full follow-up period. The columns on the left side of the table show 
impacts for the group that reported to CEO within three months of release from prison, and the 
columns on the right side show impacts for the group that came to CEO more than three months 
after release. The column labeled “H-stars” on the rightmost side of the table indicates whether 
the difference in impacts between the two subgroups is statistically significant. This statistic 
shows that, over the two-year follow-up period, impacts on only a few measures of recidivism 
are statistically different across the subgroups. 
 For this subgroup, CEO substantially reduced prison incarceration and felony 
convictions in the first year of follow-up. For the subgroup that came to CEO later after their 
release, early results show that the program had no effect on recidivism. 
• CEO reduced recidivism both for people who came to CEO soon after 
release and for those who came later; earlier differences in results for 
these two groups are less pronounced in Year 2.  
As mentioned above, in Year 1, recidivism reductions were found only among the re-
cently released group. The results in Table 5.3 show that, over the course of the two-year 
follow-up period, reductions in recidivism can be found among both subgroups. For example, 
the table shows that among those who came to CEO within three months of prison release, CEO 
led to a 12.2 percentage point reduction in misdemeanor convictions. For those who reported 
further from release, the program also significantly reduced convictions, but these reductions 
were driven by a decrease in felony-level crime. Program group members in the recently 
released subgroup spent 25 fewer days in prison over the two-year period. This reduction is not 
seen in the subgroup that reported to CEO further from release. 
Table 5.4 focuses on CEO’s impacts on selected measures of recidivism and shows de-
tails about exactly which recidivism outcomes were affected for both subgroups in the first and 
second years of follow-up. This analysis provides some evidence about the reason that impact 
differences between the two subgroups became less clear over time; it shows that recidivism 
impacts continued into Year 2 for the recently released subgroup while new impacts emerged 
later in the follow-up for the group that reported to CEO later. Although there were no impacts 
on recidivism in Year 1 for the group that reported to CEO further from release, the program led 
                                                 
14Bloom, Redcross, Zweig, and Azurdia (2007). 
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The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table 5.3
Two-Year Impacts on Recidivism, by Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
Center for Employment Opportunities
Less Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Value H-Starsg
Arresteda (%) 40.2 46.3 -6.1 0.235 36.2 39.8 -3.7 0.392
Convicted of a crimeb (%) 32.2 42.9 -10.7 ** 0.030 29.9 36.4 -6.5 0.118
Convicted of a felony 12.7 9.0 3.7 0.280 2.8 6.8 -4.0 ** 0.031 **
Convicted of a misdemeanor 20.8 33.0 -12.2 *** 0.007 25.5 27.9 -2.4 0.536 *
Convicted of a violent crimec (%) 4.3 8.4 -4.1 0.123 4.4 4.4 0.0 0.990
Incarceratedd (%) 48.5 60.8 -12.3 ** 0.016 50.4 53.6 -3.2 0.457
Prison 28.1 32.7 -4.6 0.338 25.9 25.3 0.6 0.877
Jail 47.5 60.4 -13.0 ** 0.011 50.4 50.7 -0.3 0.936 *
Incarcerated for a new crime (%) 16.7 19.9 -3.2 0.436 13.5 15.1 -1.5 0.620
Prison 7.1 8.1 -1.0 0.717 2.5 6.2 -3.8 ** 0.033
Jail 10.2 12.3 -2.1 0.540 11.3 9.7 1.6 0.551
Incarcerated for a technical parole violation (%) 29.2 33.0 -3.8 0.436 33.7 27.9 5.8 0.149
Prison 18.4 18.6 -0.3 0.950 18.7 13.7 5.0 0.119
Jail 24.3 29.1 -4.8 0.311 32.4 25.0 7.4 * 0.062 **
Total days incarcerated 119 146 -27 0.144 93 84 9 0.439 *
Prison 51 76 -25 ** 0.049 47 41 6 0.467 **
Jail 68 70 -2 0.844 46 43 3 0.612
Arrested, convicted, or incarcerated (%) 54.2 66.4 -12.2 ** 0.016 56.8 62.2 -5.3 0.212
(continued)
More Than 3 Months
Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
 Less Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Value H-Starsg
Status in the last quarter of Year 2f (%)
Incarcerated and employed 3.2 2.5 0.7 0.684 3.9 1.4 2.5 * 0.094
Incarcerated and not employed 28.1 31.0 -2.9 0.546 17.4 21.1 -3.8 0.267
Not incarcerated and employed 33.3 25.5 7.7 * 0.095 27.4 27.4 0.0 0.994
Not incarcerated and not employed 35.4 40.9 -5.5 0.289 51.4 50.1 1.3 0.757
Sample size (total = 929)e 225 160 311 233
Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
More Than 3 Months
Table 5.3 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of 
Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, only one the most serious charge is recorded 
in the analysis.
bA total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random assignment. These convictions are counted in the 
analysis as occurring after random assignment. The total includes convictions for "other" reasons, felonies and misdemeanor crimes.
cViolent crimes are based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin (2002). See Appendix C for charges defined as violent.
dIncludes all reasons for incarceration, such as sentences for new crimes, technical violations of parole, detainee (jail), and other reasons. Therefore, 
incarcerations for new crimes and parole violations do not sum to percentage incarcerated. See Appendix Table C.1 for more details about reasons for 
incarceration.
eA total of 48 sample members are missing the last prison release date and are therefore missing from all outcomes in this table.
fIncarceration status based on Quarter 8 after random assignment. Incarceration includes both prison and jail.
gWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts between 
the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
tests are interpreted. 
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Less Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Value H-Starsd
Arresteda (%)
 Year 1 20.8 24.2 -3.4 0.429 24.0 22.1 1.9 0.612
Year 2 25.8 33.7 -7.8 0.109 20.0 24.5 -4.5 0.222
Convicted of a felony (%)
Year 1 1.4 4.8 -3.4 * 0.051 1.3 2.3 -1.1 0.366
 Year 2 11.3 4.2 7.1 ** 0.020 1.6 4.5 -2.9 ** 0.048 ***
Convicted of a misdemeanor (%)
Year 1 9.5 11.9 -2.4 0.461 14.2 12.5 1.7 0.578
Year 2 13.2 25.5 -12.3 *** 0.003 16.3 19.9 -3.7 0.280
Convicted of a violent crimeb (%)
Year 1 2.5 1.3 1.2 0.432 1.6 1.5 0.1 0.937
Year 2 1.7 7.0 -5.3 ** 0.015 3.0 2.9 0.1 0.951 **
Admitted to state prison (%)
Year 1 9.4 19.5 -10.1 *** 0.005 12.8 11.6 1.3 0.658 **
Year 2 21.1 19.0 2.2 0.616 15.8 16.4 -0.6 0.846
Incarcerated in prison for a new crime (%)
Year 1 0.5 4.9 -4.4 *** 0.005 1.1 2.1 -1.0 0.365 *
Year 2 6.6 3.2 3.4 0.164 1.4 4.2 -2.8 * 0.051 **
Incarcerated in prison for a technical parole violation (%)
Year 1 7.2 12.1 -4.9 0.119 9.1 8.6 0.5 0.840
Year 2 12.7 11.3 1.5 0.681 11.7 7.8 3.9 0.124
(continued)
Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table 5.4
Impacts on Selected Measures of Recidivism in Year 1 and Year 2, by Time Since Release from Prison
Center for Employment Opportunities
More Than 3 Months
 Less Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Value H-Starsd
Total days incarcerated in prison
Year 1 10 20 -10 ** 0.036 14 9 4 0.184 **
Year 2 41 56 -15 0.132 33 31 2 0.793
Sample size (total = 929)c 225 160 311 233
Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
More Than 3 Months
Table 5.4 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of 
Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, only one the most serious charge is recorded in 
the analysis.
bViolent crimes are based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin (2002). See Appendix C for charges defined as violent.
cA total of 48 sample members are missing the last prison release date and are therefore missing from all outcomes in this table.
dWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts between 
the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
are interpreted.
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 
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to reductions in felony convictions and prison incarceration for new crimes for that group in 
Year 2. For the recently released subgroup, the table shows that there was a significant increase 
in felony convictions in Year 2.15
With the additional follow-up, the overall trend in results for both subgroups appears 
similar to the results for the full sample presented above. In general, these results highlight the 
complexity of CEO’s impacts on recidivism. 
 Importantly, however, CEO reduced convictions for violent 
crimes by 5.3 percentage points during the same time period. Further analysis reveals that the 
violent crime convictions consisted primarily of misdemeanor-level simple assault charges, 
whereas the felony convictions were due to drug and property crimes for the most part (not 
shown).  
Appendix Tables E.3 and E.4 show –– for Year 1 and Year 2 separately –– CEO’s im-
pacts on additional measures of recidivism for the subgroups defined by time between release 
from prison and random assignment.  
Other Subgroups 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the research team examined results for other subgroups, 
based on literature suggesting that CEO may have affected certain subgroups differently. As 
with the results for employment and earnings, recidivism results were analyzed for older 
participants compared with younger participants and for those who had a high school diploma 
or General Educational Development (GED) certificate at baseline compared with those who 
did not. Impact results for these other subgroups are generally similar to results for the full 
sample. Findings are presented in Appendix E.  
Conclusion 
CEO led to reductions in recidivism in the first and second years of the follow-up pe-
riod. This means that CEO continued to impact recidivism beyond the time that participants 
were active in the program and beyond the time that the program had impacts on employment.  
Because CEO had no impact on employment in Year 2, these findings raise questions 
about why or how CEO reduced recidivism during that time. CEO’s model is built around a 
package of services designed to allow staff to observe and coach participants on a regular 
(daily) basis. It is possible that these regular interactions with program staff, in conjunction with 
the work environment, led to changes in the behavior and outlook of participants, even without 
                                                 
15It is not clear why CEO would lead to an increase in felony convictions in Year 2. Further analysis does not 
indicate that there was “delayed” recidivism for the recently released subgroup; in fact, that subgroup had a 7.8 
percentage point reduction in arrests in Year 2 (which is nearly statistically significant). 
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the lasting impact on employment. Some evidence that staff interactions played an important 
role is discussed in Chapter 3. Results from the client survey show that program group members 
were more likely than their control group counterparts to report that a CEO staff person offered 
support and guidance to them (Table 3.3).   
The findings from this study also suggest that there is some connection between em-
ployment and recidivism but that the connection is complicated. Even when program group 
members were not experiencing higher rates of employment, they were still experiencing 
reductions in recidivism.  
Most recidivism occurs within the first year of release from prison. Because many sam-
ple members in this study had already been out of prison for a substantial amount of time before 
coming to CEO, Year 1 of the study period often does not correspond to the first year out of 
prison. It is likely that by the time many individuals enrolled in the study, they had already 
made it past the riskiest and most difficult period of transition. There is also some evidence that 
the control group in this evaluation experienced below-average recidivism compared with the 
larger reentry population in New York State.16
The fact that CEO produced lasting impacts on recidivism is important, inasmuch as 
few rigorous random assignment evaluations of reentry programs have found positive effects on 
recidivism. Each year, government agencies spend billions of dollars on incarceration. Even 
small reductions in recidivism can lead to substantial monetary savings. Chapter 7 explores the 
costs of CEO’s program services in detail and includes a brief discussion of the program’s cost-
effectiveness thus far. 
 These circumstances may have made it difficult 
for CEO to achieve positive impacts on recidivism outcomes, making those results all the more 
noteworthy. However, this group was also motivated enough to seek help from an employment 
program, suggesting that, in general, the research sample may have been more amenable to 
services and that this motivation may have helped CEO achieve its positive results.  
 
                                                 
16As discussed early in this chapter, the research sample was less likely than New York State’s larger reentry 
population to experience a return to prison. 
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Chapter 6 
Impacts of CEO on Other Outcomes 
This chapter presents the effects of the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) 
transitional job program for former prisoners returning to the community –– compared with the 
results for the control group –– on a range of noneconomic outcomes, such as educational 
attainment, housing, substance abuse treatment, health insurance coverage, and health. It also 
presents the impacts of CEO on income and formal child support. The chapter primarily uses 
data from the client survey, which was administered to members of the program and control 
groups approximately 16 to 23 months after they entered the study; random assignment oc-
curred between January 2004 and October 2005. In addition, in order to estimate the program’s 
effects on child support, the chapter also uses administrative records data from the New York 
State Division of Child Support Enforcement (CSE) of the Office of Temporary and Disability 
Assistance.1
Although CEO focused on providing employment services and transitional work to as-
sist participants in gaining employment, increases in employment and earnings or a reduction in 
recidivism could also indirectly result in positive effects on some of the outcomes presented in 
this section. Yet impacts on outcomes that are tied to employment or income are not expected, 
since, as discussed in Chapter 4, CEO did not lead to earnings increases over the long run and 
people were surveyed long after the employment impacts had faded. CEO, however, did lead to 
statistically significant impacts on recidivism.  
  
Noneconomic Outcomes 
• As expected, CEO had little effect on noneconomic outcomes, such as 
educational attainment, living arrangements, health, and receipt of sub-
stance abuse treatment. 
                                                 
1The tables in this chapter present the effects on summary measures, while the effects on the full set of 
outcomes from the client survey are shown in Appendix D. Note that the survey results on child outcomes are 
not presented in this section but are shown in the appendix. Control group members were more likely than 
program group members to report having children at the survey interview (even though there were no 
differences between the groups at baseline). All the survey results that are related to being a parent may have 
been affected by this and, thus, may be unreliable.  
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Table 6.1 presents CEO’s effects on noneconomic outcomes, such as educational at-
tainment, housing, and health care coverage.2 Similar to the baseline characteristics, the survey 
results show that about half of the program and control group members did not have a high 
school diploma or General Educational Development (GED) certificate at the time of the survey 
interview.3
The second panel of Table 6.1 shows that, compared with the control group, program 
group members were more likely to report living at someone else’s residence at the time of the 
survey interview: 70 percent of the program group, compared with 61 percent of the control 
group, for a statistically significant difference of 9.3 percentage points. Program group members 
were less likely than control group members to report living with a relative. It is not clear why 
CEO had an effect on living arrangements. The program did not have an effect on the percent-
age of respondents who moved since random assignment; about 40 percent of both research 
groups moved at least once. This suggests that living arrangements on release from prison are 
temporary, or it may indicate difficulties in maintaining housing arrangements. Among those 
who moved at least once since random assignment, the reasons for moving included being 
kicked out or being unable to pay the rent (Appendix Table D.1).  
 In addition, equal proportions of program and control group members (about 70 
percent) reported never having been married. Compared with the baseline characteristics 
discussed in Chapter 1 (Table 1.1), a larger percentage of survey respondents reported being 
married at the time of the survey interview (about 15 percent, compared with 9 percent). 
The third panel of Table 6.1 presents CEO’s effects on substance abuse treatment. Al-
though CEO did not provide treatment services, it could have affected the receipt of treatment 
indirectly. Note that since the survey did not collect data on substance use or abuse, it is impos-
sible to know the percentage of the population who used drugs or alcohol after study entry. As 
shown, the program did not have an effect on substance abuse treatment. About half the 
program and control group members attended treatment since random assignment, and about 
one-fifth reported attending treatment at the time of the client survey. The results also show that 
the majority of individuals who attended drug treatment were mandated by their parole officer 
to do so, which may suggest that attending treatment was a condition of parole.4
The next panel of the table shows that sample members in both research groups rated 
their health similarly; less than 20 percent of each research group rated their health as either fair 
  
                                                 
2Note that data were collected from individuals in the study regardless of whether they were in the com-
munity or were incarcerated at the time of the survey interview. For those who were incarcerated, some 
questions, such as those about living arrangements, reference the period prior to the latest commitment. 
3Selected characteristics of the survey sample at baseline are presented in Appendix Table A.2. 
4Conditions of Parole are rules that parolees must follow while under supervision. The conditions can be 
set by the parole officer or by the Board of Parole prior to the parolee’s release. 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Educational attainment (%)
High school diploma/GED certificate 49.0 47.3 1.7 0.643
Marital status (%)
Never married 73.5 70.4 3.1 0.439
Married 15.5 15.2 0.3 0.923
Other 11.0 14.4 -3.4 0.229
Housing (%)
Currently living in:a
Own place 20.4 24.8 -4.4 0.220
Someone else's place 70.4 61.0 9.3 ** 0.021
Treatment facility/transitional housing/halfway house 3.2 5.5 -2.3 0.191
Homeless/other 4.2 4.8 -0.7 0.725
Sample member currently lives with:
Spouse/partner 34.9 30.5 4.4 0.300
Relative 59.6 67.0 -7.5 * 0.076
Nonrelative 9.1 5.0 4.1 * 0.080
Ever moved since random assignment 41.6 39.2 2.4 0.585
Substance abuse treatment (%)
Received substance abuse treatment or attended
self-help groupsb 53.1 55.9 -2.8 0.516
Currently in drug treatment or attending self-help groups 21.8 18.9 2.9 0.407
Mandated to drug treatment by parole officer 40.7 43.2 -2.5 0.567
Health 
Rated own health as fair or poor (%) 17.5 19.1 -1.6 0.636
Psychological Distress Scalec 6.6 6.7 -0.1 0.778
Experienced serious psychological 
distress in the past monthd (%) 17.3 19.2 -1.9 0.556
Went to emergency room during the past year (%) 22.8 22.4 0.5 0.899
(continued)
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Table 6.1
Impacts on Educational Attainment, Marital Status, Housing, Substance Abuse,  
Center for Employment Opportunities
Health, and Health Insurance Coverage
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or poor. In addition, there is no significant difference in the percentages of sample members 
who went to the emergency room in the year prior to the survey interview.  
The final panel of Table 6.1 shows that the program and control group members were 
also just as likely to be covered by health insurance. However, CEO increased the percentage of 
program group members who were covered by private health insurance; this is somewhat 
surprising, because there is no indication that CEO increased the proportion of people who had 
employer-provided insurance. (See Chapter 4.) 
Income and Public Assistance 
• CEO did not have an effect on income or public assistance receipt. 
Table 6.2 shows the percentages of respondents who had different income sources dur-
ing the month prior to the survey interview. Not surprisingly, the program did not have an effect 
on earnings and public assistance receipt. About half of both research groups had income from 
earnings, and about a quarter of sample members received public assistance. The low rates of 
public assistance receipt are not surprising, since individuals with criminal histories are subject 
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Health insurance coverage (%)
Respondent has health insurance 55.1 57.1 -2.0 0.642
Publicly funded 48.3 54.1 -5.8 0.188
Privately funded 6.9 3.1 3.8 * 0.061
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
Table 6.1 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations based on responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between 
research groups for the corresponding variable.
aSubcategories may not sum to the total due to rounding or missing data.
bIncludes Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) groups.
cBased on the K6 scale that includes six questions about how often a respondent experienced symptoms of 
psychological distress during the past 30 days. The response codes (0-4) of the six items for each person are 
summed to yield a scale with a 0-24 range.  
dA value of 13 or more for this scale is used here to define serious psychological distress.  
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to a range of restrictions –– including lack of  access to some public benefits, depending on the 
type of prior criminal conviction.5
                                                 
5The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 includes a 
lifetime ban on eligibility for food stamps and benefits under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program for anyone who receives a felony drug conviction if both the conviction and the underlying 
conduct occurred after August 22, 1996. However, states have the flexibility to “opt out” or to modify the ban. 
As of the time of publication, New York State has opted out and made benefits available without regard for 
prior conviction offenses. The 1996 welfare reform law also prohibits states from providing TANF assistance, 
food stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and public housing to anyone who is in violation of 
probation or parole. The duration of ineligibility is different for each program. For SSI and food stamps, the 
ineligibility applies “during such month” and “during any period,” respectively, that the individual has either 
absconded or has been out of compliance with the conditions of release (Reentry Policy Council, 2008).  
 Low earnings coupled with low public assistance receipt 
resulted in a very low total average income (less than $800 per month) for both research groups. 
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Individual income
Percentage of respondents with each income source
Earnings 51.9 46.0 5.9 0.181
Child support 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.617
Public assistance (%)
TANF 9.8 14.2 -4.4 0.115
Food stamps 29.0 26.6 2.5 0.521
SSI or disability 1.8 3.2 -1.4 0.290
Total individual income in prior month ($) 775 760 15 0.901
Percentage of household income that is respondent's 56.6 63.3 -6.7 0.329
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
Table 6.2
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Center for Employment Opportunities
Impacts on Income
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between 
research groups for the corresponding variable.
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The results also show that most of the individuals contributed a significant amount to the overall 
household income; more than half of the household income came from respondents.6
Using survey data, Box 6.1 examines how many control group members were not em-
ployed in a UI-covered job and were not incarcerated at the time of the survey interview.  
 
Formal Child Support 
• Program and control group members were just as likely to provide any 
formal child support during the follow-up period.  
Table 6.3 presents CEO’s estimated impacts on formal child support payments, as 
measured through administrative records from the child support enforcement (CSE) agency. 
Child support outcomes are analyzed only for sample members who had a child support case 
with CSE prior to study entry. Note that since the sample size is very small (about 20 percent of 
the research sample), the results should be interpreted cautiously.  
Child support payments include only financial payments to cases known to the CSE 
system. It is possible that sample members may have been providing informal support to 
children, but this information is not captured in these results.7
Results on informal child support and parent-child contact as measured by the client 
survey are presented in Appendix D. 
 The results show that program 
and control group members were just as likely to provide formal child support. Within the two-
year follow-up period, about 40 percent of both research groups made at least one payment 
through the CSE system. (As noted above, these percentages include only sample members who 
had CSE cases at study entry.) Program and control group members paid, on average, about 
$600 over the two-year follow-up period. 
Conclusion 
The economic results discussed in Chapter 4 show that CEO did not have a long-term 
employment effect; therefore, CEO was not expected to have an effect on income and most 
noneconomic outcomes. As shown, this expectation was borne out. CEO had little effect on the 
outcomes presented in this chapter, such as educational attainment, health, and health insurance 
coverage.  Furthermore, CEO did not have an effect on other outcomes, such as public assis-
tance receipt, income, and formal child support payments. 
                                                 
6For results on other household members’ income, see Appendix Table D.2. 
7Payments made through the CSE system are made through different venues, including wage withhold-
ings, tax levies, and others.  
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Box 6.1 
Income Sources and Housing Status for  
Control Group Members Not Employed in a UI-Covered Job and 
Not Incarcerated at the Time of the Survey Interview 
Chapter 5 shows that over 45 percent of the research sample were not working or incarce-
rated at the end of the Year 2 (Table 5.1). Using data from the client survey, this box 
examines the primary means of support and living arrangements for control group mem-
bers who were not working in a UI-covered job or were not incarcerated at the time of the 
survey interview. The outcomes for this group are compared with the survey sample 
responses for the control group as a whole. This comparison examines whether this group 
differs from the larger population. 
The results show that 24 percent of control group survey respondents not working in a UI-
covered job and not incarcerated reported working at the time of the survey interview. 
Compared with all the control group survey respondents, they were more likely to be 
employed at a temporary job or in day labor or an odd job. This group’s earnings made up 
a smaller fraction of total household income, and they relied more on food stamps and 
cash assistance. The total measured household income for both groups is very low, but it is 
much lower for those not incarcerated and not working in a UI-covered job. 
Living arrangements are very similar between both groups; most were living at someone 
else’s place and only small differences were found in the percent that were homeless or in 
transitional housing. However, those not incarcerated and not working in a UI job were 
more likely than the control survey respondents to be in drug treatment. 
Outcome   Full Sample (N = 215) 
Not Incarcerated, Not in 
UI-Covered Job (N = 88) 
      
Currently working in the community (%) 37.5 24.4 
      
Current or most recent job is day 
labor, temporary, or odd job (%)  10.7 15.7 
      
Respondent’s income source (%)    
 Earnings   46.7 30.3 
 
TANF/Safety 
Net   14.2 20.9 
 Food stamps   26.9 37.3 
 SSI or disability  3.0 6.9 
      
Total individual income in prior month ($) 776 499 
      
Total household income in prior month ($) 1,646 1,160 
      
Living arrangements (%)    
 Own place   24.9 23.2 
 Someone else’s place  61.5 60.9 
 
Treatment facility / transitional housing / 
halfway house 5.0 6.1 
 Homeless/other  4.5 2.7 
      
Currently in drug treatment (%)  13.4 18.9 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group  Group (Impact) P-Value
Child support paymentsa 
Ever made a child support payment (%) 38.6 41.6 -3.0 0.687
Average number of child support payments 8 7 1 0.637
Number of child support payments (%)
0 61.4 58.4 3.0 0.687
1-4 15.6 17.2 -1.6 0.783
5-20 11.7 11.6 0.2 0.974
21 or more 11.3 12.9 -1.6 0.736
Average amount paid ($) 607 612 -5 0.985
Sample size (total = 187) 104 83
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Table 6.3
Impacts on Formal Child Support Payments
Center for Employment Opportunities
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Office of Child Support Enforcement (CSE).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment 
characteristics. This table includes only sample members who had a child support case with CSE prior to random 
assignment.  
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance 
level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups 
for the corresponding variable.
aThese payments were made during the two years following random assignment.
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Chapter 7 
Costs of the Center for Employment Opportunities 
The preceding chapters report on the implementation and impacts of the New York 
City-based Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) program, which places former 
prisoners who are returning to the community in immediate, wage-paying transitional jobs 
during the uncertain period after release. The results show that the program was well imple-
mented and that most program group members worked in a paid transitional job. Impact results 
show that CEO increased employment early in the study’s follow-up period and led to reduc-
tions in convictions and incarceration during the two years following random assignment.1
This chapter presents estimates of the costs of operating the CEO program and achiev-
ing those effects. The costs of services for program group members are compared with the 
estimated costs of providing services to the control group both within CEO and through outside 
organizations.  
  
Methodology of the Cost Analysis 
The cost analysis measures the differences in expenditures for serving the program 
group and the control group, and so it compares the costs of CEO’s services with the typical 
costs of employment services that control group members received from CEO and other 
organizations. The cost analysis considers the value of all resources required for service provi-
sion. The general approach is to place dollar values on all resources used, wherever possible, 
either by directly measuring them or by estimating them. The cost of services was estimated for 
20 months following random assignment, on average. The costs are estimated and presented as 
an average cost per program group member.  
Cost Components 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the main cost components for both the program and the control 
group. It shows that the total cost of CEO for each program group member (Box C) is made up 
of expenditures for CEO’s program services (Box A) and expenses for services received outside 
CEO (Box B). Box F represents the total cost that accrued for each control group member, 
including costs for CEO’s limited job coaching and life skills services (Box D) and costs for 
services obtained outside CEO (Box E).  
                                                 
1Random assignment occurred between January 2004 and October 2005. 
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The main cost components of CEO for the program group include (1) intake and re-
cruitment, (2) expenses for transitional jobs, (3) the cost of other CEO services (job coaching, 
job development, and fatherhood services), and (4) the management information system and 
payroll functions. In addition, the costs for the program group include expenses incurred by 
other organizations for employment and training services that were provided to program group 
members outside CEO.  
The cost of services provided to control group members represent what would have 
been spent on program group members in the absence of CEO. The cost components for the 
control group consist of expenses for (1) CEO’s limited job coaching and life skills services2 
and (2) expenses incurred by outside agencies for providing employment and training services 
to control group members and, for some of them, transitional jobs.3
The net cost of CEO, –– that is, the cost per program group member over and above the 
cost per control group member –– is represented in Box N. The net cost is obtained by subtract-
ing the total cost per control group member (Box F) from the total cost per program group 
member (Box C).  
  
Data Sources 
The cost of each program component was estimated using CEO’s detailed financial ex-
penditure reports for Fiscal Year 2005 and in-depth interviews with program fiscal staff.4
Information on the use of services outside CEO was obtained from the client survey, 
which included questions about the types of education and training received and the duration of 
those services. Cost estimates for the services are based on multiple sources. For example, 
college costs were estimated using tuition and fees information for New York City public 
 Study 
participants were randomly assigned to the two research groups and were enrolled in CEO’s 
program between January 2004 and October 2005. Therefore, Fiscal Year 2005 represents a 
steady-state period of CEO program operation as experienced by program group members. To 
produce cost estimates for each program component per participant in that activity, expenditure 
data were combined with data from CEO’s management information system concerning the 
number of individuals served by CEO in various activities during the same time period.  
                                                 
2It was assumed that the control group would have received job search and life skills services outside CEO 
if CEO did not provide a basic set of these services to them.  
3As noted in Chapter 3, some control group members reported working at transitional jobs (provided by 
organizations other than CEO). 
4Fiscal Year 2005 covers the period from July 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005. 
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colleges.5
Limitations of the Analysis 
 For transitional jobs outside CEO (that is, for the transitional jobs accessed by the 
control group), costs were assumed to be the same as those for CEO’s transitional jobs, includ-
ing wages, fringe benefits, and on-site supervision. It was also assumed that control group 
members who worked in transitional jobs worked the same average number of weeks as the 
program group members who worked in CEO’s transitional jobs (eight weeks).  
Some limitations of the cost analysis should be recognized. First, this analysis is not a 
cost-benefit analysis and, therefore, does not account for any offsetting benefits of the program. 
For example, Chapter 5 shows that CEO reduced the number of days incarcerated in prison.6
There are also a number of expected benefits stemming from the transitional jobs them-
selves. City and state agencies contract with CEO to perform work that needs to be done. Thus, 
if CEO’s participants were not performing these job functions, it is likely that these agencies 
would have had to use regular employees to do this work. In this analysis, the wages, fringe 
benefits, supervision, and administration of the transitional jobs are presented as part of operat-
ing costs, and the analysis does not account for the funding of these positions by the agencies or 
for any offsetting benefits of the labor output. The cost of the possible displacement of other 
workers resulting from the increased employment of program group members is also not 
accounted for. Finally, this analysis does not account for any nonmonetary benefits or costs of 
CEO’s program.  
 
Given the very high expenditures by government agencies on incarceration, any reduction in 
prison days could translate into substantial cost savings. CEO also led to reductions in arrests 
and convictions during the follow-up period. Savings from reduced court costs, which also 
could be substantial, are not accounted for in this analysis.  
Financial Costs of CEO 
Operating Costs 
CEO’s operating costs cover expenditures for the average program group member and 
have been estimated for all the main program activities or functions. The average operating cost 
                                                 
5Estimates of the cost of General Educational Development (GED) and vocational programs were based 
on cost estimates for similar services provided in Philadelphia, another site in the Hard-to-Employ evaluation. 
6CEO reduced the number of days in prison by 25 for each program group member who reported to CEO 
within three months of release from prison. On average, CEO reduced the days in prison by eight for each 
program group member (combining those who were released from prison within three months of enrollment 
and those who were not). The eight-day difference is not statistically significant. 
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per program group member for a specified activity was calculated by first estimating a unit cost 
(that is, the average operating cost per participant in that activity). This unit cost includes all 
staff salaries, fringe benefits, overhead, and administration costs for the activity. However, not 
all program group members participated in each activity. In order to obtain an average cost per 
program group member, the cost per participant in each component was multiplied by the 
participation rate in that activity.  
• The cost of providing CEO’s services was about $4,200 per program 
group member, including nearly $1,000 in direct payments to partici-
pants. 
Table 7.1 presents the estimated costs of operating CEO. As shown in the table, more 
than half of CEO’s total program cost (55 percent) was made up of direct expenses for the 
transitional jobs. (Direct expenses include participants’ wages, fringe benefits, and supervision.) 
The largest single expense was for field and site supervision of the participants on the transi-
tional job work sites. Field and work site supervisors make up the largest proportion of CEO’s 
staff and play a critical role in managing the work of participants. They are responsible for 
directing and observing clients’ work performance on the work sites as well as for providing 
transportation to and from the sites and for other duties.7
Taken together, other services provided to participants were estimated to cost $1,381 
per program group member. Most of this cost was for job coaching ($559) and job development 
activities ($489). Program group members were also given about $70 worth of supportive 
service payments and incentives (for example, transportation and clothing). 
 Each work crew has a separate 
supervisor, and work crews generally consist of only 8 to 10 participants. Thus, the client-to-
staff ratio on the work sites is very low and allows for a significant amount of daily supervision 
and job coaching by CEO staff. The second-largest expense was for participants’ wages. The 
average cost for wages, including for those who worked a transitional job and those who did 
not, was $887 per program group member.  
CEO’s fatherhood program provided a set of enhanced services, including parenting 
classes and advocacy for participants who required help with issues involving the child support 
enforcement agency.8 Because only a small proportion of CEO’s clients enroll in the fatherhood 
program, it was one of the most expensive activities per participant.9
                                                 
7Based on research that was conducted for the Hard-to-Employ project by Demetra Nightingale of the 
Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies and John Trutko of Capital Research Corporation.  
 However, spread over  
8These estimates do not include the costs of staff in the child support enforcement agency. There are two 
employees in that office whose job is to coordinate with CEO. One is a case manager, and one is a staff analyst 
in the outreach department. Conversations with the child support office indicate that case managers spend an 
(continued) 
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average of 30 minutes with each client but that those in the CEO fatherhood program are so well prepared that 
they require less time, estimated at 15 to 20 minutes per client.  
9Only about half of the research sample reported that they have any children, and even fewer (18 percent) 
enrolled in fatherhood services. 
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Average Cost per Program Group Average Cost 
Participant Participation Program Group 
Cost Component in Component ($) Rate (%) Member ($)
CEO expenditures
Recruitment/intake 160 160
Expenses for transitional jobs
Transitional job wages 1,237 71.7 887
Transitional job fringe benefitsa 206 71.7 148
Field/site supervision 1,849 71.7 1,326
Expenses for other services
Job coaching/life skills 940 59.5 559
Job development 851 57.4 489
Bonding 15 30.0 5
Fatherhood component 1,435 18.0 258
Supportive services 97 71.7 70
MIS and payroll 458 78.9 362
Total operating costs 7,249 4,263
Table 7.1
Estimated Unit and Gross Costs of CEO (in 2005 Dollars)
Center for Employment Opportunities
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from CEO's financial expenditure reports for Fiscal 
Year 2005 and CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and Learning 
(NIGEL) database. 
NOTE: 
aCEO incurs fringe benefit costs of 16.7 percent of day labor wages resulting from 
employer-paid payroll taxes.
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participants and nonparticipants, the fatherhood program resulted in a cost of only about $250 
per program group member, because only a small proportion of the program group used those 
services.  
CEO’s management information system was estimated to cost $362 per program group 
member. This system supports detailed tracking of participation in the various activities as well 
as an efficient payroll system that enables CEO to pay its participants on a daily basis for their 
work in the transitional jobs.  
The total gross cost to operate CEO was $4,263 per program group member. Of this to-
tal cost, nearly $1,000 included direct payments to participants in the form of wages, incentives, 
and other supportive services like transportation and clothing. 
Net Cost of CEO 
The control group in this evaluation was provided basic job search assistance and a life 
skills class by CEO. Because CEO provided only limited job search assistance to control group 
members, it was expected that many would seek out additional services within the community. 
As Chapter 3 shows, many control group members –– and some program group members –– 
received employment and training services from other programs. This section presents the net 
cost of CEO, which is the difference between the cost of employment education and training 
services for the program group and the cost of these services for the control group.  
• The cost of all employment and training services was $3,200 more per 
program group member than the cost of services for the average control 
group member. 
The top panel of Table 7.2 shows CEO’s expenditures for services for the program and 
control groups. As noted above, CEO provided a limited set of services for members of the 
control group; they received a shorter version of the life skills class, which was taught by a job 
coach. The control group also received access to a resource room for job search activities. This 
room was staffed by a job coach who answered questions and provided assistance to partici-
pants while they conducted job search activities. Therefore, CEO’s control group costs include 
the cost of one full-time job coach, including salary, fringe benefits, overhead, and administra-
tion.10
                                                 
10The resource room provided computers and other resources for use by members of both research groups. 
The amortized cost of this equipment was included in the overhead costs, and, thus, a proportion was allocated 
to all participants.  
 It was estimated that the cost to serve a control group member in CEO was $543. 
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Gross Cost per Gross Cost per Net Cost 
Program Group Control Group per Program
Cost Component  Member ($) Member ($)  Group Member ($)
CEO services
Recruitment/intake 160 160 0
Expenses for transitional jobs
Transitional job wages 887 0 887
Transitional job fringe benefitsa 148 0 148
Field/site supervision 1,326 0 1,326
Expenses for other services
Job coaching/life skills 559 383 177
Job development 489 0 489
Bonding 5 0 5
Fatherhood component 258 0 258
Supportive services 70 0 70
MIS and payroll 362 0 362
Total CEO costs 4,263 543 3,720
Services obtained outside CEO
Expenses for transitional jobsb
Transitional job wages 0 200 -200
Transitional job fringe benefits 0 33 -33
Field/site supervision 0 215 -215
Expenses for other services
Employment/job search 158 322 -164
Adult Basic Education/GED 6 5 1
College courses 212 126 86
Vocational training 641 641 0
Total non-CEO costs 1,017 1,542 -525
Total CEO and non-CEO costs 5,280 2,085 3,195
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Table 7.2
 Estimated Net Costs of CEO (in 2005 Dollars)
Center for Employment Opportunities
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from CEO's financial expenditure reports for Fiscal Year 
2005 and CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and Learning (NIGEL) 
database. 
NOTES: 
aCEO incurs fringe benefit costs of 16.7 percent of day labor wages resulting from 
employer-paid payroll taxes.
bControl group costs represent transitional job participation reported by 16 percent of 
control group respondents on the client survey.
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As mentioned above, CEO provided only a limited set of services for the control group, 
while program group members were offered the full range of CEO’s services. Thus, it was 
expected that control group members would be more likely than program group members to 
seek out other services within the community, especially employment services. The bottom 
panel of Table 7.2 presents estimates of expenditures by outside organizations to provide job 
search and other education and training services to both research groups. As expected, expendi-
tures for services received outside CEO were $525 more for the control group than for the 
program group. Differences in expenditures for outside services are attributed mainly to costs 
for accessing transitional jobs and employment services from other organizations. There was 
little difference in costs between the two research groups for educational expenses. After 
accounting for costs of services received outside CEO, the net cost for program group members 
–– that is, costs over and above the control group costs –– was $3,195 (Box N in Figure 7.1).  
As noted in Chapter 3, 16 percent of control group members reported on the client sur-
vey that they worked in a transitional job. For program group members, information on partici-
pation in transitional jobs was available both from the client survey and from participant records 
maintained by CEO. By comparing data from these two sources, it was estimated that program 
group members underreported transitional work by about 46 percent in the client survey. In 
order to account for the possibility that control group members underreported transitional 
employment at the same rate, Appendix Table F.1 presents an alternative net cost analysis, 
which assumes that 35 percent of the control group worked in a transitional job.
Conclusion 
  
This analysis has shown that the net cost of CEO’s program was about $3,200 per pro-
gram group member. Of this total, roughly $1,000 went directly to program group clients in the 
form of wages and supportive service payments. Taken together, the majority of CEO’s 
program costs were for participant payments and expenditures for work site supervision.  
The focus of this analysis has been on the monetary costs associated with the CEO pro-
gram. Although the analysis does not attempt to estimate the monetary benefits resulting from 
participation in CEO, it is possible to briefly explore the program’s cost-effectiveness by 
comparing the information on estimated costs with the impacts produced thus far.11
                                                 
11A thorough exploration of cost-effectiveness should include a consideration of offsetting benefits as well 
as nonmonetary effects. No attempt to estimate these effects is included in this cost analysis.  
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When thinking about cost-effectiveness, it is important to consider different view-
points. For example, from the government budget perspective, the CEO program costs 
more to operate than the cost of services received by the control group, but the CEO 
program also produced increases in employment as well as reductions in prison incarcer-
ation. From this perspective, the very high expenditures by government agencies on incar-
ceration mean that any reduction in prison days could translate into substantial savings. As 
shown in Chapter 5, CEO program group members spent fewer days in prison than the 
control group members did.  
Therefore, in prison days alone, it is estimated that CEO produced a cost savings be-
tween $1,500 per program group member and as much as $4,500 per recently released program 
group member.12 All results in this report are presented on a per person basis. Cost savings to 
the government budget would be substantially higher when multiplied over the thousands of 
former prisoners who are served by CEO’s program each year.13
The estimates discussed above likely understate the full cost savings. The program 
costs presented here were realized during the first 20 months of the follow-up period, and it 
is not expected that the program group will incur any additional costs beyond this time; but 
the trend in recidivism results suggests that financial benefits from CEO could continue to 
accrue into the future. Moreover, prison days are only one potential offsetting benefit. Other 
monetary benefits –– such as reduced court costs and the value of labor output from the 
work performed by participants –– have not been measured but are also likely to be consid-
erable. Additionally, it is likely that taxpayers place value on increased employment and 
reduced recidivism that is not easily quantified but that should be considered.  
  
From the perspective of the program group members, CEO led to increased employ-
ment and earnings from transitional jobs. Chapter 4 shows that, within two years, program 
group members earned about $1,500 more than their control group counterparts in combined 
income from transitional employment and unsubsidized employment. CEO also reduced 
convictions and incarceration, which were not monetized in this analysis but –– from the 
perspective of CEO participants –– are likely to be important for financial as well as nonfinan-
cial reasons. 
                                                 
12This calculation is based on the Fiscal Year 2009 budget of $969 million for approximately 14,127 in-
mates per day for 365 days; the daily cost of incarceration therefore equals $969 million divided by the product 
of 14,127 and 365, yielding an approximate cost of $188 per day per inmate (Horn and Martin, 2008). 
13Researchers acknowledge that these savings are likely to be marginal and may not reflect true savings 
resulting from reduced incarceration. This estimate also assumes that the cost of incarceration for the recently 
released sample members is the same as for the full sample. 
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Appendix A assesses the reliability of impact results measured by the client survey. It 
also examines whether the impacts for the survey respondents can be generalized to the impacts 
for the research sample. The appendix first describes how the survey sample was selected. Then 
it discusses the response rates for the survey sample and for the program and the control groups. 
Next, it examines differences between survey respondents and survey nonrespondents, followed 
by a comparison of the two research groups among the survey respondents. Finally, it compares 
the impacts on employment and recidivism across the survey samples and the research sample, 
as calculated using administrative records.  
This appendix concludes — with some caution — that the survey is reliable and that the 
results for the survey respondent sample can be generalized to the research sample. A compari-
son of the program and control groups among the survey respondents shows no systematic 
differences in background characteristics. Furthermore, respondents and nonrespondents did not 
differ in most measurable characteristics before random assignment. However, compared with 
the research sample, survey respondents’ impacts on employment and incarceration are larger. 
In addition, the impacts between respondents and nonrespondents are significantly different. 
Therefore, the survey may produce larger impacts on outcomes linked to recidivism than might 
exist for the full sample. 
Survey Sample Selection 
As noted in Chapter 1, the research sample includes 977 sample members who were 
randomly assigned from January 2004 through October 2005. A total of 777 individuals were 
selected to be interviewed; everyone who was randomly assigned from January to December 
2004 and a random sample from the later cohort –– those randomly assigned between January 
and October 2005 –– were selected to be interviewed. This sample is referred to as the “fielded 
sample” (see Box A.1). To ensure representation of individuals across the total sample, the 
fielded sample has the same proportion of sample members in each group as the proportion of 
the sample members randomly assigned to each group. For example, since program group 
members account for 58 percent of the full sample, 58 percent of the fielded sample were 
selected from the program group. The fielded sample constitutes about 80 percent of the 
research sample, and it includes 451 program group members and 326 control group members. 
Survey Response Rates 
Sample members who were interviewed for the client survey are referred to as “survey 
respondents,” or the “respondent sample,” while sample members who were not interviewed are 
known as “nonrespondents,” or the “nonrespondent sample.” A total of 531 sample members, 
or 68 percent of the fielded sample, completed the survey (70 percent [total = 316] of program  
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group members and 66 percent [total = 215] of control group members). It was expected that a 
larger percentage of program group members would complete the survey, since program group 
members made up a larger proportion of the fielded sample.  
Of the nonrespondent sample, 75 percent (185 out of 246) could not be located for the 
interview.1
Comparison Between Respondents and Nonrespondents Within 
the Survey Sample 
 Whenever the response rate is lower than 100 percent, nonresponse bias may occur. 
That is, differences may exist between the respondent sample and the larger, fielded sample, 
owing to differences between the sample members who completed a survey and those who 
did not. Furthermore, the estimates may be biased if the background characteristics differ 
between the research groups. 
In order to examine whether there are systematic differences between those who re-
sponded to the survey and those who did not, an indicator of survey response status was created, 
and then multivariate analysis was used to identify which pre-random assignment characteristics 
are significantly related to the indicator. 
Appendix Table A.1 presents selected baseline characteristics of survey respondents 
and nonrespondents. Overall, the two groups are very similar. There is only one statistically 
                                                 
1Other respondents were not interviewed because they refused or were incapacitated, institutionalized, located after the 
fielding period expired, or deceased or had moved far away. 
Box A.1 
Key Analysis Samples 
Research sample: All individuals in the study who were randomly assigned from January 
2004 through October 2005. 
Fielded sample: Sample members in the research sample who were selected for the field 
interview. 
Respondent sample: Sample members in the fielded sample who completed the client 
survey. 
Nonrespondent sample: Sample members in the fielded sample who were not inter-
viewed because they were not located or refused to be interviewed or because of other 
reasons. 
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Respondent Nonrespondent
Characteristic Group  Group Total
Male (%) 93.5 93.0 93.3
Age (%)
18 to 24 years 19.5 19.0 19.3
25 to 30 years 24.2 26.6 25.3
31 to 40 years 31.6 28.3 30.1
41 years or older 24.8 26.0 25.3
Average age (years) 33.5 33.3 33.4
Citizen (%) 80.3 76.2 78.5
Race/ethnicity (%)
White/non-Hispanic 1.6 2.8 2.1
Black/non-Hispanic 62.7 64.7 63.6
Hispanic 31.7 30.0 30.9
Other 4.0 2.4 3.3
Has any children age 18 or younger (%) 47.7 44.9 46.5
Any children under age 18 in household (%) 15.9 13.4 14.8
Education (%)
High school diploma 9.4 12.1 10.6
GED certificate 43.1 42.6 42.8
Beyond high school diploma 2.9 5.0 3.9
None of the above 44.6 40.3 42.6
Housing status (%)
Rents or owns home             20.6 15.8 18.4
Lives with friends or relatives 57.7 59.2 58.3
Transitional housing 10.6 11.8 11.1
Emergency housing/homeless             4.1 5.5 4.7
Other 7.1 7.8 7.4
Marital status (%)
Married, living with spouse 9.6 7.8 8.8
Married, living away from spouse 6.0 9.7 7.7
Unmarried, living with partner 22.1 20.9 21.6
Single 62.2 61.6 62.0
Ordered to provide child support
to a child under 18 (%) 18.2 21.8 19.8
(continued)
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Selected Baseline Characteristics of Survey Respondents and Nonrespondents
Center for Employment Opportunities
Appendix Table A.1
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Respondent Nonrespondent
Characteristic Group  Group Total
Ever employed (%) 81.3 80.2 80.8
Ever employed 6 consecutive months 
for one employer (%) 64.4 58.1 61.5  **
UI-covered employment in the quarter prior
to random assignmenta (%) 13.0 13.8 13.4
UI-covered employment in the year prior 
to random assignmenta (%) 24.4 23.2 23.9
Violated parole prior to random assignment (%) 42.0 45.6 43.6
Prior drug conviction (%) 73.1 72.9 73.0
Number of felony conviction prior to random assignment 2.6 2.7 2.6
Number of quarters employed in the three years prior 
to random assignment 1.4 1.4 1.4
Randomly assigned within 3 months of release (%) 42.5 44.5 43.4
Sample size 531 446 977
Appendix Table A.1 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using CEO Baseline Information Form data, unemployment insurance (UI) 
wage records from New York State, and data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 
(DCJS).
NOTES: Data in this table are unweighted, but the results for the statistical significance test are weighted by 
week of random assignment.
In order to assess differences in characteristics across research groups, chi-square tests were used for 
categorical variables, and t-tests were used for continuous variables. Statistical significance levels are 
indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability 
that one would be making an error in concluding that there is a difference between research groups for the 
variable in question.
aThis measure was created using data from unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New York 
State.
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significant difference between them:  before random assignment, respondents were significantly 
more likely than nonrespondents to have worked for six consecutive months for one employer. 
Furthermore, a multivariate regression analysis was performed to test whether or not there is an 
overall difference in measurable characteristics between the research groups. A 0/1 dummy 
indicating response to the client survey was regressed on baseline characteristics — many of 
which are shown in Appendix Table A.1. The results show that there are not significant differ-
ences in the baseline characteristics of respondents and nonrespondents.  
Comparison Between the Research Groups in the Survey 
Respondent Sample 
Random assignment research designs minimize potential bias. There is the possibility, 
however, that the characteristics of the research groups will differ due to the selective nature of 
the survey response process. If this is true, the reliability of impact estimates for the respondent 
sample may be affected.  
Appendix Table A.2 shows selected baseline characteristics of the program and control 
group members. In general, only a few statistically significant differences were found between 
them. The program group members were more likely than the control group members to have 
violated parole prior to random assignment and to have had a higher number of felony convic-
tions. A logistic regression was also used to test whether or not there is a relationship between 
the sample  members’ background characteristics and their research status. The results of this 
tests show that the program group did not differ from the control group in the baseline character-
istics (results not shown). 
Comparison of Survey Respondents and the Nonrespondent, 
Fielded, and Research Samples 
Using administrative records data for comparison, this section discusses whether the 
survey respondents’ impacts can be generalized to the fielded sample and the research sample. 
Consistency of impact findings among the samples is considered to be the best result, suggest-
ing that impacts on measures calculated from survey responses can be generalized to the 
research sample. Survey results may be considered unreliable because of response bias when 
the impacts for survey respondents that are calculated using administrative data differ in size 
and direction from the results for all other samples. An unlucky sample draw, or “sampling 
bias,” may be inferred when impacts for the respondent sample resemble results for the fielded 
sample but findings for both samples vary from findings for the research sample –– from which 
the samples were drawn.  
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Program Control
Characteristic Group  Group Total
Male (%) 92.6 94.8 93.5
Average age (years) 33.6 33.4 33.5
Citizen (%) 81.9 77.9 80.3
Race/ethnicity (%)
White, non-Hispanic 1.5 1.7 1.6
Black, non-Hispanic 64.0 60.9 62.7
Hispanic 31.4 32.1 31.7
Other 3.1 5.4 4.0
Has any children age 18 or younger (%) 46.0 50.3 47.7
Any children under age 18 in household (%) 14.7 17.6 15.9
Has General Educational Development (GED) certificate (%) 43.4 42.6 43.1
Housing status (%)
Rents or owns home 18.5 23.4 20.6
Lives with friends or relatives 60.1 54.3 57.7
Transitional housing 10.7 10.4 10.6
Emergency/temporary housing              3.8 4.4 4.1
Other 6.8 7.6 7.1
Marital status (%)
Married, living with spouse 10.1 8.9 9.6
Married, living away from spouse 5.0 7.5 6.0
Unmarried, living with partner 22.3 21.9 22.1
Single 62.6 61.7 62.2
Ever employed (%) 79.3 84.1 81.3
Ever employed 6 consecutive months 
for one employer (%) 63.6 65.5 64.4
UI-covered employment in the quarter prior
to random assignmenta (%) 13.4 12.5 13.0
Violated parole prior to random assignment (%) 45.8 36.8 42.0  **
Prior drug conviction (%) 73.9 71.9 73.1
Number of felony convictions prior to random assignment 2.7 2.4 2.6 ***
Randomly assigned within 3 months of release (%) 44.7 39.3 42.5
Sample size 316 215 531
(continued)
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Selected Baseline Characteristics of Survey Respondents, by Research Group
Center for Employment Opportunities
Appendix Table A.2
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Appendix Table A.3 shows the adjusted means and impacts on employment and several 
recidivism outcomes for the report, fielded, respondent, and nonrespondent samples.2 This table 
shows larger effects on employment and incarceration for the survey respondent sample. For 
instance, the impact on incarceration for the respondent sample is –9.6, but it is –5.9 for the 
research sample and 1.5 for the nonrespondent sample. In general, the results show that the 
impacts for the respondent sample are very different from the impacts for the nonrespondent 
sample; the respondents are better off than the nonrespondents.3
                                                 
2All the impacts are regression-adjusted within each sample, to control for differences in background characteristics, 
prior earnings, prior employment, prior recidivism, and quarter of random assignment. 
 Therefore, the survey results 
may show larger impacts on outcomes linked to recidivism that might exist for the research 
sample. 
3To test whether the impacts for respondents and nonrespondents are significantly different statistically, MDRC ran a 
multiple regression model using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). The results show that the Wilks’ Lambda F-
statistic is significant; therefore, the impacts are significantly different for respondents and nonrespondent 
Appendix Table A.2 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using CEO Baseline Information Form data, unemployment insurance (UI) 
wage records from New York State, and data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 
(DCJS).
NOTES: Data in this table are unweighted, but the results for the statistical significance test are weighted by 
week of random assignment.
In order to assess differences in characteristics across research groups, chi-square tests were used for 
categorical variables, and t-tests were used for continuous variables. Statistical significance levels are indicated 
as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would be making an error in concluding that there is a difference between research groups for the variable in 
question.
aThis measure was created using data from unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New York 
State.
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Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea
Ever employed in a UI-covered job
Research sample 83.4 65.3 18.1 *** 0.000
Fielded sample 85.6 66.6 19.0 *** 0.000
Respondent sample 88.0 67.8 20.2 *** 0.000
Nonrespondent sample 80.5 64.4 16.1 *** 0.004
Convicted of a felony
Research sample 6.6 7.7 -1.1 0.536
Fielded sample 6.1 6.0 0.1 0.956
Respondent sample 5.9 5.4 0.5 0.815
Nonrespondent sample 6.3 7.5 -1.2 0.711
Arrested
Research sample 37.7 41.8 -4.1 0.192
Fielded sample 37.0 42.1 -5.1 0.143
Respondent sample 34.4 40.8 -6.4 0.133
Nonrespondent sample 44.9 44.2 0.7 0.912
Incarceratedb
Research sample 49.5 55.4 -5.9 * 0.064
Fielded sample 49.5 55.2 -5.8 0.107
Respondent sample 46.9 56.5 -9.6 ** 0.026
Nonrespondent sample 56.2 54.7 1.5 0.814
Sample size
Research sample (total = 977) 568 409
Fielded sample (total = 777) 451 326
Respondent sample (total  = 531) 316 215
Nonrespondent sample (total = 246) 135 111
Center for Employment Opportunities
Appendix Table A.3
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Two-Year Impacts for the Research, Fielded, Respondent, and Nonrespondent Samples
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New York State and 
data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of 
Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment 
characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance 
level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for 
the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the standard 
errors for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000 (presented in the order in which they appear on the table): 2.7,  2.9, and 
3.37.
bThis measure includes both prison and jail incarcerations.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Additional Impacts on Employment and Earnings 
 
 
 
Appendix B presents additional results showing CEO’s impacts on employment and earnings in 
the following tables: 
B.1 Comparison of the National Directory of New Hires Database and the 
New York State Department of Labor Employment Data 
B.2 Quarterly Impacts on Employment and Earnings  
B.3 Comparison of Unemployment Insurance Records and Survey-Reported 
Employment 
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 Appendix Table B.1
Comparison of the National Directory of New Hires Database and the New York State Department of Labor 
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference Sample Program Control Difference 
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) Size Group Group (Impact)
CEO transitional employment
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 58.7 2.1 56.6 *** 534 60.7 1.2 59.5
Quarter 2 37.0 1.4 35.6 *** 624 40.5 1.0 39.6
Quarter 3 12.1 0.0 12.1 *** 788 13.1 0.0 13.1
Quarter 4 6.4 0.5 5.9 *** 973 6.4 0.5 5.9
Quarter 5 2.8 0.5 2.3 *** 973 3.7 0.5 3.2
Quarter 6 1.6 0.0 1.6 ** 973 2.7 0.0 2.7
Quarter 7 2.7 0.7 1.9 ** 973 2.7 0.7 1.9
Quarter 8 2.5 0.0 2.5 *** 973 2.7 0.2 2.4
Unsubsidized employment
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 20.5 27.8 -7.3 ** 534 21.4 28.6 -7.2
Quarter 2 32.4 34.2 -1.8 624 32.7 43.0 -10.3
Quarter 3 33.0 37.0 -4.1 788 38.1 43.5 -5.5
Quarter 4 32.1 35.0 -2.9 973 34.9 40.3 -5.5
Quarter 5 29.6 34.5 -4.9 973 31.0 39.9 -8.9
Quarter 6 30.5 32.8 -2.3 973 33.6 33.7 -0.1
Quarter 7 31.7 32.3 -0.5 973 34.3 33.7 0.6
Quarter 8 31.9 32.8 -0.8 973 32.6 36.2 -3.6
(continued)
Employment Data
Data Source
National Directory of New Hires  New York State DOLa
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Program Control Difference Sample Program Control Difference 
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) Size Group Group (Impact)
Total UI-covered employment
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 67.2 29.5 37.8 *** 534 67.8 25.9 41.9
Quarter 2 58.9 35.2 23.7 *** 624 58.8 35.2 23.6
Quarter 3 41.4 37.0 4.4 788 40.5 35.7 4.8
Quarter 4 35.5 35.5 0.0 973 34.5 34.0 0.5
Quarter 5 31.0 35.0 -3.9 973 29.9 31.5 -1.6
Quarter 6 31.4 32.8 -1.4 973 29.4 29.1 0.3
Quarter 7 33.7 32.8 0.9 973 31.2 30.1 1.1
Quarter 8 34.2 32.8 1.5 973 31.7 28.9 2.8
Sample size (total = 973)b 564 409 564 409
Data Source
National Directory of New Hires  New York State DOLa
Appendix Table B.1 (continued)
SOURCES: Aggregate counts by random assignment cohort and research group were provided by the New York State Department of Labor 
(DOL). Individual-level data were provided by the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH).
NOTES: Results in this table are unadjusted and unweighted means for both data sources. 
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the 
probability that one would be making an error in concluding that there is a difference between research groups for the variable in question.
aNew York State DOL provided MDRC with aggregate estimates of CEO transitional and unsubsidized employment. These estimates were 
compared with data from NDNH for a partial sample in Quarters 1 through 3 and for the full sample in all remaining quarters (shown above).
bFour sample members are missing Social Security numbers and could not be matched to UI data.
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Appendix Table B.2
Quarterly Impacts on Employment and Earnings
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea
Employment (%)
CEO transitional employment
 Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 62.7 1.6 61.1 *** 0.000
Quarter 2 43.1 2.1 41.1 *** 0.000
Quarter 3 14.0 0.3 13.7 *** 0.000
Quarter 4 5.7 0.5 5.2 *** 0.000
Quarter 5 2.3 0.5 1.8 ** 0.020
Quarter 6 1.3 0.0 1.4 ** 0.018
Quarter 7 2.2 0.8 1.5 * 0.076
Quarter 8 2.9 0.1 2.7 *** 0.001
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 69.8 3.8 66.0 *** 0.000
Unsubsidized employmentb 
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 19.0 28.3 -9.2 ** 0.011
Quarter 2 29.5 34.0 -4.5 0.236
Quarter 3 34.4 36.4 -2.0 0.557
Quarter 4 32.6 34.2 -1.6 0.602
Quarter 5 30.6 33.8 -3.1 0.293
Quarter 6 30.5 31.7 -1.3 0.673
Quarter 7 32.1 30.8 1.3 0.661
Quarter 8 32.5 32.3 0.2 0.952
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 59.6 62.8 -3.2 0.307
Total UI-covered employment
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 65.8 26.0 39.8 *** 0.000
Quarter 2 59.1 34.9 24.2 *** 0.000
Quarter 3 41.7 35.4 6.4 ** 0.045
Quarter 4 35.8 34.6 1.2 0.689
Quarter 5 32.0 34.2 -2.2 0.468
Quarter 6 31.2 31.7 -0.5 0.867
Quarter 7 33.7 31.3 2.4 0.433
Quarter 8 35.2 32.4 2.8 0.357
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 85.2 69.3 16.0 *** 0.000
(continued)
  110 
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea
Earnings ($)
Earnings from CEO transitional job
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 371 6 364 *** 0.000
Quarter 2 374 13 361 *** 0.000
Quarter 3 107 6 101 *** 0.000
Quarter 4 37 4 32 *** 0.000
Quarter 5 21 2 18 ** 0.022
Quarter 6 11 1 11 0.287
Quarter 7 12 5 6 0.344
Quarter 8 17 1 16 *** 0.008
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8)d 949 39 910 NA --
Unsubsidized earnings
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) -- -- -- -- --
Quarter 2 -- -- -- -- --
Quarter 3 -- -- -- -- --
Quarter 4 1,143 1,174 -31 0.873
Quarter 5 1,227 1,174 53 0.783
Quarter 6 1,261 1,089 173 0.336
Quarter 7 1,330 1,209 122 0.588
Quarter 8 1,287 1,189 98 0.615
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) -- -- -- -- --
Total earnings from UI-covered employment
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) -- -- -- -- --
Quarter 2 -- -- -- -- --
Quarter 3 -- -- -- -- --
Quarter 4 1,180 1,178 2 0.994
Quarter 5 1,248 1,177 71 0.710
Quarter 6 1,272 1,089 183 0.307
Quarter 7 1,342 1,214 128 0.569
Quarter 8 1,304 1,190 114 0.558
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) -- -- -- -- --
Sample size (total = 973)c 564 409
(continued)
Appendix Table B.2 (continued)
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Appendix Table B.3
Comparison of Unemployment Insurance Records and Survey-Reported Employment
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Quarter of interview: survey employment/no UI employment 17.3 20.4 -3.1 0.384
Interviewed in prison or jail 12.5 14.4 -1.9 0.535
Currently working in prison or jail 6.2 8.3 -2.1 0.359
Current or most recent job is day labor, temporary, or odd job 14.4 10.8 3.6 0.227
Among those with survey employment/no UI employment
Currently working in prison or jail 37.5 39.6 -2.1 0.823
Current or most recent job is day labor, temporary, or odd job 8.8 10.8 -2.0 0.751
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
 
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New York State and the 
client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment 
characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance 
level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups 
for the corresponding variable.
  
 
  
 
 
 
Appendix C 
Glossary of Recidivism Outcomes and 
Additional Impacts on Recidivism 
 
 
 
Appendix C presents a Glossary of Recidivism Outcomes as well as additional impacts on 
recidivism in the following tables: 
C.1 Additional Two-Year Impacts on Recidivism  
C.2 Impacts on Recidivism in Year 1 
C.3 Impacts on Recidivism in Year 2 
C.4 Quarterly Impacts on Arrests and Incarceration 
C.5 Quarterly Impacts on Incarceration and Employment 
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Glossary of Recidivism Outcomes 
Arrests 
Sealed/unsealed arrest data: New York State’s Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) 
provided both types of arrest information. In general, unsealed arrests include those that 
end in conviction (about half of all arrests) or those still awaiting disposition. Arrests may 
become sealed arrests –– removed from a person’s public record –– for a number of 
reasons, including: events that are favorably disposed (that is, do not end in a conviction), 
some lower-level misdemeanor convictions, and some events where “youthful offender 
status” was granted. Thus, following adjudication, an arrest may be removed from a 
person’s unsealed record. 
The sealed arrest information from DCJS was provided without personal 
identifiers, so it can be analyzed only in a limited way in this report. In Chapter 5, the ar-
rests discussed are unsealed at the time of the data collection. In Appendix Table C.2, the 
first two arrest outcomes (arrest rate and number of arrests) include all arrests in an indi-
vidual’s record, both sealed and unsealed. 
Months between random assignment and first arrest: For individuals with an unsealed arrest 
in the follow-up period, this measure calculates the number of months between the random 
assignment date and the first arrest date. 
Convictions 
Convictions: Equal to 1 if a person had a conviction with a disposition date after random 
assignment. The disposition date is the date of a sentence for conviction. 
Convicted of a felony or misdemeanor: Conviction class is based on information provided by 
DCJS for a court dispositon. Conviction classes include felony, misdemeanor, violation, 
and infraction.  
Convicted of a violent crime: In Chapter 1, Table 1.2 (“Criminal History at the Time of 
Random Assignment, by Research Group”), categorization as a violent crime is based on a 
violent crime indicator in an individual’s DCJS record. Recidivisim outcomes shown in 
Chapter 5 and the appendix tables categorize violent crime based on the 1994 Bureau of 
Justice Statistics Special Report (Langan and Levin, 2002) and on the Uniform Crime 
Reporting (UCR) conviction codes in the DCJS record. In the present report, violent crime 
may be either a felony-level or a misdemeanor-level conviction. 
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Incarceration 
Incarceration in state prison: Equal to 1 if a person was incarcerated for at least one day in a 
state prison facility during the specified period. 
Admitted to state prison: Equal to 1 if a person was admitted to prison in the given year of 
follow-up. For Year 2, this measure does not include a person’s continued incarceration in 
prison from the previous year.  
Jail incarceration: Equal to 1 if a person was incarcerated for at least one day on Rikers Island, 
New York City’s large jail facility. Admission status for Rikers incarceration fell into one 
of three categories: city sentence, detainee, or technical parole violation. This measure 
includes jail stays before and after adjudication.  
Incarcerated for a new crime: Equal to 1 if a person was admitted to prison or jail with a new 
sentence. A return to jail or prison for a parole violation associated with a previous arrest or 
conviction in the follow-up period is not a new incarceration.  
Incarceration as a detainee (Rikers Island only): An individual was given a 1 on this 
measure if the admission status to Rikers was classified as “detainee.” These incarceration 
spells most frequently ended with a transfer to state prison, but individuals in the detainee 
category were incarcerated for a variety of reasons both before and after adjudication. 
Individuals incarcerated as detainees were released for the following reasons: transferred to 
prison, in custody of the New York Police Department, transferred to a mental hospital, 
paid bail, expired city sentence, dismissed case, and released on own recognizance. 
Parole 
Absconded/revoked from parole: Equal to 1 if a person has a parole record with a discharge 
date after random assignment and the discharge reason associated with that date is 
“absconded” or “revoked.” Note, that a person can be revoked from parole only after being 
found. Someone who absconded and was not found during the follow-up period remained 
listed as absconded. 
Other 
Recidivism composite measure: An individual was given a 1 on this measure if (1) arrested, 
(2) convicted, or (3) incarcerated at any time during the follow-up period. This measure is 
not a cumulative score of recidivism. An individual could have had a 1 on any of the three 
outcomes, on two of the three outcomes, or on all three of them.  
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Appendix Table C.1
Additional Two-Year Impacts on Recidivism
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Additional arrest measures
Arrested (sealed and unsealed)a,b (%) 53.2 58.4 -5.1 0.106
Average number of arrests (sealed and unsealed)b 1.1 1.2 -0.2 0.132
Number of months between
random assignment and first arrest (%)
Never arrested 47.0 42.7 4.3 0.176
3 months or less 1.5 2.0 -0.5 0.600
4-6 months 2.4 1.8 0.6 0.561
7-12 months 5.8 4.7 1.0 0.499
13-18 months 7.4 6.1 1.3 0.435
19-24 months 5.8 9.0 -3.2 * 0.061
Months until first unsealed arrest, conviction,
or incarcerationc 9.3 10.2 -0.9 0.164
Incarceration in state prison (%)
Incarcerated in state prisond 25.3 27.7 -2.4 0.399
Incarcerated for a new crime 4.2 6.8 -2.6 * 0.077
Incarcerated for a technical parole violation 17.4 15.5 1.9 0.428
Incarcerated for all other/unknown reasonse 4.4 5.7 -1.3 0.352
Incarceration in jail (%)
Incarcerated in jail 49.1 53.5 -4.4 0.168
Incarcerated for a new crime 10.1 10.8 -0.7 0.718
Incarcerated for a technical parole violation 29.1 25.6 3.5 0.234
Incarcerated as a "detainee" 29.4 33.9 -4.5 0.127
Parole outcome (%)
Absconded/revoked from parole 31.4 31.5 -0.1 0.984
Reason for convictionf,g (%)
Violent crime 4.4 5.8 -1.5 0.309
Drug crime 15.6 19.9 -4.3 * 0.079
Property crime 14.9 18.3 -3.4 0.159
Public order crime 3.4 2.9 0.5 0.674
Other 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.871
Sample size (total = 977) 568 409
(continued)
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Appendix Table C.1 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 
(DCJS) and the New York City Department of Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between 
research groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, 
only the most serious charge is recorded in the analysis.
bThis measure includes both sealed and unsealed arrest events. Data on sealed events were provided to 
MDRC in a format that did not allow for the identification of individuals.
cA total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random 
assignment. These convictions are counted in the analysis as occurring after random assignment. The total 
includes convictions for "other" reasons, felonies, and misdemeanor crimes.
dDue to multiple incarcerations, subcategories are not mutually exclusive and may sum to a total greater 
than the "Incarcerated" measure.
eAll other incarcerations, including those for technical violations while not on parole and for other 
unknown/unspecified reasons.
fCategories of conviction charges are based on definitions from Langan and Levin (2002). See Appendix C 
for charges defined as violent.
gCategories may sum to more than the percentage convicted because a person may be convicted of more 
then one crime during the follow-up period.
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Arresteda (%) 21.7 22.9 -1.3 0.638
Convicted of a crimeb (%) 15.5 17.3 -1.8 0.460
Convicted of a felony 1.4 3.1 -1.7 * 0.071
Convicted of a misdemeanor 11.8 12.1 -0.3 0.897
Convicted of a violent crimec (%) 1.9 1.4 0.5 0.542
Incarceratedd (%) 35.0 39.8 -4.9 0.120
Prison 11.0 14.0 -3.0 0.166
Jail 34.8 39.7 -4.8 0.120
Incarcerated for a new crime (%) 7.0 8.2 -1.2 0.474
Prison 0.8 3.0 -2.2 ** 0.012
Jail 6.2 5.2 1.0 0.522
Incarcerated for a technical parole violatione (%) 19.9 22.1 -2.1 0.420
Prison 8.0 9.5 -1.5 0.412
Jail 18.6 20.3 -1.7 0.516
Total days incarcerated 37 38 -1 0.801
Prison 12 13 -1 0.583
Jail 25 25 0 0.941
Arrested, convicted, or incarcerated (%) 39.3 45.5 -6.2 * 0.053
Sample size (total = 977) 568 409
(continued)
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Appendix Table C.2
Impacts on Recidivism in Year 1
Center for Employment Opportunities
               
                
             
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice 
Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists 
between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the 
same date, only the most serious charge is recorded in the analysis.
bA total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random 
assignment. These convictions are counted in the analysis as occurring after random assignment. The 
total includes convictions for "other" reasons, felonies, and misdemeanor crimes.
cViolent crimes are based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin (2002). See 
Appendix C for charges defined as violent.
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Appendix Table C.2 (continued)
dIncludes all reasons for incarceration, such as sentences for new crimes, technical violations of parole, 
detainee (jail), and other reasons. Therefore incarcerations for new crimes and parole violations do not sum 
to percentage incarcerated. See Appendix Table C.1 for more details about reasons for incarceration.
eIncarceration status based on Quarter 8 after random assignment. Incarceration includes both prison and 
jail. 
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Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Arresteda (%) 22.8 27.5 -4.6 * 0.098
Convicted of a crimeb (%) 20.2 26.3 -6.1 ** 0.025
Convicted of a felony 5.2 4.5 0.7 0.630
Convicted of a misdemeanor 14.5 21.5 -7.1 *** 0.004
Convicted of a violent crimec (%) 2.5 4.5 -1.9 0.106
Admitted to prison or jaild (%) 29.9 33.0 -3.2 0.292
Prison 16.7 17.5 -0.8 0.733
Jail 29.6 31.2 -1.6 0.591
Incarcerated for a new crime (%) 8.4 10.8 -2.3 0.228
Prison 3.4 3.8 -0.4 0.742
Jail 5.2 7.0 -1.8 0.251
Incarcerated for a parole technical violation (%) 18.7 15.4 3.2 0.192
Prison 11.2 9.5 1.7 0.395
Jail 14.9 10.4 4.5 ** 0.042
Total days incarcerated 62.9 68.6 -5.7 0.424
Prison 33.8 40.5 -6.7 0.228
Jail 29.1 28.1 1.0 0.801
Arrested, convicted, or incarcerated (%) 47.1 51.8 -4.7 0.146
Sample size (total = 977) 568 409
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Appendix Table C.3
 Impacts on Recidivism in Year 2
Center for Employment Opportunities
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 
(DCJS) and the New York City Department of Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between 
research groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, 
only the most serious charge is recorded in the analysis.
bA total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random assignment. 
These convictions are counted in the analysis as occurring after random assignment. The total includes 
convictions for "other" reasons, felonies, and misdemeanor crimes. 
cViolent crimes are based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin (2002). See Appendix C for 
charges defined as violent. 
dIncludes all reasons for incarceration, such as sentences for new crimes, technical violations of parole, 
detainee (jail), and other reasons. Therefore incarcerations for new crimes and parole violations do not sum to 
percentage incarcerated. See Appendix Table C.1 for more details about reasons for incarceration. This measure 
only includes new admissions to prison or jail in Year 2.
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Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value
Arrested and not incarcerated
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.906
Quarter 2 1.0 1.6 -0.5 0.466
Quarter 3 1.8 1.8 0.0 0.959
Quarter 4 2.5 2.2 0.2 0.820
Quarter 5 2.6 2.4 0.3 0.808
Quarter 6 2.9 3.1 -0.3 0.820
Quarter 7 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.980
Quarter 8 2.7 3.7 -1.0 0.407
Arrested and incarcerated 
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 2.1 4.0 -1.8 0.109
Quarter 2 5.0 3.3 1.6 0.221
Quarter 3 5.2 4.8 0.4 0.776
Quarter 4 5.8 5.9 -0.1 0.950
Quarter 5 4.8 7.9 -3.0 ** 0.048
Quarter 6 4.5 5.1 -0.6 0.649
Quarter 7 5.6 6.3 -0.7 0.653
Quarter 8 4.3 6.3 -2.0 0.172
Not arrested and not incarcerated
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 78.7 78.8 -0.2 0.947
Quarter 2 82.5 83.5 -1.0 0.698
Quarter 3 76.7 74.4 2.3 0.407
Quarter 4 74.7 69.3 5.4 * 0.062
Quarter 5 70.5 68.1 2.5 0.408
Quarter 6 69.7 67.6 2.1 0.486
Quarter 7 71.4 69.6 1.7 0.552
Quarter 8 72.4 68.2 4.2 0.151
Not arrested and incarcerated
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 18.5 16.6 1.9 0.409
Quarter 2 11.5 11.6 -0.1 0.947
Quarter 3 16.2 19.0 -2.8 0.261
Quarter 4 17.0 22.5 -5.5 ** 0.033
Quarter 5 22.0 21.7 0.3 0.905
Quarter 6 23.0 24.2 -1.2 0.664
Quarter 7 20.3 21.4 -1.1 0.683
Quarter 8 20.6 21.9 -1.3 0.624
Sample size (total = 977) 568 409
(continued)
Center for Employment Opportunities
Quarterly Impacts on Arrests and Incarceration
Appendix Table C.4
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Appendix Table C.4 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from New York State unemployment insurance (UI) 
wage records and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-
random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. 
The significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a 
difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
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Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea
Employed and not incarcerated
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 54.0 22.4 31.6 *** 0.000
Quarter 2 54.6 32.2 22.4 *** 0.000
Quarter 3 38.8 32.7 6.1 * 0.051
Quarter 4 33.2 29.0 4.2 0.158
Quarter 5 27.5 27.4 0.1 0.978
Quarter 6 27.6 25.1 2.5 0.382
Quarter 7 29.0 24.3 4.7 * 0.097
Quarter 8 29.3 26.9 2.4 0.404
Employed and incarcerated
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 11.8 3.6 8.2 *** 0.000
Quarter 2 4.4 2.7 1.7 0.169
Quarter 3 3.2 2.8 0.4 0.696
Quarter 4 1.6 4.4 -2.8 *** 0.010
Quarter 5 3.4 2.9 0.5 0.661
Quarter 6 1.8 2.7 -0.9 0.335
Quarter 7 2.6 3.5 -0.9 0.403
Quarter 8 3.5 1.9 1.6 0.135
Not employed and not incarcerated
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 24.2 56.5 -32.3 *** 0.000
Quarter 2 29.1 53.2 -24.1 *** 0.000
Quarter 3 40.1 44.4 -4.3 0.184
Quarter 4 44.1 44.0 0.2 0.953
Quarter 5 45.6 44.4 1.1 0.730
Quarter 6 45.1 46.7 -1.6 0.617
Quarter 7 44.9 49.1 -4.2 0.200
Quarter 8 45.9 46.3 -0.4 0.911
Not employed and incarcerated
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 10.0 17.5 -7.5 *** 0.000
Quarter 2 11.8 11.9 0.0 0.984
Quarter 3 17.9 20.2 -2.3 0.375
Quarter 4 21.0 22.6 -1.6 0.541
Quarter 5 23.5 25.2 -1.7 0.542
Quarter 6 25.5 25.5 0.0 0.990
Quarter 7 23.5 23.1 0.4 0.887
Quarter 8 21.4 25.0 -3.7 0.177
Sample size (total = 974)b 565 409
(continued)
Center for Employment Opportunities
Quarterly Impacts on Incarceration and Employment
Appendix Table C.5
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Appendix Table C.5 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from New York State unemployment insurance (UI) 
wage records and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-
random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists 
between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are 
the standard errors for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000 (presented in the order in which they 
appear on the table): 3.0, 3.1, 1.8, 2.8, 3.1, and  2.1.
bA total of  three people were excluded from the sample because they were missing a Social 
Security number.
  
 
  
 
 
 
Appendix D 
Impacts on Housing, Income, Health, and  
Family Outcomes  
 
 
 
Appendix D shows the impacts that CEO had on the following outcomes. 
D.1 Impacts on Housing and Mobility 
D.2 Impacts on Income and Financial Assistance  
D.3 Impacts on Health Insurance Coverage and Health 
D.4 Impacts on Participation in Substance Abuse Treatment 
D.5 Impacts on Child Custody and Child Support 
D.6 Impacts on Child Contact and Relationships 
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Appendix Table D.1
Impacts on Housing and Mobility
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control 
Outcome (%) Group Group Impact P-Value
Current housing status
Currently living in:
Own place 20.4 24.8 -4.4 0.220
Someone else's place 70.4 61.0 9.3 ** 0.021
Treatment facility/transitional housing/halfway house 3.2 5.5 -2.3 0.191
Homeless/other 4.2 4.8 -0.7 0.725
Currently in public housing 31.6 31.5 0.0 0.995
Currently living in subsidized housing (Section 8) 12.6 13.0 -0.4 0.892
Sample member lives alone 13.7 13.7 0.0 0.992
Sample member currently lives with:
Spouse/partner 34.9 30.5 4.4 0.300
Relative 59.6 67.0 -7.5 * 0.076
Nonrelative 9.1 5.0 4.1 * 0.080
Length in current home:a
Less than 2 months 8.3 8.8 -0.5 0.840
2 to 6 months 19.9 15.4 4.6 0.192
7 to 12 months 9.4 10.3 -0.9 0.740
More than 1 year 57.1 57.6 -0.5 0.919
Name is on lease/mortgage 13.3 15.2 -1.9 0.530
Contributes to cost of rent or mortgage 70.1 65.2 4.9 0.238
Mobility
Ever moved since random assignment 41.6 39.2 2.4 0.585
Number of residences:
1 55.1 57.4 -2.3 0.604
2 27.8 25.7 2.1 0.598
3 or more 13.8 13.5 0.3 0.918
Reason for last move (%)
Evicted/kicked out 6.0 3.5 2.6 0.175
Unable to pay rent 3.9 1.9 2.0 0.204
Found own place to live 6.6 6.7 -0.1 0.976
Moved in with family/friends 13.7 11.3 2.4 0.409
Other 12.7 14.4 -1.7 0.580
Sample size (total = 531)b 316 215
(continued)
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Appendix Table D.1 (continued)
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Subcategories may not sum to the total due to rounding and missing data
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists 
between research groups for the corresponding variable.
For those currently in jail/prison, all responses are based on the most recent housing status before 
incarceration.
aFourteen respondents replied "no answer" to this question, and one respondent refused to respond.
bThe total sample size ranges from 488 to 531 as a result of missing responses to various items.
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Appendix Table D.2
Impacts on Income and Financial Assistance
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control 
Outcome Group Group Impact P-Value
Individual income
Percentage of respondents with each income source 
Earnings 51.9 46.0 5.9 0.181
Child support 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.617
Public assistance
TANF 9.8 14.2 -4.4 0.115
Food stamps 29.0 26.6 2.5 0.521
SSI or disability 1.8 3.2 -1.4 0.290
Total individual income in prior month ($) 775 760 15 0.901
Other household members' income
Percentage with each income source
Earnings 47.8 42.7 5.1 0.251
Child support 3.3 3.2 0.1 0.952
Public assistance
TANF 6.7 10.6 -3.9 0.126
Food stamps 13.8 23.5 -9.7 *** 0.005
SSI or disability 13.0 15.4 -2.4 0.426
Total household income in prior month ($) 1,756 1,550 206 0.547
Percentage of household income that is respondent's 56.6 63.3 -6.7 0.329
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists 
between research groups for the corresponding variable.
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Program Control 
Outcome Group Group Impact P-Value
Health insurance coverage (%)
Respondent has health insurance
Publicly funded 48.3 54.1 -5.8 0.188
Publicly funded and not on TANF or SSI 37.6 37.6 -0.1 0.986
Privately funded 6.9 3.1 3.8 * 0.061
Spouse has health insurance 37.3 36.0 1.3 0.759
Medical hardship (%)
Unable to go to a doctor or hospital due to lack of
money or health insurance 17.0 16.5 0.5 0.881
Unable to go see a dentist due to lack of money
or health insurance 14.8 19.6 -4.9 0.127
Went to emergency room 22.8 22.4 0.5 0.899
Health
Average Body Mass Index (BMI)a
Underweight 0.0 1.2 -1.2 ** 0.045
Normal weight 27.1 36.7 -9.6 ** 0.019
Overweight 41.4 40.3 1.1 0.796
Obese 30.5 21.4 9.1 ** 0.019
Self-rated health (%)
Excellent health 27.1 26.3 0.7 0.850
Very good 31.5 26.6 4.9 0.227
Good health 22.1 27.1 -5.0 0.192
Fair health 15.7 15.6 0.2 0.961
Poor health 1.8 3.5 -1.7 0.198
Psychological Distress Scaleb 6.6 6.7 -0.1 0.778
Experienced serious psychological 
distress in the past monthc (%) 17.3 19.2 -1.9 0.556
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
(continued)
Impacts on Health Insurance Coverage and Health
Appendix Table D.3
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Appendix Table D.4
Impacts on Participation in Substance Abuse Treatment 
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control 
Outcome (%) Group Group Impact P-Value
Received substance abuse treatment or attended
self-help groups 53.1 55.9 -2.8 0.516
In substance abuse treatment since random assignment 51.9 51.7 0.1 0.974
Emergency room visit for drug or alcohol treatment 5.8 6.9 -1.1 0.632
Hospital stay for detoxification 8.2 9.3 -1.1 0.667
Outpatient treatment 37.9 42.9 -5.0 0.239
Medicinal interventions including methadone 5.5 6.8 -1.4 0.526
Residential treatment 14.1 17.1 -2.9 0.350
Other treatment 23.8 15.2 8.7 ** 0.015
Attended self-help groupsa 16.5 21.7 -5.2 0.124
Mandated to drug treatment by parole officer 40.7 43.2 -2.5 0.567
Currently in drug treatment or attending self-help groups 21.8 18.8 2.9 0.407
Currently in self-help 8.9 9.5 -0.6 0.802
Currently in drug treatment 18.2 13.4 4.8 0.148
Sample size (total = 531) 316 215
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists 
between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aIncludes Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) groups.
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Program Control 
Outcome Group Group Impact P-Value
Respondent has any children (%) 45.3 56.2 -10.9 ** 0.013
Has any children living apart (%) 71.6 65.0
Had difficulties getting custody (%) 4.9 8.4
Other parent not willing to give up custody (%) 3.1 3.1
Had difficulties making visitation arrangements (%) 6.8 7.1
Formal child support
Required to pay child support for any children (%) 11.3 11.0
Did child support court order change?
Yes (%) 2.7 2.1
State forgave or decreased child support debt (%) 1.9 0.5
Informal child support
Provided informal support to children in prior month (%) 8.4 7.3
Average amount of informal support in prior month($) 14 9
Types of informal support in prior month (%)
Cash 8.4 7.3
Food 6.4 3.4
Clothing 8.4 4.2
Something else 3.7 3.5
Sample size (total = 530) 315 215
Center for Employment Opportunities
Impacts on Child Custody and Child Support
Appendix Table D.5
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
SOURCE: MDRC calculations based on responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random 
assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The 
significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists 
between research groups for the corresponding variable.
All measures in italic type are calculated among those who were parents (total = 281) and are therefore 
considered nonexperimental and are not tested for statistical significance.
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Appendix Table D.6
Impacts on Child Contact and Relationships
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control 
Outcome (%) Group Group
In past month, had contact with any child 83.4 86.2
Relationship between respondent and child in past month
Hugged child and said that he loved child 73.6 73.2
Helped child with homework or school project 33.8 31.9
Attended child's school events 23.4 25.9
For parents that have at least one child living apart
Frequency of visits in past month
Daily 13.8 11.4
A couple times a week 11.4 9.8
Weekly 10.0 18.3
2-3 times in past month 9.6 2.3
Once in past month 2.4 0.9
Frequency of phone/mail contact with child in past month
Daily 16.7 10.1
A couple times a week 12.5 14.3
Weekly 8.5 4.8
2-3 times in past month 3.3 2.7
Once in past month -0.1 1.3
Ever baby-sat during the past month 21.2 10.6
Sample size (total = 530) 315 215
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from responses to the client survey.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted 
for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 
10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one would incorrectly 
conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding 
variable.
All child contact measures include those parents who were incarcerated.
All measures in italic type are calculated among those who were parents and are 
therefore considered nonexperimental and are not tested for statistical significance.
  
 
  
 
 
 
Appendix E 
Additional Subgroup Impacts: 
Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment; 
Age; and Educational Attainment 
 
Appendix E shows the impacts that CEO had on various subgroups, as defined by the titles of 
the following tables. 
E.1 Quarterly Impacts on Employment, by Time Between Prison Release 
and Random Assignment 
E.2 Quarterly Impacts on Earnings, by Time Between Prison Release and 
Random Assignment  
E.3 Year 1 Impacts on Recidivism, by Time Between Prison Release and 
Random Assignment 
E.4 Year 2 Impacts on Recidivism, by Time Between Prison Release and 
Random Assignment 
E.5 Two-Year Impacts on Employment, by Age 
E.6 Two-Year Impacts on Recidivism, by Age 
E.7 Impacts on Employment, by Educational Attainment 
E.8 Two-Year Impacts on Recidivism, by Educational Attainment 
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Less Than 3 Months More Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea H-Starsb
CEO transitional employment
 Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 65.8 -0.7 66.6 *** 0.000 62.1 2.3 59.8 *** 0.000
Quarter 2 47.7 -0.4 48.1 *** 0.000 41.4 2.1 39.3 *** 0.000 *
Quarter 3 15.8 0.5 15.3 *** 0.000 12.9 0.2 12.7 *** 0.000
Quarter 4 5.8 0.0 5.8 *** 0.002 5.9 0.7 5.1 *** 0.001
Quarter 5 1.5 0.2 1.3 0.198 2.8 0.7 2.0 * 0.083
Quarter 6 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.360 1.7 -0.1 1.8 ** 0.029
Quarter 7 2.0 0.0 2.0 * 0.093 2.3 1.2 1.1 0.383
Quarter 8 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.373 4.5 0.2 4.3 *** 0.002 **
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 73.3 -0.6 74.0 *** 0.000 68.1 5.4 62.7 *** 0.000 **
Unsubsidized employmentc 
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) - - - - - - - -
Quarter 2 - - - - - - - -
Quarter 3 - - - - - - - -
Quarter 4 36.6 32.7 3.9 0.434 30.7 34.2 -3.5 0.389
Quarter 5 37.2 33.7 3.5 0.489 26.6 34.1 -7.5 * 0.055 *
Quarter 6 32.2 32.6 -0.4 0.936 29.8 31.6 -1.8 0.650
Quarter 7 37.1 29.4 7.7 0.122 28.7 31.4 -2.7 0.503
Quarter 8 37.8 31.0 6.8 0.163 30.1 32.6 -2.5 0.538
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 64.2 61.5 2.7 0.602 55.7 62.9 -7.2 * 0.079
(continued)
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Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
Center for Employment Opportunities
Quarterly Impacts on Employment, by Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
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Less Than 3 Months More Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea H-Starsb
Total UI-covered employment
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 69.9 25.9 44.0 *** 0.000 65.9 24.7 41.1 *** 0.000
Quarter 2 65.4 31.3 34.1 *** 0.000 57.0 35.4 21.6 *** 0.000 *
Quarter 3 48.2 34.6 13.6 *** 0.009 39.4 35.1 4.3 0.307
Quarter 4 39.6 32.7 7.0 0.168 34.5 34.7 -0.2 0.963
Quarter 5 37.5 33.7 3.8 0.447 28.5 34.8 -6.3 0.111
Quarter 6 32.5 32.6 -0.1 0.978 31.1 31.5 -0.5 0.905
Quarter 7 38.8 29.4 9.3 * 0.063 29.9 32.1 -2.2 0.592 *
Quarter 8 38.1 31.0 7.1 0.148 34.6 32.8 1.9 0.649
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 89.4 66.7 22.7 *** 0.000 83.8 69.4 14.3 *** 0.000
Sample size (total = 925)d 220 155 313 237
Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
Appendix Table E.1 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) database and unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New 
York State and payroll data from CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and Learning (NIGEL) database. 
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the standard errors for all impacts with a p-value of 
0.000 (presented in the order in which they appear on the table beginning with the 'Less than 3 Months' group):4.0887, 4.1722, 3.0841, 3.7945, 4.8697, 
5.0911, 4.1909, 3.2232, 3.2419, 2.1439, 3.282,  3.8544, 4.1601, and  3.5286.
bWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts between 
the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
tests are interpreted.
cUnsubsidized employment is estimated from NDNH data that are incomplete for Quarters 1 to 3. A comparison of aggregate estimates provided for the 
full sample from the U.S. Department of Labor indicates that the results from NDNH are representative of the full sample.
dForty-eight sample members are missing a release date, and four sample members are missing a Social Security number; they therefore could not be 
matched to UI data.
  
141 
Less Than 3 Months More Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome ($) Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea H-Starsb
Earnings
CEO transitional job earnings
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) 385 -10 395 *** 0.000 378 11 368 *** 0.000
Quarter 2 422 13 409 *** 0.000 348 12 336 *** 0.000
Quarter 3 115 15 100 *** 0.001 102 3 99 *** 0.000
Quarter 4 42 1 42 *** 0.005 37 6 31 ** 0.012
Quarter 5 7 0 7 0.192 29 4 25 * 0.055
Quarter 6 18 0 18 0.465 9 -1 10 * 0.056
Quarter 7 16 -1 17 0.206 10 8 2 0.816
Quarter 8 4 -1 5 0.374 24 1 23 ** 0.011 *
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) - - - - - - - -
Unsubsidized earnings
Quarter 1 (quarter of random assignment) - - - - - - - -
Quarter 2 - - - - - - - -
Quarter 3 - - - - - - - -
Quarter 4 1,437 1,355 82 0.794 1,043 1,005 39 0.879
Quarter 5 1,534 1,500 33 0.912 1,126 916 209 0.426
Quarter 6 1,566 1,267 299 0.329 1,153 896 257 0.262
Quarter 7 1,676 1,550 126 0.780 1,189 917 272 0.246
Quarter 8 1,501 1,386 114 0.693 1,260 988 272 0.310
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) - - - - - - - -
Sample size (total = 925)c 220 155 313 237
(continued)
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Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
Center for Employment Opportunities
Quarterly Impacts on Earnings, by Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
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Appendix Table E.2 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations based on unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New York State provided by the National Database of New Hires 
(NDNH) and payroll data from CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and Learning (NIGEL) database.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the standard errors for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000 
(presented in the order in which they appear on the table beginning with the "Less Than 3 Months" group): 36.6834, 48.8841, 28.951, 31.8575, and 20.6718. 
bWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts between 
the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
are interpreted.
cForty-nine sample members are missing a release date, and four sample members are missing a Social Security number; they therefore could not be 
matched to UI data.
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Appendix Table E.3
Year 1 Impacts on Recidivism, by Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
Center for Employment Opportunities
Less Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Value H-Starsf
Arresteda (%) 20.8 24.2 -3.4 0.429 24.0 22.1 1.9 0.612
Convicted of a crimeb (%) 12.6 18.4 -5.7 0.124 18.1 17.3 0.7 0.828
Convicted of a felony 1.4 4.8 -3.4 * 0.051 1.3 2.3 -1.1 0.366
Convicted of a misdemeanor 9.5 11.9 -2.4 0.461 14.2 12.5 1.7 0.578
Convicted of a violent crimec (%) 2.5 1.3 1.2 0.432 1.6 1.5 0.1 0.937
Incarcerated (%) 32.5 42.2 -9.8 * 0.053 36.6 39.4 -2.9 0.496
Prison 9.4 19.5 -10.1 *** 0.005 12.8 11.6 1.3 0.658 **
Jail 32.0 42.3 -10.3 ** 0.041 36.6 39.1 -2.5 0.552
Incarcerated for a new crimed (%) 7.4 10.9 -3.5 0.240 7.6 6.7 0.9 0.704
Prison 0.5 4.9 -4.4 *** 0.005 1.1 2.1 -1.0 0.365 *
Jail 6.9 6.0 0.9 0.734 6.5 4.6 1.9 0.353
Incarcerated for a technical parole violation (%) 17.1 22.0 -4.9 0.255 20.8 23.8 -3.1 0.393
Prison 7.2 12.1 -4.9 0.119 9.1 8.6 0.5 0.840
Jail 15.3 20.6 -5.3 0.204 19.7 21.7 -1.9 0.577
Total days incarcerated 39 54 -15 * 0.077 36 29 7 0.217 **
Prison 10 20 -10 ** 0.036 14 9 4 0.184 **
Jail 28 34 -5 0.390 23 20 3 0.484
Arrested, convicted, or incarcerated (%) 34.6 46.7 -12.2 ** 0.018 42.6 45.8 -3.3 0.454
Sample size (total = 929)e 225 160 311 233
(continued)
More Than 3 Months
Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
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Appendix Table E.3 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of 
Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, only one the most serious charge is recorded in 
the analysis.
bA total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random assignment. These convictions are counted in the 
analysis as occurring after random assignment. The total includes convictions for "other" reasons, felonies, and misdemeanor crimes. 
cViolent crimes are based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin (2002).  See Appendix C for charges defined as violent.
dIncludes all reasons for incarceration, such as sentences for new crimes, technical violations of parole, detainee (jail), and other reasons. Therefore, 
incarcerations for new crimes and parole violations do not sum to percentage incarcerated. See Appendix Table C.1 for more details about reasons for 
incarceration.
eA total of 48 sample members are missing the last prison release date and are therefore missing from all outcomes in this table.
fWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts between 
the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
are interpreted. 
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Appendix Table E.4
Year 2 Impacts on Recidivism, by Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
Center for Employment Opportunities
Less Than 3 Months
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Value H-Starsf
Arresteda (%) 25.8 33.7 -7.8 0.109 20.0 24.5 -4.5 0.222
Convicted of a crimeb (%) 23.1 29.6 -6.5 0.170 18.5 25.0 -6.5 * 0.072
Convicted of a felony 11.3 4.2 7.1 ** 0.020 1.6 4.5 -2.9 ** 0.048 ***
Convicted of a misdemeanor 13.2 25.5 -12.3 *** 0.003 16.3 19.9 -3.7 0.280
Convicted of a violent crimec (%) 1.7 7.0 -5.3 ** 0.015 3.0 2.9 0.1 0.951 **
Admitted to prison or jaild (%) 33.4 37.7 -4.3 0.399 28.2 29.9 -1.7 0.660
Prison 21.1 19.0 2.2 0.616 15.8 16.4 -0.6 0.846
Jail 32.9 37.5 -4.6 0.367 27.7 27.1 0.6 0.870
Incarcerated for a new crime (%) 11.3 10.6 0.7 0.845 7.6 10.7 -3.1 0.216
Prison 6.6 3.2 3.4 0.164 1.4 4.2 -2.8 * 0.051 **
Jail 4.6 7.4 -2.7 0.282 6.4 6.5 -0.1 0.954
Incarcerated for a technical parole violation (%) 19.8 18.7 1.1 0.790 18.9 13.2 5.7 * 0.077
Prison 12.7 11.3 1.5 0.681 11.7 7.8 3.9 0.124
Jail 15.1 13.5 1.6 0.671 15.3 8.2 7.2 ** 0.013
Total days incarcerated 80 92 -12 0.356 57 54 2 0.777
Prison 41 56 -15 0.132 33 31 2 0.793
Jail 39 36 3 0.681 24 23 1 0.879
Arrested, convicted, or incarcerated (%) 50.3 58.8 -8.5 * 0.099 45.9 49.2 -3.2 0.458
Sample size (total = 929)e 225 160 311 233
(continued)
More Than 3 Months
Length of Time Between Prison Release and Random Assignment
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Appendix Table E.4 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of 
Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, only one the most serious charge is recorded in 
the analysis.
bA total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random assignment. These convictions are counted in the 
analysis as occurring after random assignment. The total includes convictions for "other" reasons, felonies, and misdemeanor crimes. 
cViolent crimes are based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin (2002). See Appendix C for charges defined as violent.
dIncludes all reasons for incarceration, such as sentences for new crimes, technical violations of parole, detainee (jail), and other reasons. Therefore, 
incarcerations for new crimes and parole violations do not sum to percentage incarcerated. See Appendix Table C.1 for more details about reasons for 
incarceration.
eA total of 48 sample members are missing the last prison release date and are therefore missing from all outcomes in this table.
fWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts between 
the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
are interpreted. 
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Appendix Table E.5
Two-Year Impacts on Employment, by Age
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea H-Starsb
CEO transitional employment
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) 63.9 2.8 61.1 *** 0.000 73.8 1.9 71.9 *** 0.000 **
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 6.1 2.2 3.8 * 0.069 6.5 0.8 5.7 *** 0.001
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 64.1 4.8 59.3 *** 0.000 74.0 2.4 71.6 *** 0.000 **
Total UI covered employment
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) 80.3 59.5 20.8 *** 0.000 82.6 55.6 27.1 *** 0.000
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 47.1 53.2 -6.0 0.237 54.3 47.5 6.9 0.103 *
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 82.8 71.9 10.9 *** 0.008 87.4 67.1 20.3 *** 0.000 *
Sample size (total = 972)c 227 167 336 242
Age at Baseline
Age 30 or OlderAge 29 or Younger
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) database and unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from 
New York State and payroll data from CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and Learning (NIGEL) database.
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that 
one would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the standard errors for all impacts with a  p-
value of 0.000 (presented in the order in which they appear on the table beginning with the "Age 29 or Younger" group): 3.9295, 4.0419, 4.4634, 
2.9884, 3.0148, 3.7557, and 3.4211.
bWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts 
between the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) tests are interpreted. 
cFive sample members are missing an age and therefore could not be included in the analysis.
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Appendix Table E.6
Two-Year Impacts on Recidivism, by Age
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Value H-Starsf
Arresteda (%) 35.6 36.5 -0.9 0.853 39.7 45.2 -5.5 0.186
Convicted of a crimeb (%) 28.2 31.4 -3.2 0.494 32.8 42.5 -9.7 ** 0.017
Convicted of a felony 9.2 7.5 1.7 0.565 5.2 7.4 -2.2 0.306
Convicted of a misdemeanor 17.6 22.9 -5.3 0.196 27.0 33.3 -6.3 0.107
Convicted of a violent crimec (%) 5.7 4.4 1.3 0.559 3.4 6.9 -3.5 * 0.067
Incarceratedd (%) 46.6 55.4 -8.8 * 0.078 52.6 55.0 -2.4 0.566
Prison 22.3 30.3 -8.0 * 0.073 27.9 25.4 2.5 0.511 *
Jail 46.2 52.3 -6.2 0.216 52.4 53.7 -1.3 0.758
Incarcerated for a new crime (%) 10.2 15.6 -5.4 0.114 16.9 16.6 0.4 0.907
Prison 4.5 7.3 -2.7 0.241 4.2 5.9 -1.7 0.374
Jail 5.7 8.4 -2.7 0.312 13.4 11.9 1.5 0.605
Incarcerated for a technical parole violation (%) 28.2 31.4 -3.2 0.491 34.5 27.3 7.3 * 0.065 *
Prison 11.0 12.8 -1.8 0.587 22.3 17.1 5.2 0.135
Jail 24.1 26.8 -2.7 0.535 32.8 24.9 8.0 ** 0.040 *
Total days incarcerated 103 109 -6 0.711 100 104 -4 0.749
Prison 49 61 -12 0.311 44 48 -3 0.714
Jail 54 48 6 0.510 55 56 -1 0.900
Arrested, convicted, or incarcerated (%) 55.0 62.1 -7.0 0.165 57.4 62.5 -5.1 0.206
Sample size (total = 976)e 230 167 337 242
(continued)
Age 29 or Younger Age 30 or Older
Age at Baseline
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Appendix Table E.6 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of 
Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, only the most serious charge is recorded in the 
analysis.
bA total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random assignment. The total includes convictions for "other" 
reasons, felonies, and misdemeanor crimes.
cViolent crimes as based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin (2002).  See Appendix C for charges defined as violent.
dIncludes all reasons for incarceration, such as sentences for new crimes, technical violations of parole, detainee (jail), and other reasons. Therefore, 
incarcerations for new crimes and parole violations do not sum to percentage incarcerated. See Appendix Table C.1 for more details about reasons for 
incarceration.
eFive sample members are missing an age and therefore could not be included in the analysis.
fWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts between 
the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
are interpreted.
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Appendix Table E.7
Impacts on Employment, by Educational Attainment
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Outcome (%) Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Valuea H-Starsb
CEO transitional employment
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) 71.6 4.4 67.2 *** 0.000 65.9 0.8 65.1 *** 0.000
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 4.8 1.2 3.7 ** 0.021 7.6 2.3 5.3 ** 0.027
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 71.6 4.8 66.8 *** 0.000 66.4 3.0 63.3 *** 0.000
Total UI covered employment
Year 1 (Q1-Q4) 85.5 60.8 24.7 *** 0.000 75.9 55.6 20.3 *** 0.000
Year 2 (Q5-Q8) 58.2 52.4 5.8 0.196 44.8 49.0 -4.2 0.411
Years 1-2 (Q1-Q8) 89.7 73.4 16.3 *** 0.000 79.1 66.5 12.6 *** 0.007
Sample size (total = 889)c 292 221 221 155
Does Not Have High School DiplomaHas High School Diploma
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) database and unemployment insurance (UI) wage records from New 
York State and payroll data from CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and Learning (NIGEL) database. 
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aStandard errors are presented in this report for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000. Following are the standard errors for all impacts with a p-value of 0.000 
(presented in the order in which they appear on the table beginning with the "Has High School Diploma" group):3.3375, 3.3627, 3.7328, 2.7505, 3.7221,  
3.8887, and 2.9728.
bWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts between 
the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
are interpreted.
cEighty-four sample members are missing data for educational attainment, and four sample members are missing a Social Security number; they therefore 
could not be matched to UI data.
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Appendix Table E.8
Two-Year Impacts on Recidivism, by Educational Attainment
Center for Employment Opportunities
Program Control Difference Program Control Difference
Group Group (Impact) P-Value Group Group (Impact) P-Value H-Starsf
Arresteda (%) 33.9 42.0 -8.1 0.108 39.0 39.7 -0.7 0.873
Convicted of a crimeb (%) 29.0 38.0 -9.0 * 0.069 31.0 36.2 -5.2 0.209
Convicted of a felony 4.6 8.9 -4.3 * 0.093 7.7 6.6 1.1 0.643
Convicted of a misdemeanor 21.0 29.6 -8.5 * 0.059 23.2 27.8 -4.6 0.229
Convicted of a violent crimec (%) 4.8 6.0 -1.2 0.624 4.1 5.1 -1.1 0.586
Incarceratedd (%) 53.5 58.6 -5.1 0.316 44.8 51.1 -6.2 0.155
Prison 23.2 29.3 -6.1 0.188 26.3 26.2 0.0 0.991
Jail 52.9 56.5 -3.6 0.485 44.4 49.1 -4.6 0.290
Ever incarcerated for a new crime (%) 12.3 20.1 -7.9 ** 0.041 13.2 14.0 -0.9 0.778
Prison 2.7 8.9 -6.1 *** 0.010 4.7 5.6 -0.9 0.644 *
Jail 10.0 12.2 -2.2 0.501 8.9 9.2 -0.3 0.899
Incarcerated for a technical parole violation (%) 34.6 27.1 7.5 0.127 28.7 26.9 1.9 0.642
Prison 14.5 15.5 -1.0 0.789 19.3 15.1 4.2 0.205
Jail 32.3 22.6 9.7 ** 0.041 25.6 23.7 1.9 0.629
Total days incarcerated 94 113 -19 0.227 99 97 1 0.924
Prison 46 59 -12 0.277 43 49 -6 0.543
Jail 48 55 -7 0.418 55 48 7 0.396
Arrested, convicted, or incarcerated (%) 58.0 63.4 -5.4 0.291 52.8 59.5 -6.6 0.134
Sample size (total = 893)e 223 155 294 221
(continued)
Does Not Have High School Diploma Has High School Diploma
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Appendix Table E.8 (continued)
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using data from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and the New York City Department of 
Correction (DOC).
NOTES: Results in this table are weighted by week of random assignment and adjusted for pre-random assignment characteristics.
Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent. The significance level indicates the probability that one 
would incorrectly conclude that a difference exists between research groups for the corresponding variable.
aEach arrest date is counted only as a single event. If there are multiple crimes or charges on the same date, only the most serious charge is recorded in the 
analysis.
bA total of 23 convictions were found to be associated with an arrest that occurred prior to random assignment. These convictions are counted in the 
analysis as occurring after random assignment. The total includes convictions for "other" reasons, felonies, and misdemeanor crimes.
cViolent crimes are based on conviction charges defined by Langan and Levin (2002). See Appendix C for charges defined as violent.
dIncludes all reasons for incarceration, such as sentences for new crimes, technical violations of parole, detainee (jail), and other reasons. Therefore, 
incarcerations for new crimes and parole violations do not sum to percentage incarcerated. See Appendix Table C.1 for more details about reasons for 
incarceration.
eEighty-four sample members are missing educational attainment; they therefore could not be included in the analysis.
fWhen comparing impacts between two subgroups, an H-statistic is generated. The H-statistic is used to assess whether the difference in impacts between 
the subgroups is statistically significant. It is interpretable in much the same way as the T-statistic and the F-statistic from analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
are interpreted.
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Sensitivity Tests for the Estimated Net Cost of CEO 
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Gross Cost per Gross Cost per Net Cost 
Program Group Control Group per Program
Cost Component  Member ($) Member ($)  Group Member ($)
CEO services
Recruitment/intake 160 160 0
Expenses for transitional jobs
Transitional job wages 887 0 887
Transitional job fringe benefitsa 148 0 148
Field/site supervision 1,326 0 1,326
Expenses for other services
Job coaching/life skills 559 383 177
Job development 489 0 489
Bonding 5 0 5
Fatherhood component 258 0 258
Supportive services 70 0 70
MIS and payroll 362 0 362
Total CEO costs 4,263 543 3,720
Services obtained outside CEO
Expenses for transitional jobsb
Transitional job wage 0 433 -433
Transitional job fringe benefits 0 72 -72
Field/site supervision 0 464 -464
Expenses for other services
Employment/job search 158 322 -164
Adult Basic Education/GED 6 5 1
College courses 212 126 86
Vocational training 641 641 0
Total non-CEO costs 1,017 2,063 -1,046
Total CEO and non-CEO costs 5,280 2,605 2,674
The Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Demonstration
Appendix Table F.1
Sensitivity Analysis of Estimated Net Costs of CEO,
Center for Employment Opportunities
Assuming That 35 Percent of the Control Group Worked a Transitional Job 
SOURCES: MDRC calculations from CEO's financial expenditure reports for Fiscal Year 2005 and 
CEO's Network for Information Gathering Evaluation and Learning (NIGEL) database.
NOTES: 
aCEO incurs fringe benefit costs of 16.7 percent of day labor wages resulting from employer-paid 
payroll taxes.
bControl group costs represent transitional job participation reported by 35 percent of control 
group respondents on the client survey. The main analysis in Chapter 7, Table 7.2, assumes that 16.2 
percent of the control group worked in a transitional job.
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